The Transformation of Jake Arrieta

Let's take a break from the endless assault of spring training tweets and photos and talk about Jake Arrieta. Spoiler alert: Arrieta no longer pitches for the Orioles. In the summer of 2013, he was shipped to the Chicago Cubs along with Pedro Strop and some international bonus pool money in exchange for Scott Feldman and Steve Clevenger. As Joe noted at the time, it was "a classic trade in which a contender trades long-term assets to a non-contender for a short-term asset." And Feldman was perfectly serviceable and did help the Orioles, though they still missed out on a playoff spot.

Feldman signed with the Astros after the 2013 season and Clevenger has been mediocre in limited major league duty. Strop immediately turned things around in Chicago, and he's been very good in a season and a half. But the real prize in the deal turned out to be Arrieta, who had a career year in 2014 and is under team control through 2017.

Arrieta got a late start last season because of some shoulder inflammation, but when he was finally able to go in early May, he pitched very well. Out of all pitchers who threw at least 150 innings, Arrieta was 11th in fWAR (4.9), 10th in ERA (2.53), and second in FIP (2.26). He established career bests in innings pitched, strikeout rate, walk rate, home run rate, groundball percentage, and home run/fly ball ratio (and obviously in ERA, FIP, and WAR).

Combined with the decent but not nearly as good numbers Arrieta posted in 50-plus innings in 2013 after coming over to the Cubs, here are how his numbers stack up in Baltimore vs. Chicago:

Team	IP	ERA	FIP	K/9	BB/9	bWAR	fWAR
Orioles	358	5.46	4.72	7.0	4.0	0.3	2.7
Cubs	208.1	2.81	2.92	8.8	2.8	6.0	4.8

So, yes, Arrieta has been much, much better in Chicago than in Baltimore. So what has he done differently?

Arrieta has been more effective at keeping pitches low in the strike zone. Here's his zone profile while with the Orioles:

And here's his zone breakdown with the Cubs:

And while Arrieta's strikeouts are up and walks are down, he hasn't been pounding the zone more. He actually threw fewer pitches in the strike zone in 2014 (47%) than his career average (48.7%). But he has been getting more swings and misses, especially on low pitches. Arrieta hasn't needed to throw as many pitches in the zone because opposing batters are swinging more often at pitches outside the zone and making less contact. They also swung a bit more on pitches in the zone and still made less contact.

A big part of Arrieta's success has been a pitch addition. Here's his pitch usage breakdown while with the Orioles and Cubs:

With Orioles: 30% four-seam; 31% sinker; 16% slider; 15% curve; 8% change
With Cubs: 21% four-seam; 31% sinker; 26% slider; 17% curve; 5% change

Arrieta has traded four-seamers for more sliders -- or, more accurately, more cutters -- and it's been a devastating weapon for him. He's been much better at controlling his cutter and using it more in fastball counts.

It's known that Dan Duquette and Rick Peterson (the O's director of pitching development) are not huge fans of the cutter. They prefer that their young pitchers work on other secondary pitches, and they also believe that overuse of the pitch can cause a decrease in velocity. Baseball America covered the cutter and a possible decline in velocity in 2010, and Dan Haren talked about it last year. An interesting part of Haren's interview: ". . . the cutter 'absolutely' leads to velocity loss. (He just didn’t care because he was already losing velocity.)" (Read more on the O's and the cutter here and here. The O's are more extreme when it comes to worrying about the effects of the pitch, but there isn't a great data set to entirely prove that some of their concerns aren't justified.)

Arrieta has actually seen an uptick in velocity with the Cubs. His fastball velocity jumped about 1 mph. He's throwing his cutter about 3 mph harder than his slider in Baltimore. And even his curveball has seen a 2 mph bump. Cutters tend to be late-career pitch additions, so it is interesting to see Arrieta add the pitch in his late-20s and also still see an increase in his velocity across the board. Perhaps that won't continue. But for at least one season, Arrieta pitched better than he ever did in Baltimore -- by far.

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Plenty of factors have had a part in Arrieta's flourishing with the Cubs. He's been mostly healthy, he's pitching in the National League Central instead of the American League East, and he went to a team that embraced the use of the cutter and tweaked his mechanics enough to show him how to throw it properly. Arrieta also admitted that changing teams helped:

It can’t really be as simple as the change-of-scenery theory floated almost every time [Theo] Epstein’s front office acquires a new pitcher.

“It’s so hard to know,” Arrieta said. “It’s one of those things where I was at a point where one small thing needed to happen — and that happened to be it. I feel like I was in a situation where I was pretty much standing on the edge. Just wasn’t able to get over.”

Cubs general manager Jed Hoyer also had a smart comment about change of scenery in general:

“Sometimes, I think it’s probably as much as trying to impress in a new place. Sometimes, it’s probably as much as being able to feel like your new employer likes you maybe better than your old employer did. You’re excited to be in a fresh environment. . . . Things can get stale or get negative in a place for a player and they can go somewhere else and be a different person.” 

Arrieta's challenge now will be to do something he's never done before: keep pitching well after having almost a full season of fantastic work. It would have been great if he'd been able to succeed in Baltimore, but his turnaround has been remarkable and it's a lot of fun to watch him pitch (especially for Cubs fans).

Dan Duquette's Trades in 20/20 (2013)

The last post covered Duquette's deals during the 2012 season and found that five of his seven deals were simply parts with minimal value dealt for other parts with minimal value.  The two deals that differed were very much in his favor: (1) Jeremy Guthrie for Jason Hammel and Matt Lindstrom and (2) Matt Lindstrom for Joe Saunders.  Five pushes and two pluses are a track record that any first year General Manager would enjoy having.

In this post, we progress to the 2012 season and see how things shake out.

