Why You Should Care That The Orioles Traded A Draft Pick

This is a guest post by Jeff Long of Baseball Prospectus. You can find his work here and follow him on Twitter.

As I write this (before Sunday's win over the Indians), the Orioles sit at 27-20; one game behind the Red Sox in the AL East and right in the thick of the race among some of the best teams in the American League thus far. We’re just over a quarter of the way through the season, but surprise starts from teams like the Mariners and the White Sox have muddied the (very-early) playoff picture.

It’s been a terrific start for an Orioles club that faced a lot of questions coming into the season. The team spent a lot of money—their Opening Day payroll went up nearly $30 million from Opening Day 2015—to essentially field the same club as last year. The 2015 version of the Orioles finished 81-81, a dozen games back in the division and five out of the Wild Card. It was a disappointing season, and the team didn’t have any significant upgrades coming into 2016.

All of this is to say that performance to date might not reflect the team’s actual chances of making the playoffs and battling for the World Series. As of this writing, Baseball Prospectus has the Orioles with a roughly 26% chance of making the playoffs. That projection—based on BP’s PECOTA projection system—lands the Orioles fourth in the division behind the Rays (34%), Blue Jays (42%), and Red Sox (76%) respectively. Lest you think this means that PECOTA is down on the Orioles, that number represents a roughly 18 percentage point increase from their preseason playoff odds of 8%. Matt Trueblood worded PECOTA’s opinion thusly, They’ve gone from a very long shot to a legitimate contender, which is significant progress. From here, they have an honest chance to make a run at the postseason. That they aren’t a favorite is affirmation that, yes, some things are starting to carry real meaning, but it’s still early.

This is an elaborate (314 words, if you’re counting) way of saying that the Orioles have a shot at the playoffs. It may not be a great one, but it’s a shot.

This is critically important, because of the way that the team’s front office is running the club. They’ve largely thrown all of their eggs into the 2016/2017 basket; the future be damned. Trading draft picks and international bonus slots is simply their modus operandi in its most basic form.

I won’t get into the details, but it’s important that we understand that moves like the Brian Matusz or Ryan Webb trades are simply salary dumps wherein draft picks are exchanged for cold hard cash. This approach has ramifications that Dave Cameron summarized well:

If Peter Angelos just pockets the $3 million, and the team doesn’t reallocate this money back into the franchise, then it’s perfectly reasonable for Orioles fans to be annoyed by this trend of the team selling draft picks. Making a habit out of reducing your prospect stock isn’t a great idea if you’re not using those prospects to acquire other things of value, and if shedding Matusz’s contract just allows Angelos to go buy some fancy art, well, that would suck for the franchise. But at this point, with the Orioles as likely buyers this summer and some obvious holes on the roster, I think it’s probably best to assume that this is a move made in preparation for taking on big league salary in July.

And if that’s the case, then all the Orioles are really doing is trading a prospect for some help at the big-league roster, which is exactly what we expect teams in first place to do.

Dave Cameron – The Orioles Sold a Draft Pick Again

There are a few components to this that are worth exploring in more detail. Cameron suggests that the Orioles’ trading of draft picks for money gives them more flexibility to take on salary at the July trade deadline. The argument, in hindsight, is often that the trading of Ryan Webb’s salary led to the acquisition of Gerardo Parra who helped (Parra actually cost the Orioles wins with his performance, but nevermind that for now) the team down the stretch run.

OK, sure. Perhaps the $3 million or so the club saved by not designating Matusz for Assignment will be used to acquire someone that will help them make the playoffs this season. Here’s the simple problem with that argument. Nobody outside the warehouse knows where that money goes. Did Webb’s salary go to Parra? Maybe. Did they really need to save the money knowing that their Opening Day salary went up 10 times that between last season and this one? Probably not.

Whether or not the Orioles need to save the money is something that frankly we won’t ever have the answer to. What we do know is that they have a long history of trading away the opportunity to acquire players and pay them paltry minor league salaries. Let’s take a trip down memory lane, shall we?

Do you remember that time the Orioles traded Jake Arrieta and Pedro Strop to the Cubs for Scott Feldman and Steve Clevenger? They also sent the Cubs multiple international bonus slots to sweeten the deal. In fairness, it’s not like the Orioles were going to use them anyway, their international spending is often pathetic (with the exception of Asia, generally speaking).

