Last time, I looked at the pitchers who were on the Norfolk Tides roster for the 2012 home opener and found that three proved to be contributors to a big-league team, six were AAA mainstays who had bigl-league cups of coffee, and four were total washouts. This time, I'll look at the twelve non-pitchers.
Ryan Adams (infielder) — Tides' fans had high hopes for Ryan Adams after a solid 2011, including doing fairly well in a late-season major-league callup. Adams returned to Norfolk for 2012, and he got off to a slow start. He broke his thumb while frustrated; when he returned, he didn't rebound and seemed to be giving less than 100%. He was declared a free agent and has been suspended for fifty games for amphetamine use.
Matt Antonelli (infielder) — Matt Antonelli began the year on the Orioles' 40-man roster. He began the season as a third baseman/second baseman at Norfolk. His offensive approach was to take plenty of pitches, and he earned 19 walks and 23 strikeouts in 116 plate appearances. But he hit for neither average nor power, and was waived off the Orioles' 40-man roster in May. The Yankees claimed him and then released him in July, and he wasn't signed by anyone else.
Xavier Avery (outfielder) — Because Xavier Avery was still raw and hadn't really shown he had mastered AA, he something of a surprise on the opening-day roster. He played well early in the season and earned a callup to Baltimore, where he saw some time in left field. He was sent back down and played less well, although he earned some emergency callups. He ended up hitting .236/.330/.356 in 102 games with Norfolk. Baseball America ranked him as the Orioles' #7 prospect, and he figures to be in the mix for a bench job with the Orioles; if he has a good spring training he might be a candidate for starting left fielder. If he doesn't stick with the Orioles out of spring training, he will probably return to Norfolk.
Scott Beerer (outfielder) — Scott Beerer began 2012 as the Tides' fourth outfielder. With Jai Miller's struggles, he played in 18 games. He got hurt at the end of April and didn't play again the rest of the season. Beerer was declared a free agent after the season.
Josh Bell (infielder) — After two chances to claim the Orioles' third-base job, Josh Bell was still in the Orioles organization, with Norfolk, at the start of the 2012 season. He hit .094 in nine games before being designated for assignment and traded to Arizona. He hit .311 and slugged .509 with the Diamondbacks' AAA team, which earned him another callup. But he hit .173/.232./.269 in the majors with the Diamondbacks, so he was removed from their 40-man roster and is now a free agent.
John Hester (catcher) — John Hester was the primary catcher for the 2011 Tides and survived spring training. But Hester had no history with General Manager Dan Duquette, and was released when the Orioles picked up Luis Exposito. Hester caught on with the Angels and was called up when injuries hit their catching corps. He did an adequate job as a part-time backup catcher and remains on the Angels' 40-man roster.
Jamie Hoffmann (outfielder) — Jamie Hoffmann and Oscar Villarreal were the two Tides who spent all 2012 in Norfolk. Hoffmann began the year as the Tides' regular left fielder. When L.J. Hoes was promoted from Bowie and Nate McLouth was signed, Hoffmann became the fourth outfielder. When McLouth joined Baltimore, Hoffmann saw more playing time, and in 110 games finished the season at .254/.347/.407. Hoffmann was declared a free agent after the season and has signed a minor-league contract with the Mets.
Joe Mahoney (infielder) — Joe Mahoney spent most of 2012 as the Tides' regular first baseman. He led the Tides in games played, at bats, hits, and runs batted in; he also went 0-for-4 in two games with the Orioles. Mahoney didn't hit quite as well as we hoped he would, and when the Orioles removed him from the 40-man roster was claimed on waivers by Miami. He's currently on the Marlins' 40-man roster.
Jai Miller (outfielder) — Jai Miller had an amazing 2012 season. He started the season as the starting right fielder, and hit 8 home runs — including two of the longest I've ever seen at Harbor Park — in 211 plate appearances. He also struck out 95 times in those 211 plate appearances — a rate of 247 strikeouts in 550 plate appearances. Miller was demoted to Bowie where he was equally ineffective; he hit .196 combined. Miller was granted free agency after the season.