November 20, 2012
INF Robert Andino for OF Trayvon Robinson

This was one of those deals where each team wants to check out an uninspiring piece the other team owns to fill a place of organizational need.  Andino's four years in baseball hate some highlights, such as a game winning hit that knock the Red Sox out of the 2011 playoffs, but largely was a long trial that showed that Andino was a Norfolk shuttle type of player who had no options.  Seattle gave Trayvon Robinson two extended shots in a pretty meager outfield, but his free swinging and marginal defense were poor fits in SafeCo (and likely everywhere else).  So, the clubs exchanged pieces they were quite willing to simply release.

Robinson wound up playing well in Bowie last season and was then granted free agency status where he quickly returned to his first club, the Los Angelos Dodgers.  Andino had a miserable stint with the Mariners and is now organizational filler for the Pittsburgh Pirates.

Depot Thoughts at the Time: The Orioles didn't give up much in Andino or probably get much in Robinson.
Conclusion: 0.2 bWAR, Push

November 30, 2012
RHP Jhondaniel Medina for INF Yamaico Navarro

Second base has been a sore subject for the Orioles ever since Brian Roberts's extension became an albatross of medical calamities.  Each season, some hope was placed on Roberts to fulfill his annual 10 MM salary with some useful play at second, but age and conclusions can be cruel.  To provide a bit of a cushion the Orioles tried to use players like Robert Andino and Ryan Flaherty in 2012 to varying success.  They now looked for a new collection of second basemen to provide a safety net for Roberts.

Navarro was an interesting prospect who was continually not living up to expectations and frustrating clubs with his behavior.  However, it was clear to see there was talent there and that keeps a guy employed.  After a season in Pittsburgh where he dominated AAA and was dominated in the Majors, the Pirates saw him as a commodity they no longer saw as part of their future.  They were willing to ship him to the Orioles for a hard throwing pitcher in rookie ball named Medina.  It was a commodity that most teams have in spades, a hard throwing pitcher in the low minors.  However, it is a commodity that the Orioles largely lack.  That said, these guys rarely pan out, so losing one is not a big loss.  Though, having no stable full of hard throwing relief arms in the low minors is an issue, but that article is for another day.

What happened?  Navarro appeared in a couple games for the Orioles while performing well in AAA.  He is now toiling in the Yankees system.  Medina has moved up to HiA ball where his stuff plays well against the hitters, but he has little clue where his pitches are going.  He does not look destined for the big league club yet.

Depot Thoughts at the Time: The Orioles find themselves with a player who used to be an interesting prospect and has failed multiple times at the major league level, but gives them more options for filling second base.  The Pirates get more flexibility in their 40 man roster by dealing a guy two other teams had given up on in the past two seasons along with acquiring an slightly interesting, but certainly not unique, arm.
Conclusion: 0.2 bWAR; Push

April 10, 2013
RHP Luis Ayala for LHP Chris Jones

Luis Ayala is one of the pitchers who seems to always find himself gainfully employed as the third or fourth righthander out of the pen or as someone who is earning some money in AAA, waiting for a spot to open up.  After a strong 2012 season where he prevented his own baserunners from scoring, but not others, he was a someone extra arm in the pen for the 2013 squad.  The Braves, however, needed another decent and cheap arm in the pen.  They offered a talented and erratic southpaw reliever by the name of Chris Jones.

Ayala proceeded to produce well for the Braves, making the Orioles kind of wish that Pedro Strop was dealt instead and led to more dealing that now looks somewhat poor now to make up for a lack of right handed bullpen depth.  Jones has been strong in AAA and is on target this year to throw more innings in season than he ever has.  Ayala returned to the Orioles this year, but was released and was most recently throwing for the Blue Jays in their minor league system.

Depot Thoughts at the Time: No comment was made.
Conclusion: -0.4bWAR; Arguably the Braves benefited.

April 28, 2013
RHP Rob Delaney for C Chris Snyder

This was a deal done simply for depth and a chance to see if a player could regain former glow at a position of need while dealing out a player who did not fit the organization.  That sentence could be written for the Orioles' side as well as the Angels'.  Delaney was a smart right handed pitcher who succeeded everywhere in the minors except AAA where his stuff came across as average.  Two short stints in the Majors were largely full of trouble.  Chris Snyder used to be the future of the Diamondbacks organization with a profile of being an exceptional offense first talent.  However, by the time the Angels got him, the Diamondbacks, Pirates, Astros, and Nationals had given up on him.

This deal also wound up being a lot of nothing.  Delaney struggled to finish his year and is no longer with any organization.  Chris Snyder played in nine games for the Orioles and held his own, but it was nothing special.  He retired after the season.

Depot Thoughts at the Time: Chris Snyder has operated long under the guise of being an offensive catcher.  He does have a little pop, but that was more present his first few years in the league.  Since 2009 though, he has had issues with power, contact, or both.  This, combined with slightly below average skills behind the plate and you wind up with a veteran playing in AAA without a MLB contract.  You can say that Snyder is no worse than Teagarden, which is largely true.  Both are essentially replacement level players.  Exposito caused concerns because his offensive calling card simply has not shown up and his defense is worse than Teagarden’s or Snyder’s.  For the Orioles to only have to give up a fringe MiL relief pitcher, it was a good move.  You should expect Snyder to be DFA’d upon Teagarden’s return.
Conclusion: 0.1 bWAR; Push

July 2, 2013
RHP Jake Arrieta, RHP Pedro Strop, and international money for RHP Scott Feldman, C Steve Clevenger

As July opened up, the Orioles were clearly in trouble.  Their starting pitching was a bit in shambles.  This was particularly true with Jason Hammel's regression and the imploding of Jake Arrieta whenever he took the mound.  The bullpen was also on shaky ground with Pedro Strop looking more like his Rangers' enigmatic self as opposed to the often dominating form he showed for the Orioles in 2012.  Yes, the talent was there, but they were not productively using it and the team was seeing their playoff opportunity fade.

