Other Second-Base Options at Norfolk

Since last week's report on Jonathan Schoop, several things have happened. First, the Tides have played a week's worth of games against teams good (Buffalo) and bad (Syracuse). Second, the Orioles have continued their winning ways. Third, the Orioles' second basemen have continued to play poorly (it's probably not a good sign when your team's television commentators praise you for getting a bloop single, as the Orioles' did for Ryan Flaherty.) Because the Orioles are playing well, upgrading second base isn't urgent. But it's certainly possible that the lack of production at second base will start to cost the Orioles, and they'll look to Norfolk for a replacement.

As I wrote last week, it would probably be in the Orioles' best long-term interest to keep Jonathan Schoop at Norfolk for all of 2013. On the other hand, if the Orioles need a second baseman, and Schoop is the only option, then they'll have to bite the bullet, promote Schoop, and hope that he can pull a Manny Machado. There are two other options at Norfolk, both of whom are currently playing well and who are on the forty-man roster.

Danny Valencia has been the Tides' regular third baseman. He's been hitting very well, .288/.323/.508 through May 9. He's a better defensive third baseman than his numbers look; two of the errors he's been charged with were very borderline calls (the official scorer has admitted that he'd have changed one call if he'd been asked to.) He'll never walk a lot, but he's made consistent hard contact and four of his strikeouts were in the first three games of the season. If the Orioles get desperate at second base, the Orioles could recall Valencia to play third, and either move Manny Machado to second or Machado to short and J.J. Hardy to second.

I wouldn't do it, not because Valencia wouldn't be an improvement over the Orioles' second basemen but because the other moves cause problems. If you move Machado to second, you'll be teaching him a third position in two seasons. Second base is perhaps the hardest position to learn from a technical standpoint. I believe Machado's future is at shortstop; if you move him to second base, it'll be harder to move him back to short later. Moving both Hardy and Machado has the disadvantage of having two players learning new positions in the middle of the season. Recalling Valencia would be an absolute desperation move.

Yamaico Navarro has mostly been playing shortstop, and he's also seen time at second base. He's hitting .317/.405/.462, which is substantially better than he has hit in the past. Since Jonathan Schoop moved to second base, Navarro has been playing shortstop, and his throwing arm is amazing -- in the sense that almost every throw is a line drive to the first baseman's chest. Although he hasn't played a lot of second base in his career, he has played there some and would be better defensively than Jonathan Schoop. Interestingly, in the games I've seen he has neither walked nor struck out a lot; but that goes against his overall season numbers in which he's walked and struck out 15-20% of the time.

 If the Orioles did decide to promote either Valencia or Navarro to replace their second baseman, they'd be taking a risk. Both Valencia and Navarro are playing well, and are likely to regress to their average performance. On the other hand, their current second basemen are likely to progress to their average performance. Until the Orioles stop playing well, their best plan is probably to continue as they are and wait the expected improvement.

Strikezone Analysis for May 07 - 09: Royals at Orioles

Series Thoughts

After the difficult night Wieters had behind the plate in the opening game of the series, it was nice to see much more favorable called borderline strike rates in the second and third games. In the 8 games played in May so far, the Orioles have fallen below 50% T-R strikes just once and borderline strikes twice. That's a much better trend than what we saw earlier in the season.

Overall, the Orioles staff may be benefiting from a general decline in strikes called balls and borderline pitches called balls. While the correlation may not be as strong as with overall batters faced or the final score, there does appear to be some correlation (not statistical, but "eyeball test") with the number of pitches thrown by the Orioles and higher borderline called strike rates. This may be something to keep an eye on as the season progresses and bullpen fatigue potentially becomes a factor.