I mentioned it previously, but they sent Ryan Webb and the 74th pick in the 2015 draft to the Dodgers so they wouldn’t have to pay his $2.8 million salary upon cutting him. The Orioles said, at the time, that they liked the "prospects" they got back in the deal, though those players are org guys who are unlikely to ever appear on a major-league roster. Stop me if this sounds familiar.

Then there was that time the Orioles traded two slots to the Astros for Chris Lee, who at least seems interesting, unlike previous acquisitions.

Then came the Matusz trade, followed swiftly by a dumping of international bonus slots to the Reds for a 23-year-old pitcher who hasn’t gotten past A-ball yet.

The problem with the Webb and Matusz trades of course is that those issues were completely avoidable. Both players were deemed to be DFA candidates during the offseason, when the club could have cut them without incurring financial penalties. Instead, they kept them on the roster and opted to pay a hefty price for their removal later.

The problem is sizable. As long as the major-league team keeps winning though, why should you care? Sustainability, that’s why.

***

Building a sustainable winner is a difficult task. Still, there are dozens of models to follow. You could look at the Cardinals who eschew veteran free agents in favor of a well-stocked farm system that produces impact player after impact player. This takes significant resources, but the club seem to deem it worthwhile. You could be like the Pirates and sign your young talent to long term deals, creating a cost-controlled core around which you can build. This too keeps costs down, but requires proactivity with contract negotiations. You could even follow a Red Sox model where free spending and free agency are the means by which wins are acquired. Even the Red Sox though, have a robust farm system stocked with future talent. The Orioles do not.

According to Baseball Prospectus, the Orioles have the 26th best farm system in baseball. Baseball America has them 27th. Keith Law of ESPN agrees, slotting the club at 27th. Across the board, the comments are the same. The club has some interesting talent in short season or A-ball, but those players are a long way off. The upper minors is filled with org guys and AAAA stars, guys who look good but aren’t likely to help the major-league team in a significant way.

They can’t seem to develop pitching properly, as their top pitching prospects routinely get hurt and underwhelm. Any interesting hitting prospects tend to get moved in trades, and the ones that have stayed are too few to be a true core to build around.

If you’re looking to the farm system for reinforcements or help either this season or down the road, you’ll be left wanting.

The farm system being down is a bigger problem than it seems of course. Who exactly is the team trading for veteran help at the deadline? Dave Cameron’s argument that these moves can help them win more games this season is built on a weak foundation given that the club hardly has the assets to acquire impactful talent in the first place.

The future? That’s bleak too. Matt Wieters is a free agent next season. The club will likely let him walk, with or without a qualifying offer. Mark Trumbo too, is a free agent-to-be. Chris Tillman’s team control ends in 2018, the following season, along with Hyun Soo Kim and Ubaldo Jimenez (which, let’s be honest, is probably a good thing). In 2019 both Adam Jones and Manny Machado will be free agents, along with Zach Britton who has grown into one of the best relievers in baseball.

Some of those changes are a ways away, but the fact remains that there are almost no replacements for these players in the minor leagues. They’ll need to come from somewhere, but with the club shredding draft picks and international bonus slots at every opportunity, it’s unclear from where.

The period from the late 1990s through 2012, an abysmal black hole in the franchise’s history, was set up with many of the same moves that this Orioles’ team is now engaging in. The team ignored the minors in hopes of capturing a World Series with its aging veteran talent. It didn’t work out, and the subsequent cliff was steep. It took the team more than a decade to dig out of that cliff.

The problem is that 2016, 2017, or maybe 2018 look a lot like the edge of the cliff that the team faced in 1997. My suggestion is that you hope and pray that the team wins a World Series sooner rather than later, because their odds of doing so in each subsequent season are getting worse and worse. I’m all for the win-now attitude this team has; I just hope they actually do win now, because I’m not optimistic about their chances of winning in the future.

BORT: Brian Matusz And A Lost Pick

In March of 2009, the local Orioles blogosphere was in its primordial golden epoch where sites were plentiful and largely operated by only a person or two.  Back then, I developed the Baltimore Orioles Round Table to make the community more cohesive and increase audience awareness for other sites.  Now, the lone person writing for an Orioles site is not so common anymore.  We all have large stables.  In this current incarnation,  the objective is not to increase awareness between sites, but to provide multiple slants at a single issue.  Enjoy!