On the Cubs' side, Scott Feldman was emerging with one of the better pitching performances in the National League.  With a 3.46 ERA, he looked to some to be a decent option as a front end or middle rotation starter on a playoff club.  It was a performance that was not wholly unexpected, but one that certainly was not especially exceptional.  Still, h appeared to be one of the shining arms available on the market.

What happened is that the Cubs wound up running away with this deal.  The international money helped them avoid penalties for their amateur spending.  Strop has put in very good 2013 and 2014 campaigns.  Arrieta has emerged as a good starter who could a no hitter when the moment strikes him.  For the Orioles, Scott Feldman produced below average production for the rest of the season and Clevenger has performed at a replacement player level.

Depot Thoughts at the Time: This deal is about the Orioles giving up on a good international prospect or two along with two pitchers full of promise and irritation in exchange for more catcher fodder and a backend rotation arm.  It is an improvement as it means no more Freddy Garcia, but not a great one that will change the fortune of this club.  They would be better off using Strop in mopup duty and giving Arrieta more time to sort himself out whether it being in Baltimore or in Norfolk.
Conclusion: -4.2 bWAR; Cubs

July 12, 2013
INF Russ Canzler for RHP Tim Alderson

There is not much to say about this trade.  Canzler was a bit redundant in the Orioles organization with the club already employing marginal right handed bats without much fielding acumen in Steve Pearce and Danny Valencia.  The Pirates however wanted more depth there in case they needed a bat for their bench.  Alderson was more or less a decent organizational bullpen arm.  The Orioles had been shuttling pitchers through Norfolk trying to catch lightning in a bottle ever since saying goodbye to Pedro Strop and maybe something would click with Alderson.

Neither player played in the Majors for the other club.  Canzler is currently being a professional hitter with the Phillies on their AAA squad while Alderson has struggled greatly this year in Norfolk before being given his release.

Depot Thoughts at the Time: No comment.
Conclusion: 0 bWAR; Push

July 23, 2013
INF Nick Delmonico for RHP Francisco Rodriguez

Salt was in the wound.  The Orioles dealt out Strop as part of the package for Scott Feldman.  At this point, Feldman was struggling and Strop had found his form again.  More so, the Orioles had trouble with their bullpen options.  Their fourth right handed option was largely Jairo Ascencio and that was not working out well.  Meanwhile, the postseason hopes of the Brewers fanbase had been dashed and the club was looking to deal out pieces.  Francisco Rodriguez was enjoying a stellar two months after being promoted to the Majors just before his opt out clause would go into effect.  He had had a rough go of it the year before with the Brewers and had issues with violence toward teammates and his family.  That said, he was effectively performing at a low cost and that is what baseball teams like to see.

Delmonico has been a bit shaky with the Brewers and has yet to escape HiA ball.  He is not bad, but the odds grow longer each day of him being a meaningful big leaguer.  Rodriguez wound up being wholely less than average for the Orioles, giving up the long ball a bit too often.  He did not meaningfully impact the Orioles', which was to be expected because they were simply upgrading their fourth righthander in the pen.

Depot Thoughts at the Time: Delmonico does not need to be a meaningful prospect to have value.  I’d suggest that his ability to augment a trade package is probably worth more than him being traded straight up for a reliever who at best makes the 2013 Orioles a +1 win team.  It is difficult to ever know what is possible in trades and it is an illness in the brain that us followers of the game tend to want to believe in an abundance of trade opportunities, but I do think that a package of Delmonico plus one would likely bring back to the Orioles a player of greater importance than Rodriguez.  Of course, this contention is somewhat unfair.  It is difficult for the addition of Rodriguez to stand up against a comparison of something that does not exist.  The vagueness of the unknown is certainly a draw for many to embrace and questioning Oriole front office authority has been a talent that has been thoroughly developed over the past decade and a half.  That said, I maintain that the health of the franchise is better served when second tier prospects are stacked instead of being doled out one at a time. 
Conclusion: 0.1 bWAR; Push

July 31, 2013
Josh Hader, LJ Hoes and competitive draft pick for Bud Norris

The Orioles at this point were still in a discussion for the playoffs and still needed rotation help.  Feldman was a sure starter every five days, but had not been putting the team in a position to win.  The Astros were an awful team and had an expensive player in Bud Norris who was also in his arbitration years.  He had broken out somewhat to be considered a mid-rotation arm on a playoff team.  Their original asking price of a top 25 prospect was steadily depreciating as the deadline neared.  The Orioles offered MLB filler in LJ Hoes, a highly valued competitive draft pick, and a low probability, high upside arm in Josh Hader.

Norris would up pitching rather poorly for the Orioles in 2013 and has really been only been somewhat average this year with some disconcerting peripherals.  For the Astros, Hoes has been a useful stand-in as an outfielder and the competitive draft pick helped buffer the team's misplay of not signing major pieces of their draft.  That said, the low probability high upside arm of Josh Hader has been all upside this summer.  Some scouts are thinking he has established himself as a top 100 pitching prospect.  Maybe that is a worthwhile cost for being able to employ Bud Norris, but it would be possible to imagine that Hader might be off limits in a deal now.