Chris Robinson (catcher) — Chris Robinson began the season splitting the catcher position with John Hester, but when the Orioles signed Luis Exposito and assigned Ronny Paulino to Norfolk, Robinson was left with backup duty. 2012 was a down season in Robinson's up-and-down offensive career, and he missed most of the second half with a back injury. The Orioles re-signed him to a minor league contract for 2013, and he projects to be back at Norfolk, either as part of a split-duty catching combination or as a veteran AAA backup.
Steve Tolleson (infielder) — Steve Tolleson began the season as the Tides' starting shortstop, and did well enough to be occasionally called up to Baltimore. He played 29 games at third base, second base, shortstop, and left field as a bench player with the Orioles, but didn't hit (.183/.227/.310). Tolleson did hit better in his 50 games at Norfolk, but was declared a free agent after the season and has signed a minor-league contract with the White Sox.
Zelous Wheeler (infielder) — Zelous Wheeler was a late-spring waiver pickup from the Brewers and was sent to Norfolk to serve as a spare third baseman - second baseman. When the Orioles added Blake Davis to the Tides, Wheeler was sent to Bowie, where he spent most of the season. Wheeler continued his uncanny consistency (2012: .269/.356/.440; career: .271/.368/.414) and rejoined Norfolk briefly. Wheeler wasn't eligible for free agency, and thus remains in the Orioles organization for now.
22 December 2012
21 December 2012
Trade Target: Rick Porcello
Reports circling the internet tonight have linked the Orioles to DET SP Rick Porcello, who some have speculated might be on the move after DET resigned A. Sanchez this offseason. Duquette has been focused on trying to acquire a potential middle of the order bat, but several people close to the team have said it seems like he will make a trade at some point this offseason.
Why Porcello? For starters he's 6'5 200lbs, will be 24 this season even after 4 full years in the majors, and due to some creative subverting of the CBA is 1 day short of a 4th year of service time so he is under team control for 3 more seasons. While his stats show a near replacement level pitcher for his career, he has been durable making 31 starts each year, except for the one season the team sent him down for 4 starts to save the service time which he made 27 starts. He also has a Fangraphs career GB/FB ratio of 1.86 breaking the 2.0 threshold last year with a 2.36, and a career GB% of 52.3 where league average is somewhere around 44%. That aspect makes him enticing in HR friendly Camden Yards, and it sheds more light onto Porcello's numbers as he is reliant on a good infield defense to be the best that he can be, and DET has had a sub par defense for years. Getting him out of DET and to an improved Orioles infield should help his numbers alone, not even allowing for natural maturation as he is getting more experienced and closer to his prime years. Porcello's K/9 rate has been increasing every year, as has his K/BB rate, which is showing better pitching intelligence as he is learning the league and learning better habits.
Porcello throws one of his two fastballs almost 70% of the time, while scattering an equal number of sliders and changeups, and rarely throwing a curve. The problem with this mix is that his slider is very hittable, often hanging middle-in to RHB and it's his change with good sink that he most often gets batters to chase. If he would reduce the number of sliders thrown and go to more of a heavy FB/CH rotation he would be much more effective. Fortunately, BAL currently has a pitching philosophy that lends to a FB/CH/CV arsenal, so there is some potential to get him to change his patterns and use his best tools most often.
What would he cost? That is always a loaded question since actual value for a player isn't determined until he is actually traded. Many times a player is speculated to bring back a large haul to go for less than anticipated, so speculating is kind of a waste...but where is the fun in that? DET is a solid contending team with a future star 3B prospect in the wings, a couple mashers in the middle of the order and a fairly solid rotation after resigning Sanchez. The spot that stands out the most as potential for improvement is at the back end of the BP where the team has said it is comfortable starting with fireballing Rondon and his 100mph fastball to start the season, but one can't help but think that a solid experienced closer, allowing DET to apprentice Rondon as a set up man is a more desirable option. Speculation will naturally center on a deal of Jim Johnson for Porcello, which could make sense for both sides. The O's have players they could audition or move into that role (Arrieta, Hunter, O'Day, Strop) and DET has 6 SP for 5 spots in the rotation with Verlander, Sanchez, Smyly, Fister and Scherzer in addition to Porcello. With Johnson up for FA in 2 years and Porcello in 3 the service times and arbitration costs aren't too far off from each other, it seems like the framework of a deal could be in place.
The Orioles have also been linked to the Mariners possibly for Justin Smoak as a buy low candidate and to free agent Joe Saunders who pitched great down the stretch, but with inflated SP prices could demand quite a premium on the market right now.