The Brian Matusz trade and Dan Duquette's willingness to deal draft picks.
Participants: Elie Waitzer, Patrick Dougherty, Avi Miller

Elie Waitzer: The Orioles got two Minor League arms - Brandon Barker and Trevor Belicek - from the Braves in exchange for Brian Matusz, but the real swap had nothing to do with any of those players. Atlanta immediately DFA'd Matusz, and the neither of the arms were thought of as prospects. If you want to read about how Barker and Belicek might pan out, Chris Mitchell did a good write up on Fangraphs.

Broken down into simple terms, this was a creative win-now/win-later trade between Dan Duquette and Braves GM John Coppolella. Baltimore got present-day financial flexibility by offloading the remaining $3M of Matusz contract. Atlanta got future financial flexibility in the form of an additional $830K in bonus pool allocation that comes with the 76th draft pick that will allow the Braves to be more aggressive in the draft.

This is clearly not a stand-alone trade, and it's how Duquette springboards off of this move that will determine whether it was worth it for the Orioles to reduce their ability to potentially grab better talent in mid-late rounds of the drafts (with the 27th, 54th, and 69th picks.) 

The best case scenario is that the $3M in savings will give Duquette some extra wiggle room at the trade deadline to make the O's a more attractive trading partner for teams looking to deal starting pitching. The ability to take on more of a player's contract gives Baltimore an edge over other teams, and makes up in part for the fact that they won't be able to offer the kind of prospects other teams will (Keith Law ranked the O's farm system 27th at the start of 2016). 

Before the start of the season, Matt Kremnitzer looked at the best and worst cases for the rotation and set a pessimistic tone by referencing Fangraphs' dismal projections for the O's starters. Despite their collective 3.80 ERA, the ragtag starting staff has vastly outperformed expectations, ranking ninth in the league by total WAR (3.9) thus far. But the pleasant start has been fueled largely by strong starts from Chris Tillman and Kevin Gausman, not by solid depth 1 through 5.  If this move leads (or partially leads) to the O's landing rotation help in the form of James Shields, Rich Hill, Jimmy Nelson, or any solid arm that can take innings away from Mike Wright and Tyler Wilson, I'll consider it a win. Until then, the jury is out. 

Patrick Dougherty: They say to trust your gut, and with a few days to think on this deal, I feel the same way I did when my phone buzzed with the notification. Brian Matusz has been a non-factor for the Orioles for years, and taking his $3.9 million salary (or the $3M of it that the Braves will assume) off the books is, in a vacuum, a win. I thought the Orioles were overpaying for Matusz when they made the one-year deal to avoid arbitration because I didn't think of him as anything more than a mediocre LOOGY (lefties have hit him for a .276 average in his career, although Matusz has successfully stayed away from giving lefties walks or home runs). Apparently, the team thought Matusz could work his way into a less specialized bullpen role, or at least into a decent return in a trade. Clearly, he could not.

The minor good of ridding the team of a player who directly affects about 3% of the Orioles' innings in a year (50 IP/1,458 innings in 162 9-inning games) is vastly outweighed by the bad of giving up the 76th pick in next year's draft. The stars-and-scrubs method of roster construction is highly variant and, in my opinion, a mistake to pursue. Particularly for a team that is in one of the smallest markets in the league and likes to paint itself as being cash-strapped, the best way to build a competitive roster is through drafting and developing well. The Orioles do neither.

In some cases, I may be tempted to argue that because the Orioles have proven themselves to be largely incapable of drafting and developing players, particularly pitchers, it makes sense for the team to ditch picks in favor of cash with which to bring in arms that have learned the game elsewhere. That specialization of labor model might be attractive if the Orioles sat atop a pile of cash the way the Yankees or the Dodgers do, but I'm tired of making the argument in favor of giving up on what is the Orioles' most obvious path for continued, cheap success.

Instead, I'll go in the opposite direction. Because the Orioles are ineffective drafters, they should be taking a shotgun approach: take the best players available as often as possible and pray that one of them becomes the exception to the organization's deflating rule.