Depot Thoughts at the Time: This is a team in need of a push and the play of Norris is unlikely to be much better than what a random collection of arms from Norfolk could produce.  You could argue that these moves are for stability and to shore up against potential injuries in the stretch run.  I would argue that would make sense for a team that sat slightly comfortably in first place. That team is not the Orioles.  Maybe that is the new inefficiency and Duquette figured it out before everyone else.  To me, it looks like a Dutch boy sticking a finger in the dike when doing nothing probably has the same result.
Conclusion: 0.6 bWAR; Push

August 30, 2013
OF Xavier Avery for UTL Mike Morse

The Orioles had about a 1 in 7 chance to make the playoffs as August drew to a close.  They were in need of a pick-me-up to improve their chances, but that was a hard thing to find past the unrestricted trade deadline.  They now had to sort through various broken and overpaid pieces to find something.  That thing was Mike Morse, a player who had made a living off of one good year.  At that point in time, he was terrible with the Mariners as he had a known leg injury that sidelined him, but was hiding a wrist injury.  The Orioles held a speedy potential fourth outfielder piece in Xavier Avery that the Mariners could use in their cavernous park.

Morse wound up hurt the Orioles' chances by about a game.  It was a poor move to make and giving him time to show how bad he would be ate into the ability of other right handers on the club who had already shown they could hit.  Avery had a decent time finishing the year in Tacoma, was designated for assignment without anyone claiming him, and now has been on a month long tear at Tacoma.  Interestingly enough, he has actually been mentioned in trade rumors as a complimentary piece in the Mariners' attempts to get into the playoffs.

Depot Thoughts at the Time: I think this is a meh deal, but that it was a marginally bad deal in a greater context.  Right handed hitting opportunities were available for cheaper in terms of money and prospects than what the Orioles wound up paying.  They gave up on a marginal prospect (of which they have very few in their system) in exchange for a player who does not seem to be an upgrade over what they already have.  I am not a fan of movement for the sake of movement.  I understand that with the team's playoff chances so low that a bet was a good idea to make.  I simply do not see Morse as the bet I would like to make.
Conclusion: -0.4 bWAR; Push, but -0.4 bWAR is awful in less than a month's play.

Final Tally
-3.8 bWAR

Costing your team four wins is pretty awful, but that margin would not have gotten the club into the playoffs.  It was good to see Duquette move pieces around and try too make things work, but the team basically got Bud Norris for Josh Hader, Pedro Strop, Jake Arrieta, a first round pick, a decent international amateur prospect, and maybe even a more emergent Xavier Avery.  That is quite a difference from the previous season when Duquette squeezed blood from stones.  Of course, 20/20 hindsight makes it easy to see that these moves hurt the Orioles and that the team perhaps could have figured out another way to spell Bud Norris' 0.3 bWAR in 2014.  That said, at the Depot, I certainly was not in favor of any of these deals.  They seemed like deck chair shuffling to me and that has been borne out to be true.

One thing that has amazed me was how much the success of Duquette's first season has created this halo of him in many a fan's eyes.  Yes, it is difficult and I have no idea if a year is a proper sample size to judge how successful a general manager is, but with a sunny 2012 and a stormy 2013 on the trade front it appears that Duquette might be more run of the mill.

Failures of Former Orioles' Cavalries and Hope in the Current One

The arms are coming.  Once they arrive in Baltimore, everything is going to work out.  The team has a solid offensive core that can be complemented with a few trades and some minor free agent pickups.  That core will be there when the cavalry comes.

The sentiment has been expressed four times in the past 20 years.  This time, the hope is being placed on Dylan Bundy, Kevin Gausman, Eduardo Rodriguez, and Hunter Harvey.  Depending on who you follow for prospecting, Bundy or Gausman is considered the best pitching prospect in the system.  They are both arguably top ten prospects.  Also, depending on your resource, Rodriguez and Harvey could be considered top 50 arms. 

As such, this is probably the most well regarded group of pitching prospects that the Orioles have ever had in the past 20 years.  As mentioned in an earlier post, prospects more often than not flame out.  This is well understood by many an Orioles fan as we will explore in this post.  We'll review the cavalries of 1996, 2004, and the period of 2008 to 2010.

1996

Rocky Coppinger 19 (Baseball America Ranking)
Jimmy Haynes 38
Billy Percibal 99

In 1996, Orioles fans for the most part did not really know much about their stable of arms.  If they did, they would have known that Rocky Coppinger was one of the better arms in the 1993 draft.  He was considered largely unsignable and the Orioles selected him in the 19th round as a draft and follow.  He had a heavy fastball that sat in the low 90s and a plus slider.  After a solid Spring at Hill JuCo, the Orioles signed him at the deadline just before the 1994 draft.

With two plus pitches, Coppinger tore apart Bluefield in 1994.  He then started out well in Frederick, dominating the league in 11 starts.  The Orioles then aggressively promoted the 21 year old to Bowie and then on to Rochester where he saw a great deal of success.  It is much remembered that Syd Thrift referred to him as "colt who could become a horse."  It was one of those quaint Thrift-isms when Thrift was not a dirty word in Baltimore, but one that made one remember the player development system of the powerhouse Pittsburgh Pirates.  Times have changed.  Anyway, Coppinger performed well. 

Rocky Coppinger Statistics Going into 1996 Spring Training

Year	Age	Tm	Lg	Lev	W	L	W-L%	ERA	GS	SHO	IP	H/9	HR/9	BB/9	SO/9
1994	20	Bluefield	APPY	Rk	4	3	.571	2.45	13	0	73.1	6.3	0.6	4.9	10.8
1995	21	Frederick	CARL	A+	7	1	.875	1.57	11	1	68.2	6.0	0.4	3.1	11.9
1995	21	Bowie	EL	AA	6	2	.750	2.69	13	2	83.2	6.2	0.8	4.6	6.7
1995	21	Rochester	IL	AAA	3	0	1.000	1.04	5	0	34.2	6.0	0.5	4.4	4.9

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 1/6/2014.

Nowadays, we would still see someone with a very promising career based on that performance.  However, there would be some concern that he was quite lucky in AA and AAA.  He had a high walk rate and his strikeouts evaporated.  Further analysis would show that he was a wild pitcher whose change up was nearly worthless, making him a platoon pitcher.  Unfortunately, his performance masked these red flags and much was expected of him as he entered 1996 Spring Training as the favorite to be the fifth pitcher behind Mike Mussina, David Wells, Scott Erickson, and Kent Mercker.