Data: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0An-w9dFaRvtmdENTeWZnczVZUERyc25Gd1NNOE0xV3c#gid=0

Nick Markakis's Power Outage

Nick Markakis has been a productive player for the Orioles since his rookie season in 2006, but things really came together for him in 2008, when he posted a .306/.406/.491 batting line. That offseason, he signed a six-year, $66 million extension, with the Orioles expecting at least a handful of similar seasons to follow. Unfortunately, Markakis hasn't approached that banner 2008 year. He still gets on base at a decent clip, but his power numbers have really fallen off.

Here are his on-base, slugging, and wOBA numbers since 2008:

Year	PA	OBP	SLG	wOBA
2009	711	.347	.453	.349
2010	709	.370	.436	.353
2011	716	.351	.406	.333
2012	471	.363	.471	.359
2013	154	.318	.357	.296

Markakis's 2013 numbers are included above, but it's still sort of early in the season. Still, besides reversing the power trend last season, his power has been declining pretty steadily. He obviously has plenty of time to turn things around in 2013, but it wouldn't be surprising to see his slugging percentage stay closer to .400 than .471.

It's important that Markakis is still efficient at getting on base (though he is in a funk right now). His walk rate has dipped slightly the last few years, but he's still doing fine in that department (7.3 BB%). It's likely that that number will be over 8 percent before the season is over. But if Markakis is not going to do much more than hit lots of singles and walk (he only has seven extra-base hits at the moment), then the O's are paying a ton of money for a corner outfielder whose defensive skills also appear to be declining.

It's not hard to speculate on a couple of reasons for Markakis's recent lack of power. I'm not going to say the Orioles ran Markakis into the ground ever since he debuted with the team, but O's managers probably could have done a better job of giving him more rest. Before his injury-shortened 2012, he played in at least 147 games in every season -- and at least 157 after 2006. That workload would take a toll on many players, even one as durable as Markakis.

Also, due to some bad luck, Markakis struggled to stay on the field in 2012. Things got off to an ominous start when he had abdominal surgery in January of 2012, but he recovered sufficiently before the season started. Then in the middle of the season, he missed all of June and about half of July after having surgery to remove a broken hamate bone from his right wrist. A couple months later a CC Sabathia fastball broke his left thumb in September, which ended his season. Then in March, it was reported that he was dealing with a sore neck, so he rested for a couple of weeks.

Oddly enough, Markakis just had his best year since 2008. But was it just a temporary improvement? Are the injuries catching up to him now? Really, it's likely a combination of both. At this point in his career, he probably won't be as good offensively going forward as he was last season (and certainly not in 2008). It's also possible that the thumb and neck injuries are having at least some negative effect on his power, or even just his swing in general.

The best thing the O's could do is try to keep Markakis as healthy as possible by giving him some time at DH, like they've already done a few times this season, and hope that he picks it up shortly. His numbers certainly aren't approaching Ryan Flaherty territory, and there's plenty of time for Markakis to go on a tear and have his numbers tick up a bit.

But it would be foolish at this point to expect Markakis to start hitting a bunch of home runs or even 40-plus doubles again. He's still a very smart hitter who can take a walk and slap hits to any part of the field. But those hits are likely going to be singles.

Wins are an Imperfect Way to Measure Who is Best

Bill Parcells once uttered these words which have become a silly mantra.

You are what your record says you are.

Why is this silly?  I think there is a kernel of truth in Parcells statement.  Our current state is a product of what we have done, so in a way we are what we were.  However, this is a statement that is fraught with potential error.  What if the way in which we define ourselves and others is an imperfect way of defining ourselves and others?  What if what we use to measure does not translate accurately what we are?  Is your record truly defining you.

We know that any statistic in baseball, wins included, is an approximation of ability.  You truly are not measuring ability, you are measuring the impact of ability.  Stats are the imprint of the hand, not the hand.  That imprint can have errors.  This is a known fact.  OK, maybe some do not know this to be true as I somehow spent much of Monday discussing why statistics are not perfect definitions of ability.

Maybe a picture will help.