If I sound fed up, I am. During the offseason, the Warehouse talks about the importance of draft picks and why the team just can't give them up to sign premiere free agents who were extended qualifying offers. This Matusz trade marks the second time in two years that the organization has given away a pick to dump the relatively meager salary of an average reliever (not to mention the pick given up for Bud Norris and the many international signing slots the team has traded away in recent years).

The Matusz trade is, in my opinion, a failure both in terms of the potential that the team jettisoned by trading away a competitive balance pick, and in terms of continuing the Orioles' precedent of undervaluing draft picks. I don't believe $3 million in wiggle room is going to allow the team to bring in a stud pitcher at the deadline; they cost a lot more than that, and the budget is already stretched, as far as anyone outside the Warehouse knows. I do believe that the team consistently undervalues draft picks - or realizes that they're so bad with them that they're using them as currency because they've given up.

Avi Miller: So why exactly did the Orioles even tender Matusz heading into 2016? Complaints abound among the Baltimore fan base, Dan Duquette knew very well that Matusz would command a fourth-year arbitration salary above $3.2 million, his 2015 earnings.

Matusz, despite popular belief, could have been a very serviceable middle relief arm in 2015. Though his career average against when facing left-handed hitters is .276, as Patrick noted, I redirect your attention to his 2015 showing against that same group: .185/.231/.333 across 109 batters faced.

Thus, as a LOOGY, Matusz slotted in quite nicely. Even when he took the mound against almost the equivalent number of batters in the right-handed batter's box, the results were not dreadful: .238/.375/.346 across 97 batters faced (16 walks killed him against this group).

So a salary expectation in the mid-$3 million range for a left-hander after a 49-inning season to the tune of a 2.94 ERA wasn't absurd, to say the least. And here's why.

Name	Games	Innings Pitched	ERA	FIP	xFIP	fWAR	K/9	BB/9	HR/9	BABIP	GB%
Brian Matusz	186	151.2	3.32	3.50	3.87	1.8	9.44	3.15	0.89	.289	36.4%
Tony Sipp	172	142.2	3.22	3.45	3.63	1.7	10.54	3.41	1.01	.253	32.6%
Zach Duke	171	150.2	3.58	3.57	3.16	1.1	9.44	3.52	0.90	.301	55.9%

The table above compares Matusz to two other notable lefty relievers, Tony Sipp and Zach Duke. The numbers shown are from the 2013-2015 seasons.

Tony Sipp, a veteran who had a choppy history with both Cleveland and Arizona before settling in Houston a couple years ago, signed a three-year, $18 million contract to return to the Astros prior to the 2016 campaign.

Zach Duke, taking an even bumpier road starting in Pittsburgh back in 2005, earned a three-year, $15 million contract with the White Sox two offseasons ago.

As such, Brian Matusz was on his way to a nice little payday following the 2016 season. How he gets there now is a bit more in question.

What Happened To Brian Matusz?

Here's what’s crazy about the Brian Matusz situation: he was good last year. Legitimately good. Just last year! Against 206 batters, split nearly evenly between righties and lefties, he had a solid 71 ERA-, 85 FIP-, and 98 xFIP-. His K-BB rate was an excellent 17.5%, nearly 30% better than a league-average reliever.

But he couldn’t find it again in 2016. Against 35 batters he put up an ERA- of 290, FIP-, of 303, and xFIP- of 248. That’s while striking out a paltry 2.9% (just one batter!) and walking an astounding 20%. On top of that, he surrendered three HR in six innings, with two coming in the same game.

It's just six innings, but -- what the hell happened?

Matusz stopped throwing strikes. Hitters waited him out, taking their walks, and crushed what he gave them, refusing to strike out. The speed with which hitters caught up to him, and the severity with which they tagged him, is odd to me. Matusz was never stellar but he was never this bad.

His Zone% plummeted:

Hitters didn't chase like they did in 2015. In particular, they spat on his fastball and slider, which he'd used as strikeout pitches:

In 2015, these two pitches accounted for 50 strikeouts and 12 walks of 206 batters, amounting to a 24.2% K rate and 5.8% walk rate.

In 2016, these pitches accounted for one strikeout and seven walks of 35 batters, for terrible 2.8% strikeout and 20% walk rates.