Competing against Coppinger was another arm held in high regard, Jimmy Haynes.  Haynes was drafted in 1991 out of high school.  He performed well at every level and the Orioles were very patient with his development.  His fastball was more of a show me pitch as he tended to dispatch minor leaguers with his curve, slurve, and changeup.  It was another prospect profile where questions should have been raised as to whether he would be able to get through a MLB lineup without a legitimate fastball.  Hopes of him being Plan B were raised as a September callup in 1995 saw him with 22 strikeouts in 24 IP and a 2.25 ERA.

In Spring Training, Coppinger struggled with his control and with left handers.  Haynes performed well against uneven competition and wound up securing the fifth spot in the rotation.  Haynes found himself quickly in trouble.  The Orioles chose to try Arthur Rhodes and Rick Krivda out to try to find a solution to their starting pitching troubles.  Eventually, the slot was handed outright to Krivda.  Later, Mercker was sent off and Coppinger, not Haynes, was placed into the rotation.

Where they wound up?

Rocky Coppinger - Over the next three years, Coppinger bounced up and down between Baltimore and Rochester as he could not figure out how to handle his wildness and, more importantly, left handed batters.  In 1999, he was dealt to the Brewers for a player to be named later who was Alberto Reyes.  They used him as a relief pitcher to handle right handed sides, a role in which he excelled until he blew his elbow out and Tommy John surgery was not successful.  Reyes was in Baltimore for parts of two seasons and was rather mediocre.  He was dealt in 2000 to the Los Angeles Dodgers for Alan Mills, who could no longer get out MLB hitters.

Jimmy Haynes - Haynes never wore an Orioles uniform after 1996.  He played half of the year in the minors until he was dealt to the Athletics for the overachieving Geronimo Berroa.  Haynes bounced around occasionally performing as a decent back end arm before washing out as a 31 year old in Cincinatti.

Billy Percibal- An unfortunate arm injury ended Percibal's 1996 minor league season although he was added to the 40 man roster and spent five days in Baltimore even though he could not pitch.  After a year off rehabbing from Tommy John surgery, Percibal was not the same pitcher.  What has happened to him since, I do not know.  He seems to have disappeared except for the story where Peter Angelos intervened and was able to get Percibal's infant son desperately needed emergency care in the Dominican Republic.

2004

Adam Loewen 13
John Maine 54
Denny Bautista 59

At this point and time, Adam Loewen was a great ball of potential.  The previous season, he dominated short season A ball as a nineteen year old.  Injuries, mechanics, and wildness had yet to be concerns.  All scouts were seeing at this point were his pitches.  The questions would come later.  Those issues would eventually end a very promising pitching career and turn Loewen into a fringe fifth outfielder.

During Spring Training, Maine, an Orioles product, and Bautista, a Marlins product acquired for Jeff Conine the year prior, were seen as promising pitchers threatening to disrupt the team's plan of pairing ace Sidney Ponson with Eric DuBose, Kurt Ainsworth, Rodrigo Lopez, and Matt Riley.  Neither were able to beat out the starting five.  Though, Lopez was knocked into the bullpen by a resurgent former top prospect by the name of Erik Bedard.  Maine and Bautista found themselves in Bowie.  As Ainsworth, Riley, and Dubose faltered, Lopez was pushed into the rotation and another AA pitcher, Daniel Cabrera was promoted in their place.

Bautista was given a couple relief appearances in June before the team confused everyone and traded him for an aging middle relief arm, Jason Grimsley of Mitchell Report fame.  Maine earned a July start and was promptly throttled.  He was sent back down and never saw Batimore again in 2004.  Loewen?  He wound up being shut down and having surgery on his labrum.

Where Did They Wind Up?

Adam Loewen - Loewen would show a great deal of promise and he eventually matured into a pitcher with ace quality ability.  However, that ability was rarely seen in game as he suffered yearly arm injuries.  In 2008, the Orioles released Loewen with the understanding that he would resign and try to be a position player with the team.  He was caught off guard when a team from his home country, the Toronto Blue Jays, expressed interest in him.  As a free agent he chose to go home.  Since then, he has shown some power for the Jays, Mets, and Team Canada teams.  His only MLB experience as a batter came with the Blue Jays.  He did not perform well.

John Maine - As a fly ball, soft tossing pitcher, Maine had difficulty performing well against the souped up AL East teams in 2005.  Before the 2006 season, he was paired with Jorge Julio and dealt to the Mets for a promising pitcher who had never reached his potential, Kris Benson.  Maine did well in the NL East as his fly balls more often went to the warning track and not over the fence.  That lasted a couple years until his rotator cuff became shredded and he left New York amid a great deal of controversy.

Denny Bautista - As confused and angry as fans were that Bautista was dealt for Grimsley, he wound up having several cups of coffee with a handful of teams, but with no lasting success.  Grimsley is remembered for being a focus point for the introduction of Performance Enhancing Drugs in the Orioles clubhouse, fairly or unfairly.  Pitching-wise, he was above average for them in 2006 and poorly in 2007.

2008-2010

Chris Tillman 67/22/--
Brian Matusz --/25/5
Zach Britton --/--/63
Radhames Liz 69/--/--
Jake Arrieta --/67/99
Troy Patton 78/--/--

This period of time is where the term "cavalry" was applied.  It was a rather tumultuous time where the Orioles constantly had arms in the wing and those arms largely failed to show up (we are not even discussing Brandon Erbe here).  It is difficult to tell a Spring Training and Season story as we did in the previous two iterations of the cavalry.  Instead, we'll address this player by player.