Taking a chance that Porcello would break out a bit this year and stabilize the rotation further may be worth the risk of dealing a very solid closer who is getting too expensive for the team and will be looking at large raises in arbitration the next two seasons.
Why Porcello? For starters he's 6'5 200lbs, will be 24 this season even after 4 full years in the majors, and due to some creative subverting of the CBA is 1 day short of a 4th year of service time so he is under team control for 3 more seasons. While his stats show a near replacement level pitcher for his career, he has been durable making 31 starts each year, except for the one season the team sent him down for 4 starts to save the service time which he made 27 starts. He also has a Fangraphs career GB/FB ratio of 1.86 breaking the 2.0 threshold last year with a 2.36, and a career GB% of 52.3 where league average is somewhere around 44%. That aspect makes him enticing in HR friendly Camden Yards, and it sheds more light onto Porcello's numbers as he is reliant on a good infield defense to be the best that he can be, and DET has had a sub par defense for years. Getting him out of DET and to an improved Orioles infield should help his numbers alone, not even allowing for natural maturation as he is getting more experienced and closer to his prime years. Porcello's K/9 rate has been increasing every year, as has his K/BB rate, which is showing better pitching intelligence as he is learning the league and learning better habits.
Porcello throws one of his two fastballs almost 70% of the time, while scattering an equal number of sliders and changeups, and rarely throwing a curve. The problem with this mix is that his slider is very hittable, often hanging middle-in to RHB and it's his change with good sink that he most often gets batters to chase. If he would reduce the number of sliders thrown and go to more of a heavy FB/CH rotation he would be much more effective. Fortunately, BAL currently has a pitching philosophy that lends to a FB/CH/CV arsenal, so there is some potential to get him to change his patterns and use his best tools most often.
What would he cost? That is always a loaded question since actual value for a player isn't determined until he is actually traded. Many times a player is speculated to bring back a large haul to go for less than anticipated, so speculating is kind of a waste...but where is the fun in that? DET is a solid contending team with a future star 3B prospect in the wings, a couple mashers in the middle of the order and a fairly solid rotation after resigning Sanchez. The spot that stands out the most as potential for improvement is at the back end of the BP where the team has said it is comfortable starting with fireballing Rondon and his 100mph fastball to start the season, but one can't help but think that a solid experienced closer, allowing DET to apprentice Rondon as a set up man is a more desirable option. Speculation will naturally center on a deal of Jim Johnson for Porcello, which could make sense for both sides. The O's have players they could audition or move into that role (Arrieta, Hunter, O'Day, Strop) and DET has 6 SP for 5 spots in the rotation with Verlander, Sanchez, Smyly, Fister and Scherzer in addition to Porcello. With Johnson up for FA in 2 years and Porcello in 3 the service times and arbitration costs aren't too far off from each other, it seems like the framework of a deal could be in place.
The Orioles have also been linked to the Mariners possibly for Justin Smoak as a buy low candidate and to free agent Joe Saunders who pitched great down the stretch, but with inflated SP prices could demand quite a premium on the market right now.
Taking a chance that Porcello would break out a bit this year and stabilize the rotation further may be worth the risk of dealing a very solid closer who is getting too expensive for the team and will be looking at large raises in arbitration the next two seasons.
2012 Orioles Retrospective: Adam Jones
Adam Jones. Above average hitter despite plate discipline issues. Gold Glove center-fielder, even though the defensive stats don't like him. Team leader, who entered the season only 26 years old and approaching free agency. Jones may not have quite lived up to the expectation some had of him when he was acquired from the Mariners for Erik Bedard* in previous seasons, but he sure made up for some of that with how he started the 2012 season.
* Along with Chris Tillman. And George Sherrill, who go the team Steven Johnson. And Kam Mickolio, who was sent to the D'Backs in the Mark Reynolds trade. That Erik Bedard deal ended up having big ramifications for the '12 O's playoff-bound team. And to think, many fans hated it at the time.
The Orioles got off to a hot start, going 14-9 in April, and a big part of that was Jones tearing the cover off the ball - .333/.368/.611 with 6 home runs. And it didn't slow down in May, as a lower batting average was made up for with some extra pop and a few more walks - .298/.362/.623 and 10 longballs. Was the Adam Jones some people always thought he could be finally arriving? Well... no, not really. It was pretty clear even in the early going that his home run per flyball rate was unsustainably high, and would surely come down (dragging his batting line with it somewhat).