When they did get a pitch to their liking, batters didn’t miss. Opponents' Z-Contact% jumped from 67.2% to 75.8%.

Hitters connected with his fastball and change-up more often:

When they connected, they did more damage:

These weren't fluke hits. Exit velocity shows Matusz's fastball, and to some extent his change-up, were very hittable:

Whew. That's a pretty ugly story. The speed and magnitude of hitters' adjustment to Matusz astounds me. Was it bad luck? Poor sequencing? It wasn't velocity; his fastball was down about 0.80 MPH, which isn't good, but that drop isn't enough to explain the graphs above. And his other pitches were flat or even up. His horizontal release points separated out a bit compared to last year, but again, could those fractions of an inch really make that much of a difference?

The first graph tells the story to me: Matusz lost his command. He couldn't locate his fastball like he used to in order to put hitters away. That, and perhaps some pitch-tipping (or amazing advance scouting) led to hitters laying off the heater and the slider because they were ahead in the count. Thus the high walk rate and increased damage on pitches in the zone.

Finally, his HR/FB rate of 30% indicates some bad luck. Matusz had been keeping the ball on the ground better than ever before; his GB/FB rate of 1.10 was the highest of his career. That's what you want to see from a pitcher who's not striking out a lot of batters.

He'll be back in the majors. Matusz is left-handed, 29 years old, and making reasonable money. He's one season removed from a good year and his struggles came on so rapidly and sharply that other teams may see them as a fluke. Besides, his stinker of a 2016 is only six innings.

Plus, he's coming from the Orioles. Some team is bound to look at him and think they can do what the Cubs did to Jake Arrieta. Neither the Orioles nor the Braves need him, but there are 28 more teams who might.

Fare thee well, Brian Matusz. You never lived up to your promise as the number four overall pick, but you were a good reliever for a few years and you deserve a tip of the cap from this fanbase.

Microtrends: Brian Matusz's Success

During April, I looked at a few patterns for Brad Brach and Caleb Joseph, both of whom have sustained those early numbers (to differing extents). Within a 162-game season, these types of microtrends will present themselves, although the games that surround them can obscure their significance. I'll look at some of these trends in the weeks to come, starting with Baltimore's favorite quasi-LOOGY.

To begin the season, Brian Matusz sucked. Like, more-walks-than-strikeouts sucked. More precisely: From his 2015 debut on April 8th, to his May 19th outing, Matusz compiled 13.1 innings, in which he struck out 12.3% of the batters he faced, walked 15.8%, and gave up a 53.8% fly ball rate. A .184 BABIP kept his ERA at a low 2.70, but the 6.47 xFIP (!) he posted foreshadowed bad times to come.

Well, those bad times haven't come yet, and based on what Matusz has done since then, I'd say they won't come back this season. From May 21st until now, he's pitched about the same amount of innings as he did before, but to much better results: a 37.1% K%, 11.3% BB%, and 44.8% FB%, giving him a 3.07 xFIP for that span. Maintaining that depreciated BABIP, he's also allowed far fewer earned runs — 1.88 of them per nine innings.

Interestingly, Matusz underwent something of a similar transformation last year, when his 5.05 xFIP through the first three months of the year gave way to a 2.75 xFIP across the final three. Writing during that September, I observed the two impetuses of this: Matusz faced more lefties, and gained velocity. Those factors have helped to cause his 2015 reversal as well, but there's something else at play here.

As a starter, as a reliever, as a swingman, in a box, with a fox, Matusz has severely struggled against right-handed batters. They've abused him for a .365 wOBA this year, and for a .372 wOBA in his career. Lefties, on the other hand (get it?), have given him little trouble — he's held them to a 2015 wOBA of .214, and an all-time wOBA of .268. Thus, it makes sense that he'd do better when able to see more of the latter:

Period	TBF	Lefties	Lefty%
4/8-5/19	57	22	38.6%
5/21-7/7	62	34	54.8%

The Orioles, it seems, have deployed Matusz more intelligently, and have reaped the rewards of that decision. Of course, him throwing harder hasn't hurt — on every pitch in his arsenal, Matusz's velocity has spiked:

Period	Fourseam	Sinker	Change	Slider	Curve
4/8-5/19	90.6	89.9	82.0	84.9	76.4
5/21-7/7	91.9	91.5	84.0	85.3	79.8

But handedness and power alone can't account for all of Matusz's improvement. Possibly the biggest change he's made comes from one pitch, which many people once deemed his best: his changeup. As a scrub, Matusz relied on it heavily; as a star, not so much:

Period	Fourseam	Sinker	Change	Slider	Curve
4/8-5/19	37.7%	7.6%	25.9%	24.1%	4.7%
5/21-7/7	47.8%	9.3%	9.3%	31.0%	2.6%

The slider and four-seam fastball have all but phased out the changeup.