Along with Matusz, Chris Tillman was another rather highly considered arm.  He was acquired by the Orioles in the monsterly one sided Erik Bedard deal that also saw Adam Jones, George Sherrill, Kameron Mickolio, and Tony Butler arrive into the organization.  Tillman profiled as a workhorse righthander with a mid 90s fastball and a startlingly plus curveball.  He struggled mightily with commanding and controlling his curveball and lost five mph on his fastball.  In 2012, everything began to click.  He may not be the ace pitcher the team was hoping for, but he has been a solid three slot starter on a first division team.

Brian Matusz was a solid draft selection in 2008.  However, there was major controversy about selecting him over South Carolina 1B Justin Smoak.  Although teeth were much gnashed, both picks have been rather lackluster.  As a polished lefty, Matusz made quick work of the minors.  He experienced some success in the majors, but a collection of mechanical changes, injuries, alleged disagreements with management, and unfortunate outcomes from those disagreements have led to Matusz being a much marginalized LOOGY.  There is not much hope of him becoming anything else for this team and has been often mentioned as a trade piece.

Zach Britton fits a story.  It is not a particularly complicated one and it might even be an unfair story.  His problem supposedly is that he had a devastating two seam fastball in the minors.  As hitters become more advanced, the more the pitcher has to hit the bottom of the strikezone and get it by the batter.  Too low, and advanced hitters will take it for a ball.  Too high, and it will be smoked.  Added to that, advanced fly ball hitters are quite capable of getting under well thrown two seamers.  It was a major reason why we here at Camden Depot have always been very conservative with Britton.  Too often, we think armchair and even some professional scouts become way too infatuated with groundballs while ignoring potential shortcomings.  2014 will find him out of options and either in the bullpen or on another team.

Radhames Liz held a great deal of potential.  He had a plus fastball that ran as high at 97 mph, a devastating curveball, and a great curveball.  His mechanics though often meant that nothing was going right.  When it did go right, he was a beast.  In 2006, he was part of a multi-pitcher no hitter.  In 2007, he threw one by himself.  Unfortunately, the consistency in his mechanics never came, meaning that his command never arrived.  Advanced hitters would simply force him into fastball counts by not chasing his other pitches or would tee off him when Liz failed to throw them well.  After the 2009 season, the Orioles placed him on waivers and San Diego picked him up.  After an average season in the Padres minor league system, Liz went over to Korea to pitch for the LG Twins where he has pitched well for what appears to be a rather poor team.

Jake Arrieta also spent several frustrating years pitching for the Orioles.  His fastball and his breaking ball are plus, but his change up is worthless.  That left him with a 683/833 OPS split that favored him against right handers.  It is a similar career line that Bud Norris enjoys (704/811).  As you can imagine, Arrieta had difficulty making it through lineups and, particularly, through lefty stacked lineups.  If his pitches were not running well, he tended to flame out the second time through the lineup.  That is a pretty common result for what is essentially a two pitch pitcher.  To a lesser extent, you see the same with Bud Norris.  The difference perhaps between the two pitchers is that Arrieta at times was visibly shaken when teams began teeing off him while Norris steels himself.  It is not like there is that much of a difference in the end result, Norris just plays it off better.  Anyway, Arrieta was packaged with an underperforming Pedro Strop and some international money in exchange for a partial season of Scott Feldman from the Cubs.

Troy Patton came to the Orioles injured as the center piece in the Miguel Tejada to Astros deal.  Shoulder issues made him rank lower than he would have if he had been completely healthy.  The reports were pretty solid on him as a low 90s thrower with an excellent slider and an average changeup.  He was not a big name prospect, but the bet was that he would get healthy and contribute to the Orioles.  However, the injury was slightly worse than previously thought and he came back from it a few ticks slower.  He basically is now a two seamer and slider pitcher who sometimes will use his changeup to keep hitters honest.  He is not a LOOGY like Matusz, but he would be of little use in the starting rotation.  Patton will serve a 25 game suspension for amphetamine use in 2014 and will find himself on the trade block through the season.

Hearing the Bugle
Perhaps the current batch of cavalry is different where in the past only Chris Tillman emerged--after a decent number of struggles.  It is fair to say that in 2014 we find the most impressive collection of minor league arms that this team has seen in quite a long time.  Kevin Gausman is already an MLB ready pitcher.  He had some struggles last year, but he has the ability to be a mid to top of the rotation pitcher.  Two years ago, Dylan Bundy had a cup of coffee in the Majors and did not look like he belonged there.  Last year was going to be a major polishing season, but he lost that to surgery.  This year will be about getting arm strength back to see if 2015 finds him in Baltimore.  Eduardo Rodriguez will like need a season or two to better refine his pitching.  He will likely be a back of the rotation arm if everything works out.  Finally, Hunter Harvey had a great deal of helium injected into him from pro scouts who saw a dozen innings last year and wished to rewrite what the amateur scouts thought of him.  Maybe the pro scouts are right or maybe they are too eager.  If they are right, he is a top of the rotation arm who would be ready in 2016 or 2017.

Maybe this time it will be different.  If so, it will be the foundation for the team's next big window under Dan Duquette and Buck Showalter.

The Jake Arrieta Experience Moves on

Say what you will about Jake Arrieta, but you never quite knew what was going to happen when he took the mound for the Orioles. Sure, there were probably going to be a good number of strikeouts and walks, but occasionally he put it all together in some impressive outings that enticed fans and had them wondering why he couldn't be that pitcher more often.

Overall, his numbers aren't good. In parts of four seasons with the Orioles, he posted a 5.46 ERA in 358 innings. He struck out a decent amount of opposing batters (6.96 K/9, which had trended up in 2012 (8.56) and 2013 (8.75)) but handed out too many free passes (4.0 BB/9). Arrieta's career ERA is about a full run higher than both his FIP and xFIP, and much of that comes from his strange 2012 season. In 114.2 innings last season, Arrieta's strikeouts were up and his walks were way down (2.75 BB/9). But about 24% of the balls hit against him were line drives, and like the season before, he allowed too many home runs (14.5% HR/FB). Also, out of all major league starters who pitched at least 100 innings, his strand rate of 57.3% was the lowest.