What we have in the above diagram are really three components: ability, fortune, and result.  Ability is the grey circle full of components that make up how well a team will perform.  Fortune is represented by a magnet as it contains elements like where balls go in the field or how events stack up on each other, which can alter how well ability will translate into an outcome.  The result is simply that outcome.

Let’s step through this graphic piece by piece.

Ability
This category can go by a lot of names, so we should not be too hung up on whether I chose to name this the right thing.  What I mean to put in here is basically the sum result of active elements, items that we can be informed about, items that we are able to change by choice.  This includes traditional concepts of team like talent, training, health, and coaching; but also items that perhaps people do not think about as much, such as scheduling.  All of these elements affect how well a team can perform.  That level of performance is what we are trying to find when we look to name a team the best at something.  However, this is a very difficult thing to measure.  It may well be impossible to measure, so we try to find a way to determine who has the best ability.

Result
The way we try to figure this out is by converting ability into wins by the way of runs scored and runs given.  This is how we define the outcome of a single game.  With a sport where the best team won 60% of their games and the worst won 34% of their games, it takes a pretty long season to figure out which team is the best.  This is not like football where you can have a team flirt with perfection one way or another.  In baseball, you need a larger sample size than 16 to figure it all out.

Right?  Well, that is because wins are an imperfect measure of which team has the most ability.  Why is a single win not a sufficient way to measure how good a team is?

Fortune
This is another section to not get too bog down into what it is called.  You can call this component fortune, luck, chance, randomness, etc.  Basically, this grouping is what makes wins an imprecise measure of which team is the best because it will affect how ability is converted into wins.
An example, Balls in Play.

This is something we have all experienced multiple times playing this game or watching it.  One team is striking guys out left and right while putting up an extra base hit every inning while the other team somehow manages to have balls hit right to them when the opponent is in scoring position and managing to have a wind aided ball carry just over the fence.  With our eyes, we see that the better team lost.

There is nothing that can be trained or taught that can shift a hard hit line drive straight to a second baseman versus five feet to the right.  That is the same amount of ability from the batter, but one ends in an out and the other might turn into a double.  That is an error in conversion.  The hope is that by playing 162 games that the noise that the conversion error generates will be muted…that the signal (who is better) emerges from the messy noise of wins and losses.

But What About the Post-season?
Well, after using the entire season to figure out who the best teams are, we do not have many options left.  We accept a shorter schedule that will award one of the best teams with a championship.  The championship is not designed to determine which team is truly the one with the best ability, merely the best possible way to figure out who might be.  One game series will not figure out which is the better team, nor will seven game series.

That is OK.  We do not need the World Series to definitively determine which team is best.  It works merely in determining who wins the most, which can be different from which team has the most ability.

Restating It All
So, the basic fact of this is that wins are an imperfect measure of the best team.  Ability does not neatly translate over to wins because there are elements beyond ability that affect that conversion.  That is OK.  With a long enough season, differentiation can be good enough to set up a playoff among many of the best teams.  A shortened post-season is fine because trimming away the lesser teams and letting the best teams duke it out is a sound approach.  However, we know that the team with the most wins is not automatically the best team.  They might be, they might not.  And that is OK.

Strikezone Analysis for May 02 - 05: Orioles at Angels

Summary Data: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0An-w9dFaRvtmdENTeWZnczVZUERyc25Gd1NNOE0xV3c#gid=0

May 05, 2013: Baltimore Orioles - 8, Los Angeles Angels - 4

Umpire	Real	% of Total	% of Chances	Typical	% of Total	% of Chances
Correct Calls	163	92.09%		151	85.31%
Incorrect Calls	14	7.91%		26	14.69%
Balls Called Balls	126	71.19%	94.03%	108	61.02%	98.18%
Strikes Called Strikes	37	20.90%	86.05%	43	24.29%	64.18%
Strikes Called Balls	6	3.39%	13.95%	24	13.56%	35.82%
Balls Called Strikes	8	4.52%	5.97%	2	1.13%	1.82%
Borderline - Balls	26	14.69%	63.41%
Borderline - Strikes	15	8.47%	36.59%

Sunday Comics: Go-Ahead Winners

I decided to try something a bit more minimalist this week when drawing Steve Pearce for the site. I was inspired by the art for Off, a French computer game that dates back several years but which has recently been translated into English and has achieved enormous popularity.