Why has Matusz relegated this formerly-deadly pitch to part-time duty? It certainly doesn't lack bite, as it took on more velocity than any other pitch in his repertoire, save the curveball. And while he toiled through April and most of May, it led all of his pitches in whiff rate (14.6%).

In terms of true talent, though, Matusz's slider and four-seamer most likely dwarf the changeup. The former two put up swinging strike rates of 16.5% and 11.0%, respectively, over Matusz's first two full years in relief (2013-2014), compared to 10.0% for the latter in that time. And indeed, since he turned the corner this year, the slider has induced 20.5% whiffs, the four-seamer 17.2%, and the changeup 8.0%. Recognizing this, and adjusting his usage accordingly, has driven Matusz to excellence.

Matusz's streak of progress is but one of the intriguing facets of this season for the O's, and we'll look at some more in the future. The halfway point of the 2015 season has just passed, so we still have a lot more baseball to go. Hopefully, Matusz will remain effective for all of that time; perhaps his teammates will follow his example, and make leaps of their own.

The Camden Highball (Episode 13): The Rosters They Are a-Movin'

I swear there's a good reason for this picture...
you'll have to listen to find out why (photo via Keith Allison)

It's a new week and a new show for the Camden Highball.  This week Pat and Nate talk to Jeff Long of Baseball Prospectus and Baltimore Sports and Life to get his thoughts on Oliver Drake and the unique pitch that he throws.  Jeff also revisits his thoughts on Manny Machado as the 2015 MVP and if Steve Pearce can bounce back from a dismal start to the season.

This week's musical guest is the band jason., performing the song "Rarities".  They have been on indefinite hiatus so long that the only place to find their music is on their myspace page.

Camden Highball (Episode 13): The Rosters They Are a-Movin'

0:00 - jason. - "Rarities"

3:58 - Welcome to Episode 13

5:18 - Roster Moving!

11:10 - Revisiting the Brian Matusz Suspension

14:15 - Jeff Long joins the show

15:22 - Oliver Drake throws a pretty interesting pitch

21:46 - Can Steve Pearce bounce back?

28:20 - Manny Machado as 2015 MVP?

38:20 - Outtakes (pre-planning a Logan Forsythe centric episode)

The Camden Highball (Episode 11): Talkin' Bats with Juan Baret

Brian Matusz partakes in some "shenanigans"

This week, Pat and Nate talk to Juan Baret, the owner and operator of Baret Bats, which specializes in handcrafted custom made wood baseball bats.  We talk to him about his inspirations for beginning his business, the types of materials he uses, the Emerald Ash Borer, and more.  We also discuss the growing legend of Mike Wright and the shenanigans of Brian Matusz that will likely lead to his suspension.

As with our previous episode, we begin the podcast with a song by a local musician.  This week's show begins with "productivity" by Maryland artist p.zorito.  You can find his music on his Bandcamp website, and follow him on twitter at @diarrhea.

Camden Highball (Episode 11): Talkin' Bats with Juan Baret

0:00 - p.zorito - "productivity"
3:50 - Pat demonstrates his commitment to the podcast
6:04 - The amazing Mike Wright
14:15 - Brian Matusz prefers a high SPF for sun protection
20:00 - Juan Baret of Baret Bats joins the show
23:19 - Types of wood Juan uses to make bats
24:46 - Juan gives his thoughts on white ash and the Emerald Ash Borer
26:31 - Customizing Baret Bats
33:48 - Juan's thoughts on the AL East

Should the Orioles Flip Schoop and Matusz to the Mets for Daniel Murphy?