In 2012, the average league pitching stats were:

4.01 ERA, 7.56 K/9, 3.05 BB/9, .293 BABIP, 72.5 LOB%

And Arrieta's line:

6.20 ERA, 8.56 K/9, 2.75 BB/9, .320 BABIP, 57.3 LOB%

So Arrieta pitched the best he ever had -- and performed better, at least in strikeouts and walks, than the league average -- and still had an ERA over 6. Weird.

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At his best, Arrieta throws strikes, keeps his pitch count relatively low, and pitches seven-plus innings. But those types of performances were rare while he was in an Orioles uniform. When Arrieta took the mound, anything was possible. He could look like a staff ace, or he could have barely any fastball command -- or any feel for any of his pitches, for that matter -- let alone pitch like a past top prospect. But that was why the Jake Arrieta Experience was/is entertaining -- and terrifying (if he's pitching for the team you root for).

As Joe discussed last week, the O's/Cubs trade makes sense for both teams. The O's, right now, don't have much use for "if" guys like Arrieta and Pedro Strop (also because they're 27 and 28 years old, respectively, and not really prospects anymore). There's no question that both have the kind of dominant stuff to succeed in the majors, if they're able to control it. And as we've learned with Chris Davis this season, surprises can certainly still happen.

Quick Hit on the Jake Arrieta Trade

Disclaimer Number 1 — Deep down, I'm a Chicago Cubs fan. I grew up on the Northwest Side of Chicago and watched Cubs games on WGN during summer afternoons. I write for an Orioles blog because I work for and about the Orioles' AAA farm team, but I root for the Cubs.

Disclaimer Number 2 — I've probably been more negative about Jake Arrieta than almost anyone else. I recognize that he can pitch a baseball very fast and can make pitches that move in ways that batters can't predict. But I also recognize that Arrieta's pitches don't always end up in the strike zone and, that if he pitches with less velocity or movement, batters hit them hard.

Given those two disclaimers, I think that the Cubs - Orioles trade is a good trade for both teams. The Orioles got starting pitcher Scott Feldman and catcher Steve Clevenger; the Cubs got pitcher Jake Arrieta, relief pitcher Pedro Strop, and permission to spend $388,000 on signing bonuses for interntional amateur free agents. The Orioles fill an immediate need while the Cubs add assets with longer-term potential.

That the Orioles need starting pitching is a given; the ERA of their starting pitchers ranks thirteenth in the American League. They tried Jake Arrieta as a starting pitcher earlier in the year; he failed and was optioned to Norfolk. At Norfolk, Arrieta's been an inconsistent tease; he's pitched some very good games — including a one-hit, seven-inning shutout on June 27 — but generally has struggled with his control and command. He wasn't going to be an effective part of the Orioles' 2013 rotation.

And the Orioles are, as they should be, in win-now mode. It's also fairly obvious that the Orioles' present and short-term future are better than their long-term future; there aren't a lot of young players in the Orioles' system who project to be better than their current players. Scott Feldman is pitching well as a starting pitcher for the Cubs; there's every reason to believe that he'll pitch better in 2013 than Freddy Garcia, Kevin Gausman, Zach Britton, and Arrieta, the pitchers who have rotated throught the fifth and sixth rotation spots. (A team has to account for six rotation spots because it's rare that the first five starting pitchers are healthy at the same time.)

Pedro Strop had become an ineffective and unnecessary component of the bullpen; like Carlos Marmol with the Cubs, he had been pitching so ineffectively that the fans were cutting him no slack. That made it impossible to get himself straightened out. Steve Clevenger is a generic backup catcher; because he's a left-handed, contact-oriented specialist, he may be useful after the rosters expand in September. These two players aren't important. The Orioles haven't been big spenders in the international amateur free agent market; they were unlikely to use the spending permissions they sent to the Cubs.

The Feldman for Arrieta trade is a classic trade in which a contender trades long-term assets to a non-contender for a short-term asset. The most likely outcome is that Feldman helps the Orioles to the 2013 postseason while Arrieta never rights himself; so the Orioles are most likely to "win" the trade. But the Cubs could win the trade big if Arrieta figures it out and becomes the pitcher people think he can. I think it's a good trade for both sides, and if I were a GM for either team, I'd make it.

Jake Arrieta is Jason Hammel — Kind Of

This past week, Dan Connolly was talking to Jason Hammel about the struggles Jake Arrieta has been going through this season.  Here is an excerpt:

“I know exactly how he feels,” said Hammel, who was the Orioles’ Opening Day starter this year at age 30. “Honestly, he reminds me a lot of myself. It was three or four years of impressive stuff and inconsistent results. And it was frustrating.”

Hammel did not mean it in the way I will now take this article, but I found that to be an interesting statement because Hammel’s stuff is quite similar to what Arrieta has.  Two weeks ago, Stephen Loftus wrote an article on pitching similarity scores for Beyond the Box Score.  Loftus took data recorded by Pitchf/x and used a few formulas to compare pitchers for these attributes: handedness (pitcher and batter), velocity, horizontal/vertical movement, locations, and release point.
When you put all of these together, you get these top comparisons for the Orioles original starting rotation (Loftus considers anything above 0.80 as being “Extremely Similar”):

Jason Hammel
Jake Arrieta (0.91), Jeremy Guthrie (0.90), Jordan Zimmerman (0.88), Justin Verlander (0.86), and Tyler Chatwood (0.85).
Jake Arrieta
Jordan Zimmerman (0.91), Jason Hammel (0.91), Ivan Nova (0.87), Josh Johnson (0.87), and Jeremy Guthrie (0.86).
Wei-Yin Chen
Wade Miley (0.83), AJ Griffin (0.81), Tom Gorzelanny (0.79), Felix Dubront (0.79), and Madison Bumgarner (0.79).
Chris Tillman
Grant Balfour (0.84), Wade Davis (0.79), Clayton Kershaw (0.77), Mat Latos (0.75), Brandon Beachy (0.74).
Miguel Gonzalez
Brian Matusz (0.80), Tim Lincecum (0.79), Ubaldo Jimenez (0.78), Bud Norris (0.77), and James McDonald (0.77).