That didn't stop the Orioles from giving Jones a 6 year, $85 M contract though. Panned by some due to the obviousness of the first two months being a hot streak and Jones' low OBP, (and obviously loved by most O's fans), I thought it was a solid deal for the club - one which paid him to be the guy he was in previous seasons (good, but not great) as opposed to expecting him to have reached a new level. (And with the increase in salaries we're apparently seeing, the contract might look a little better now.)
Adam rewarded the team by having an atrocious June, combining a power-outage with a lack of patience as he hit just .272/.299/.427. There were ups and downs after that, but from the day he agreed to the contract extension until the end of the year, Jones hit .277/.325/.467. From 2009 to 2011, Adam Jones hit a combined .281/.326/.455. Generally speaking, he was who we thought he was, plus maybe a little bit extra. He still swung at way too many pitches out of the strike-zone (and missed a lot of them), but the additional extra-base hits (not so much the homers, which is what people noticed, but the doubles - Jones hit 39 of them after years of only 21-26) made up for it, as they have in the past.
Overall, Jones ended up getting some MVP votes with his career high 32 home runs and .287/.334/.505 line (and 4.6 fWAR, but I doubt his voters were looking too closely at that). I think he was undoubtedly the Orioles' 2012 MVP, even if his playoff performance was a horror show (.077/.074/.077). Going forward, it seems more likely Jones will settle in more in the 2.5-4 win range than approach 5 as he did (or 7+, as he was on pace for early); and it's at least possible that the increase in doubles portents that an expected drop-off in HR/FB rate might be mitigated somewhat by some of those two-baggers clearing the fence, and he's closer to the higher point in that range.
And that's just fine. An above average hitter (105 wRC+ career, 126 in 2012 due to his hot start) with plate discipline issues (4.8% walk rate career, 4.9% last season) is still an above average hitter (with some upside potential). A center-fielder who the defensive stats don't like (-7 UZR, -16 DRS) is still a guy playing up the middle (so he could be an OK corner outfielder, where his bat would still play - and, to my eye, I thought he looked a little better out there for much of the season). A now 27 year-old team leader who's going to be hanging around for the next few years (and is also a good player) isn't a bad thing to have around for a club that's hopefully going to at least have a chance of being competitive.
* Along with Chris Tillman. And George Sherrill, who go the team Steven Johnson. And Kam Mickolio, who was sent to the D'Backs in the Mark Reynolds trade. That Erik Bedard deal ended up having big ramifications for the '12 O's playoff-bound team. And to think, many fans hated it at the time.
The Orioles got off to a hot start, going 14-9 in April, and a big part of that was Jones tearing the cover off the ball - .333/.368/.611 with 6 home runs. And it didn't slow down in May, as a lower batting average was made up for with some extra pop and a few more walks - .298/.362/.623 and 10 longballs. Was the Adam Jones some people always thought he could be finally arriving? Well... no, not really. It was pretty clear even in the early going that his home run per flyball rate was unsustainably high, and would surely come down (dragging his batting line with it somewhat).
That didn't stop the Orioles from giving Jones a 6 year, $85 M contract though. Panned by some due to the obviousness of the first two months being a hot streak and Jones' low OBP, (and obviously loved by most O's fans), I thought it was a solid deal for the club - one which paid him to be the guy he was in previous seasons (good, but not great) as opposed to expecting him to have reached a new level. (And with the increase in salaries we're apparently seeing, the contract might look a little better now.)
Adam rewarded the team by having an atrocious June, combining a power-outage with a lack of patience as he hit just .272/.299/.427. There were ups and downs after that, but from the day he agreed to the contract extension until the end of the year, Jones hit .277/.325/.467. From 2009 to 2011, Adam Jones hit a combined .281/.326/.455. Generally speaking, he was who we thought he was, plus maybe a little bit extra. He still swung at way too many pitches out of the strike-zone (and missed a lot of them), but the additional extra-base hits (not so much the homers, which is what people noticed, but the doubles - Jones hit 39 of them after years of only 21-26) made up for it, as they have in the past.