Yes, I do spend a lot of time on Tumblr, if you're wondering.

Jonathan Schoop at Norfolk

It's hardly a stunning revelation that the Orioles are not getting much out of their second basemen. After Brian Roberts was injured after three games, second base has been in the hands of Ryan Flaherty and Alexi Casilla. Casilla's slash stats of .219/.242/.281 (all stats are through April 30) are good only in comparison to Flaherty's .125/.210/.232. The Orioles' consensus #3 prospect, Jonathan Schoop, is currently at AAA Norfolk and many observers think he's being groomed as a second baseman. Offensively, Schoop is not lighting it up at Norfolk, with a line of .222/.315/.321. But how is he doing? Could he be promoted and help at some point? I've worked nine of the Tides' games through May 1, either datacasting for milb.com or scoring for BIS, and these are my observations.

Schoop began the season as a shortstop, playing occasionally at second base. He played more frequently at second base on a recent road trip and his bat warmed up, so, he's been playing more frequently at second base. I think that's a good move; I think it's very unlikely that Schoop can stay at shortstop. He's a big young man, and he's not as mobile as Omar Vizquel or Ozzie Smith. While a big man can play shortstop well - think Cal Ripken - he will need either a strong throwing arm or outstanding positioning instincts. I don't think Schoop has the arm he'd need to be a shortstop; his throws from medium depth and on double plays fell short and had to be scooped by the first baseman. And as a native of Curacao he doesn't have Ripken-esque instincts and knowledge.

I've seen and recorded 32 of Schoop's plate appearances. What I've seen gives me reason for optimism. Even though he hasn't been extremely successful, Schoop hasn't been overmatched at the plate.He's had three walks and seven strikeouts in the games I've seen, in line with his season totals of eight walks and seventeen strikeouts in 92 plate appearances. He's earned one hit-by-pitch, reached base three times on errors, had five base hits, and been retired on thirteen balls in play. Of the eighteen balls he's put in play, he's had four hard-hit balls and four softly-hit balls by my admittedly unsubstantiated and inconsistently-applied measurements. He's generally making good, solid contact, especially for a 21-year-old in Triple-A,

Schoop also hasn't driven me crazy by swinging at a lot of pitches outside the strike zone. Schoop has seen 126 pitches in his 32 plate appearances. He's taken 43 balls, 27 called strikes, and fifteen swinging strikes. He's fouled 23 pitches off and put 18 balls into play. I haven't had the resources to analyze other players for comparison, but  I feel safe in saying that he knows the pitches not to swing at. It's also interesting that he's swung at three of the 32 first pitches he's seen. That may be too low; pitchers will start to groove first-pitch strikes if they know he's not going to swing.

In the last three games I've worked, April 27, 28, and 29, I made a special effort to study Schoop's defense at second base. It's clear that he needs to work on the technical details; on April 27, he messed up the transition from glove hand to throwing hand on a double-play turn when he landed awkwardly on his pivot foot; on April 28, his feet were in an awkward position on a sharp grounder hit right at him and the play wasn't smooth. On the other hand, especially on April 29, he handled more routine plays smoothly enough. I don't think he's yet a good second baseman, but I want to see more.

Jonathan Schoop would benefit from spending the full year at AAA. He needs to master the technical details of fielding second base. I think he has a good knowledge of the strike zone; he needs to learn how to hit less-than-perfect pitches and how to use his size to hit for more power. On the other hand, the Orioles are trying to win games now. I think Schoop would be an improvement over Ryan Flaherty, right now; he's probably not an overall improvement over Alexi Casilla. But if Casilla continues to play poorly, and the Orioles start to play worse, promoting Schoop may be an irresistible option. Next week, I'll look at two other options at Norfolk that may be better for the team than promoting Schoop.