Looking at this comparisons, it is difficult to immediately recognize the utility of this exercise.  We do not know exactly how well stuff relates to absolute performance.  Tentatively, we can look at these numbers and come away with a few things:

• Jason Hammel and Jake Arrieta appear to be a similar style of pitchers and find themselves in a grouping of incredibly successful pitchers (e.g., Justin Verlander, Jordan Zimmerman, Ivan Nova).  Of course, there are some rather mediocre pitchers in that groups as well.
• The other three pitchers have rather unique repertoires as starting pitchers go, which may simply mean that they are unique or that their tool box is ill-suited for starting.
• Wei-Yin Chen’s comparison to Wade Miley and AJ Griffin is hopeful.  Both have been solid pitchers who are able to do more than the quality of their pitches would suggest.
• Chris Tillman’s top comp being a relief pitcher foretells his future if he is unable to figure out his control.  Tillman simply needs to be more efficient with respect to his pitch counts in order to get himself deeper into games.  Now, becoming efficient is not so simple.
• Miguel Gonzalez’ success seems remarkable after we have seen so much of his top comp, Brian Matusz, in the rotation.

With those points in mind, we have to remain sober as to what we can really expect these comps to mean.

Jake Arrieta Optioned to AAA: Not (Entirely) His Fault

by Nate Delong
Delong writes about the Orioles over at Orioles Proving Ground. He is part of 2013's Expanded Roster, a feature where we provide local writers opportunities to expand their reach.  Click here to find all of Camden Depot's Expanded Roster entries for 2012.  2011 Expanded Roster items can be found here.  As always, feel free to provide the Depot with suggestions for posts or with your own interest in writing an items or several to be posted here. 

On Monday, the Orioles optioned Jake Arrieta, one of their talented but frustrating young pitchers to the minor leagues, due to his inability to consistently throw strikes.  With a career best 7.1% walk rate in 2012 (following walk rates over 10% in both 2010 and 2011), he’s never been known to have great command.  However, despite an improvement last year, he’s taken a quick step back in 2013, as his walk rate has ballooned to 18.4%.  To emphasize that point, he’s walked more batters (16) than he has given up hits (15), in 19 innings. Among starters with at least 10 innings pitched, Arrieta leads the league in BB% by more than 3%.  It’s easy to see that all of these walks are the primary culprit of his 6.63 ERA, despite his high strikeout rate and a BABIP (.292) in line with his career mark.

Arrieta’s lack of command has not only hurt the Orioles by putting extra runners on base, but it has also contributed to increased use of the bullpen, due to his high pitch counts.  The Orioles bullpen has pitched 61.2 innings (as of April 22), 12^th most in all of baseball.  Arrieta has contributed greatly towards the bullpen usage, as his 19 innings have come in 4 starts.  In fact, he’s averaging almost 20 pitches per inning, which limits his ability to pitch deep into games, even when he’s throwing relatively well.  For example, on April 16^th against Tampa Bay, he only allowed 1 earned run in 5 innings (despite walking 5), but he needed 112 pitches to do it, forcing the bullpen into action much sooner than normally needed in that situation.

      So why has Arrieta struggled so much more with his command in 2013 compared to previous years? 

      According to Pitch F/X data, Arrieta is actually throwing a career high percentage of pitches in the strike zone (51% versus 48.9% career rate).  However, despite that, opposing hitters are swinging less against Arrieta’s offerings this year by roughly 2.5%.  While that may not seem significant, it becomes more interesting when you isolate which pitches opposing hitters are laying off.  Take a look at the table below.  Compared to his career numbers, batters are swinging far less on pitches outside of the strike zone, specifically with respect to his 4-seam fastball, sinker, and slider (pitches Arrieta throws about 76% of the time).  

      There are two reasons why hitters may be swinging less at Arrieta’s pitches: 

1. Knowing that he doesn’t have great command, batters have changed their approach against him and are actively deciding not to swing as frequently; and  
2.  Arrieta is missing the strike zone by such a wide margin, that opposing batters aren’t even tempted to swing

I suspect that the answer is a little bit of both.  Below is a figure showing the location of Arrieta’s pitches where the opposing hitter did not swing. The figure also notes whether that pitch was called a ball or a strike.  As you can see, there are quite a few pitches that missed by a wide margin.  However, a closer look reveals that Arrietta may have been a little unlucky as well, as the majority of his borderline pitches (and even a significant number of pitches that appear to be inside the strike zone) were called balls.

While optioning Arrieta to the minor leagues is not ideal, I do not believe it’s a big issue moving forward.  There are reasons for optimism, namely his high strikeout rate (23%) and his continued success in limiting home runs (5.9% HR/FB ratio).  As with all stats this early in the season, it is extremely important to remember that his 19 innings in 2013 are a very small sample.  However that small sample works both ways, and if a couple more of those borderline pitches would have been called strikes rather than balls, his walk rate and ERA could look very different.  Arrieta is a talented pitcher with the potential to be a very productive member of the Orioles rotation if he can limit his walks.  Hopefully his time in AAA will be productive and brief, and he returns in a matter of weeks with increased confidence and command.