Overall, Jones ended up getting some MVP votes with his career high 32 home runs and .287/.334/.505 line (and 4.6 fWAR, but I doubt his voters were looking too closely at that). I think he was undoubtedly the Orioles' 2012 MVP, even if his playoff performance was a horror show (.077/.074/.077). Going forward, it seems more likely Jones will settle in more in the 2.5-4 win range than approach 5 as he did (or 7+, as he was on pace for early); and it's at least possible that the increase in doubles portents that an expected drop-off in HR/FB rate might be mitigated somewhat by some of those two-baggers clearing the fence, and he's closer to the higher point in that range.
And that's just fine. An above average hitter (105 wRC+ career, 126 in 2012 due to his hot start) with plate discipline issues (4.8% walk rate career, 4.9% last season) is still an above average hitter (with some upside potential). A center-fielder who the defensive stats don't like (-7 UZR, -16 DRS) is still a guy playing up the middle (so he could be an OK corner outfielder, where his bat would still play - and, to my eye, I thought he looked a little better out there for much of the season). A now 27 year-old team leader who's going to be hanging around for the next few years (and is also a good player) isn't a bad thing to have around for a club that's hopefully going to at least have a chance of being competitive.
19 December 2012
How does player birthplace affect performance?
"You cannot walk off the island" is a quote said by someone long ago about how to go from being an amateur baseball player in the Dominican Republic to being a professional one in the United States of America. It is a perspective that is slowly, quite slowly, changing as the DR is incorporating more players leagues to give prospects in game experience as opposed to solely engaging in workouts. Recently, Jorge Arangure Jr wrote another fascinating article on this.
It made me think...historically, how does the country of origin affect the "average" baseball player. I decided to review the past 20 years for players who have accumulated at least 1000 games to see what successful players from these countries have been able to accomplish on average.
First off, I used 15 players as a cutoff point (small sample size alert) and I included Puerto Rico as a country of origin even though they are American through and through. Anyway, what we see is that these populations do seem to carry some of the stigma. Dominican players do tend to walk less than the average American. Venezuela's youth league system is often mentioned in how they produce players with better skills levels, but the difference in walk rate does not seem like much and it gets lost when you fact in batting average for on base percentage.
This made me wonder though if by choosing 1000 games as a cutoff point that I am ignoring players with attributes that prevent them from having a career at that length. Furthermore, it may also be that by including players in general that the numbers are being washed out due to a different kind of selection bias. It has been often mentioned that there is a dearth of American shortstop prospects and the reason for this is that these big, athletic people who could play shortstop are being pushed over to sports like basketball (as a point guard or shooting guard) or football (any skill position) where there are institutional advantages. In other words, Americans who can excel at shortstop will chase athletic opportunities that offer better scholarships options at the college level.
In 2012, 11 of 23 (48%) shortstops with over 100 games played were born in the USA. In contrast, 22 of 29 (76%) first basemen with over 100 games played were born in the USA. In 1991, American born SS were 17 out of 27 (63%) and American born 1B were 21 out of 27 (78%). This is only two data points (a later post will explore this more fully), but it seems to suggest that position profiles differ by country of origin. Therefore, it might make more sense to compare players by position and not by overall population.
Below is a comparison between the countries and the average SS with at least 100 games played from those countries. Puerto Rico was not included because they had too few players meeting this description.
The pattern for an average player remains. Dominicans walk less than both Americans and Venezuelans, but OBP is essentially the same for both Dominicans and Venezuelans. My next thought was whether or not there was an issue here with me not measuring fielding. However, using rWAR's fielding component I devised a fielding runs by 150 games (using the assumption that 4.2 plate appearances equaled a game), Americans had a 1.4 runs above average, Dominicans were -1.2 runs above average, and Venezuelans were 2 runs above average. It does not appear that lesser offensive production is accepted in exchange for defensive aptitude.
Conclusion
Historically, it appears that there are indeed differences in performance based on player origin. The above study does not determine why this is so. Speculation suggests that there are existing prejudices in the developing country and/or in the developing organization that encourages some types of performance while ignoring other types of performance. An example of this is that there is about 9:1 ration of small white guys being called gritty as opposed to small guys of other ethnicity. Personal anecdotal experience has informed me that there still is a contingency in professional baseball that tends to undervalue talent in white prospects and skills in black prospects. Likewise, athletes from other countries are often maligned as being unintelligent which often is simply a product of English not being a first language as well as organizations having little interest in providing academic education to 16 year olds that they sign. Of course, this is speculation based on anecdotes.