The Orioles have a crowded, inflexible bullpen and seemingly have an extra reliever or two who may be available. The Mets are looking for a left-handed reliever and have shown some interest in Brian Matusz. And already this offseason the O's have been willing to deal Matusz. They've also been stretching him out, possibly showcasing him for other teams, and Matusz clearly wants the opportunity to start again.

The Orioles also need an upgrade at second base, or at least need to receive better production in 2015 from their second baseman, Jonathan Schoop (or Everth Cabrera, Ryan Flaherty, and/or someone else). The most likely scenario is that Schoop gets the nod as the opening day starter, and then the O's go from there depending on how he performs. But with so many impending free agents, the O's are also in a win-now mode of sorts and could be looking at a very different roster in 2016 and beyond. That doesn't mean the Orioles should haphazardly sacrifice all or most of the future to compete in 2015, and by letting Nelson Cruz, Nick Markakis, and Andrew Miller walk, refusing to spend big on any free agents, and rebuffing all Kevin Gausman and Dylan Bundy trade inquiries, they obviously aren't doing that. But a repeat American League East crown is surely within reach, and every little bit helps.

So would it be worth parting with Schoop, an unknown quantity offensively, to get more of an assured upgrade this season?

Out of left field trade idea: Daniel Murphy for Brian Matusz and Jonathan Schoop?
— Jon Shepherd (@jsbearr) March 16, 2015

I don't think many fans would have a real issue parting with Matusz. He's certainly an effective LOOGY, but he'll make $3.2 million this season in his third year of arbitration, and as a Super Two player (meaning he has four arbitration-eligible years), will make a bit more next year as well. That's a lot to pay a situational reliever, and that money could be better allocated elsewhere, especially since the O's recently signed a left-handed specialist in Wesley Wright and also have T.J. McFarland and possibly Tim Berry as relief options. (Zach Britton, the closer, is left handed as well.)

So, really, this conceivable though unlikely trade hinges on Daniel Murphy (who the O's and Dan Duquette have checked in on in the past) vs. Schoop. Murphy, 29, is in his last year of arbitration (he'll make $8 million) and will be a free agent after this season. Schoop, meanwhile, is only 23 and is under team control through 2019. In one full season of work, Schoop impressed defensively but was terrible offensively (67 wRC+). He should be better next season, but young players don't magically get better just because they have more experience. And how much of a leap will he make? Murphy, though, grades out worse defensively but is a clear improvement offensively (108 wRC+).

Year	Age	Tm	G	PA	AB	HR	SB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS	OPS+
2008	23	NYM	49	151	131	2	0	.313	.397	.473	.871	130
2009	24	NYM	155	556	508	12	4	.266	.313	.427	.741	96
2011	26	NYM	109	423	391	6	5	.320	.362	.448	.809	126
2012	27	NYM	156	612	571	6	10	.291	.332	.403	.735	103
2013	28	NYM	161	697	658	13	23	.286	.319	.415	.733	108
2014 ★	29	NYM	143	642	596	9	13	.289	.332	.403	.734	111
6 Yrs			773	3081	2855	48	55	.290	.333	.419	.752	109
162 Game Avg.			162	646	598	10	12	.290	.333	.419	.752	109

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 3/16/2015.

Realistically, Murphy will be better than Schoop in 2015. But then he'd likely depart. So the real question is: How good do you think Schoop can be? If you think he can progress enough offensively to league average or close to it, while also performing well defensively, then it makes sense to hold onto him. But if you think he'll keep swinging at everything in sight while not walking and maintaining an on-base percentage around .270, then it would be easier to deal him. And depending on what the O's do this upcoming offseason, Schoop's ongoing development may come during a time when there's a diminished chance to compete.

I don't think Murphy is enough of an upgrade to consider trading away Schoop. I also think Schoop still possesses a decent amount of upside with the bat and could quickly become a building block. Showalter clearly values defense, and Schoop has the advantage in that department. In all likelihood, the O's won't be dealing Schoop, and the Mets might prefer to hold onto Murphy anyway. Maybe the Orioles could simply trade Matusz for Logan Verrett, who was a recent Rule 5 pick from the Mets, for roster flexibility purposes. That wouldn't be nearly as much of a gamble.