Strikezone Analysis for April 29 - May 01: Orioles at Mariners

May 01, 2013: Baltimore Orioles - 3, Seattle Mariners - 8

Umpire	Real	% of Total	% of Chances	Typical	% of Total	% of Chances
Correct Calls	157	86.26%		163	89.56%
Incorrect Calls	25	13.74%		19	10.44%
Balls Called Balls	108	59.34%	85.04%	96	52.75%	98.97%
Strikes Called Strikes	49	26.92%	89.09%	67	36.81%	78.82%
Strikes Called Balls	6	3.30%	10.91%	18	9.89%	21.18%
Balls Called Strikes	19	10.44%	14.96%	1	0.55%	1.03%
Borderline - Balls	17	9.34%	40.48%
Borderline - Strikes	25	13.74%	59.52%

Alomar in the O’s Hall, But What About Moose!

Roberto Alomar was named yesterday as the newest player inductee to the Orioles’ Hall of Fame.  At first look, this seems like a somewhat peculiar selection.  Alomar spent only three seasons in Baltimore.  Two of them were exceptional seasons ending with playoff frustrations while his final year saw him below average at the plate and seemingly giving only partial effort in the field.  Many fans were upset with him.  However, we should look at how much Alomar actually did contribute to those Orioles’ teams.  Roberto Alomar made the All Star game each year, earned two gold gloves (losing in 2007 to pre-yip Chuck Knoblauch), and winning a Silver Slugger while slashing 312/382/451 .

Albeit short, that is a solid resume.  That is pretty evident by his 11.9 bWAR, which is good for the 5th most of any Orioles second baseman.  Who is ahead of him career-wise for the Orioles?  Fellow Oriole Hall of Famers Bobby Grich (36.0, 7 years), Davey Johnson (20.1, 8 years), and Rich Dauer (14.4, 10 years) along with future Oriole Hall of Famer Brian Roberts (28.4, 13+ seasons).  Alomar’s performance is somewhere around Brian Roberts and Davey Johnson and clearly exceeds what Rich Dauer brought to the team, performance-wise.  Perhaps, one could say that Dauer was inducted partially for what he brought to the team beyond his play.  However, I’d consider Alomar’s induction to be in line with what has happened with other Oriole second basemen.

		Inducted	Oriole WAR	Years
1	Bobby Grich	1998	36.0	7
2	Brian Roberts		28.4	13+
3	Davey Johnson	1997	20.1	8
4	Rich Dauer	2012	14.4	10
5	Robby Alomar	2013	11.9	3

This made me wonder about whether or not there are other players out there who may well have been overlooked with respect to their contributions.  Over a few posts, I will be exploring the team, position by position.  Having already covered second base, first base and catcher will be covered in this post.

First Base

		Inducted	Oriole WAR	Years
1	Eddie Murray	1999	56.4	13
2	Boog Powell	1979	35.3	15
3	Raffy Palmeiro		24.5	7
4	Jim Gentile	1989	14.8	4
5	Randy Milligan		11.1	4

I think we all know that Rafael Palmeiro has the numbers to belong in the Orioles Hall of Fame.  Hurting his bid is the unfortunate positive test result for stanozolol in 2005.  If you ignore that, then you cannot find a suitable reason to refuse him the honor.  However, the more interesting omission is Randy “Moose” Milligan.  Milligan was the excellent and overlooked cog in the early 1990s Orioles teams.  He was the quintessential 2002 “Moneyball” player.  After four strong seasons with the team, he was given his release, excelled as a pinch hitter for a season, and then disappeared.  After his playing days, he wound up scouting for the Orioles.   I think an as good, if not better, argument can be made for the original Moose to make it in the Hall than Roberto Alomar.

Thoughts?