O's Sign Wesley Wright, a Potential Replacement for Brian Matusz

On Tuesday night, the Orioles reached an agreement with left-handed reliever Wesley Wright on a one-year deal. Wright, who turns 30 in January, was a seventh-round draft pick by the Dodgers in 2003 and a Rule 5 selection by the Astros in 2007. He has pitched in parts of seven major league seasons with the Astros, Rays, and Cubs.

Entering his final arbitration year with a projected salary of around $2 million (he made about $1.4 million in 2014), Wright was non-tendered by the Cubs earlier this month.

Year	Age	Tm	Lg	SV	IP	ERA+	FIP	BB9	SO9
2008	23	HOU	NL	1	55.2	85	5.00	5.5	9.2
2009	24	HOU	NL	0	44.2	76	5.29	5.0	9.5
2010	25	HOU	NL	0	33.0	70	5.14	3.5	7.9
2011	26	HOU	NL	0	12.0	261	3.52	3.8	8.3
2012	27	HOU	NL	1	52.1	124	3.34	2.9	9.3
2013	28	TOT	AL	0	53.2	110	3.92	3.2	9.2
2013	28	HOU	AL	0	41.1	104	4.06	3.5	8.7
2013	28	TBR	AL	0	12.1	136	3.45	2.2	10.9
2014	29	CHC	NL	0	48.1	121	3.44	3.5	6.9
7 Yrs				2	299.2	97	4.27	4.0	8.7

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 12/16/2014.

Unlike Brian Matusz, who made 68 career starts at the major league level before being moved to the bullpen, Wright has almost exclusively been used as a reliever (only four major league starts, all in 2010). Throwing out the starter innings, here's how they compare:

Matusz: 116.0 IP, 9.47 K/9, 2.79 BB/9, 3.28 FIP, 3.61 xFIP, 37.6 GB%, 7.9% HR/FB
Wright: 280.2 IP, 8.79 K/9, 3.98 BB/9, 4.23 FIP, 3.78 xFIP, 48.4 GB%, 14.2% HR/FB

Wright's sample size is much larger than Matusz's -- by more than 164 innings. But Matusz does have superior numbers, almost across the board. Wright has a nearly 11% advantage in groundball rate, but he's also extremely susceptible to the long ball.

Using career innings splits, though, Wright is similar to Matusz in terms of retiring left-handed batters.

Matusz: 150.2 IP, .273 wOBA against, 10.69 K/9, 2.21 BB/9
Wright: 138.0 IP, .292 wOBA against, 10.24 K/9, 3.20 BB/9

Again, Wright walks more batters, but those numbers are pretty close.

Wright relies on five different pitches, which is a bit odd for a reliever. Many only need two or three. Or some, like Zach Britton, basically rely on one phenomenal pitch. But over the last couple seasons, he's thrown five different pitches more than 8% of the time. Those pitches would be a four-seam fastball, sinker, curveball, and change-up. Wright rarely throws change-ups to lefties and generally sticks to four-seamers, sinkers, and sliders, but he mixes in more curveballs and change-ups to right-handers.

Unlike Wright, Matusz can't become a free agent until 2017 since he's eligible for four arbitration years as a Super Two player. He's also a little younger (he turns 28 in February) and better. But he's also a bit more expensive, and the Orioles do at least appear open to using Matusz as a trade chip to improve another part of the team.

With Andrew Miller gone, the left-handed options in the bullpen are currently Zach Britton and T.J. McFarland, along with Matusz and Wright. Britton will likely resume his role as closer, and McFarland could find himself back in Norfolk, especially if the Orioles end up keeping all six of their current starting pitching options -- Chris Tillman, Kevin Gausman, Wei-Yin Chen, Bud Norris, Ubaldo Jimenez, and Miguel Gonzalez. So there could conceivably be a role for both Wright and Matusz in the same bullpen, depending on its construction. But since both are pretty awful against right-handed batters, it would be difficult, and it would also limit Buck Showalter's options in late-game situations. Also, like Matusz, Wright is out of minor league options.

If the O's do end up parting ways with Matusz, Wright should at least do a decent job of replacing him. His walk and HR/FB rates are concerning, though perhaps the O's see value in his high groundball rate with a strong infield defense working behind him. And if anyone knows how to get the most out of various relief options, it's Showalter.