Catcher

		Inducted	Oriole WAR	Years
1	Chris Hoiles	2006	23.5	10
2	Rick Dempsey	1997	21.3	12
3	Matt Wieters		13.1	4+
4	Gus Triandos	1981	12.9	8
5	Mickey Tettleton		8.8	3

In this grouping, based on how the players have been selected at second and first, consideration for the Hall begins with a WAR greater than 10.  It should be noted that Elrod Hendricks is also inducted into the Hall even though he has an Orioles WAR of 6.3.  That honor though really connects his playing days to his loyal service to the organization as a coach.  So, sorry Fruit Loops, you should not wait for admittance.Next time, we will explore shortstop, third base, and designated hitter.

Patiently Aggressive: Nate McLouth's Offensive Resurgence

On a team full of hot starts, Orioles outfielder Nate McLouth's sizzling April is probably the most surprising and unexpected. Currently hitting with a slash line of .346/.452/.513, good for a 164 wRC+ and 161 OPS+, ranking 2^nd in both of those categories on the Orioles, behind only Chris Davis, McLouth is on pace for a career year in many offensive categories. It wasn't so long ago that McLouth's career had stalled, derailed by poor hitting in stops with Pittsburgh and Atlanta. Signed last year by Baltimore to a minor league deal, he started his 2012 season with AAA Norfolk, but worked his way to the bigs, eventually playing in 55 games for the Orioles and giving them a slash line of .268/.342/.435 with 1.2 WAR and 111 wRC+ in return.

McLouth has taken advantage of the opportunities and offensive resurgence of last season and has built upon those good fortunes in 2013. Not only is McLouth showing a sweet stroke from the left side, he is also taking advantage of getting on base and becoming more aggressive on the base paths, as his team leading 8 stolen bases (2^nd in the MLB overall) can attest. Yet, it is what McLouth is doing with bat more so than what he's doing with his legs that is turning heads in the AL and providing Baltimore with a potent leadoff hitter for an offense that touts an impressive amount of power and run driving ability in the form of Davis, Manny Machado, Adam Jones, Matt Wieters, and Nick Markakis.

So what seems to be the secret to McLouth's big start? What is propelling him into these uncharted offensive waters? While there are many opinions and suggestions as to what mechanical changes are possibly at the root of McLouth's success, it might not be a mechanical change so much as a philosophical one that is helping McLouth get off to his hot start.

With the help of Fangraphs, let's look at some PITCHf/x data on McLouth, both for his career and thus far in 2013:

What is striking about McLouth's 2013 start is his balanced hitting approach. Not only is he doing a better job of not swinging at balls outside of the strike zone (O-Swing%), he is also being more selective with what he swings at, as his career low Swing% of 37 percent attest. While practicing a more patient approach, he is also displaying a controlled aggressiveness with pitches in the strike zone, as judged by his Z-Contact% rate, a career best 93.3 percent thus far in 2013. In general, if it's a strike, McLouth is making good contact and putting the ball in play.

How does that make his other hitting rates look?

As seen by this table, McLouth's controlled but aggressive hitting approach is allowing him to enjoy career bests in walk (16 percent) and strikeout (9.6 percent) rates in 2013. Also of note is his ridiculously good BABIP rate – currently at a most likely unsustainable .373, nearly 100 points higher than his career average. While not shown in this table, McLouth's line drive rate for 2013 is at 24.6 percent, a roughly 6 percent jump from his career average of 18.5 percent.

Though many of his hitting rates are probably unsustainable, even if McLouth starts to cool off and regresses back towards to his career slash line of .251/.339/.424, the fact that he has become a more patient hitter and more aggressive with pitches in the strike zone bodes well for him to remain a productive leadoff hitter. Add to this his ability to get on base via the walk and steal a base, along with pitchers throwing him pitches in the strike zone at the highest rate he's seen in his career, McLouth's overall productivity and run scoring ability should remain regression-proof.