Another point to consider is that this is a historical study. It informs us a little bit, but not excessively, about what will happen from 2013 to 2032. Youth leagues are beginning to sprout up in the Dominican Republic along with talk of MLB focusing more on the island. Additionally, more and more organizations are starting to realize that foreign born players often need more assistance in acclimating to new environments and have been developing more useful instruction in language and cultures in order to make it easier on players to focus on developing their baseball abilities.
It made me think...historically, how does the country of origin affect the "average" baseball player. I decided to review the past 20 years for players who have accumulated at least 1000 games to see what successful players from these countries have been able to accomplish on average.
| 1993-2012 | Players with at least 1000 games | ||||||
| # | BB% | SO% | SB% | AVG | OBP | SLG | |
| USA-St | 163 | 9.7 | 15.8 | 71.9 | .277 | .341 | .453 |
| DR | 28 | 8.0 | 15.0 | 70.7 | .281 | .333 | .465 |
| USA-PR | 15 | 9.2 | 16.0 | 70.7 | .277 | .338 | .458 |
| VZ | 16 | 8.4 | 13.0 | 69.9 | .278 | .332 | .422 |
First off, I used 15 players as a cutoff point (small sample size alert) and I included Puerto Rico as a country of origin even though they are American through and through. Anyway, what we see is that these populations do seem to carry some of the stigma. Dominican players do tend to walk less than the average American. Venezuela's youth league system is often mentioned in how they produce players with better skills levels, but the difference in walk rate does not seem like much and it gets lost when you fact in batting average for on base percentage.
This made me wonder though if by choosing 1000 games as a cutoff point that I am ignoring players with attributes that prevent them from having a career at that length. Furthermore, it may also be that by including players in general that the numbers are being washed out due to a different kind of selection bias. It has been often mentioned that there is a dearth of American shortstop prospects and the reason for this is that these big, athletic people who could play shortstop are being pushed over to sports like basketball (as a point guard or shooting guard) or football (any skill position) where there are institutional advantages. In other words, Americans who can excel at shortstop will chase athletic opportunities that offer better scholarships options at the college level.
In 2012, 11 of 23 (48%) shortstops with over 100 games played were born in the USA. In contrast, 22 of 29 (76%) first basemen with over 100 games played were born in the USA. In 1991, American born SS were 17 out of 27 (63%) and American born 1B were 21 out of 27 (78%). This is only two data points (a later post will explore this more fully), but it seems to suggest that position profiles differ by country of origin. Therefore, it might make more sense to compare players by position and not by overall population.
Below is a comparison between the countries and the average SS with at least 100 games played from those countries. Puerto Rico was not included because they had too few players meeting this description.
| 1993-2012 | Shortstops with at least 100 games | ||||||
| # | BB% | SO% | SB% | AVG | OBP | SLG | |
| USA-St | 55 | 7.8 | 14.7 | 72.0 | .269 | .319 | .404 |
| DR | 26 | 6.3 | 13.7 | 70.2 | .271 | .310 | .397 |
| VZ | 12 | 7.1 | 12.7 | 69.4 | .267 | .311 | .375 |
The pattern for an average player remains. Dominicans walk less than both Americans and Venezuelans, but OBP is essentially the same for both Dominicans and Venezuelans. My next thought was whether or not there was an issue here with me not measuring fielding. However, using rWAR's fielding component I devised a fielding runs by 150 games (using the assumption that 4.2 plate appearances equaled a game), Americans had a 1.4 runs above average, Dominicans were -1.2 runs above average, and Venezuelans were 2 runs above average. It does not appear that lesser offensive production is accepted in exchange for defensive aptitude.
Conclusion
Historically, it appears that there are indeed differences in performance based on player origin. The above study does not determine why this is so. Speculation suggests that there are existing prejudices in the developing country and/or in the developing organization that encourages some types of performance while ignoring other types of performance. An example of this is that there is about 9:1 ration of small white guys being called gritty as opposed to small guys of other ethnicity. Personal anecdotal experience has informed me that there still is a contingency in professional baseball that tends to undervalue talent in white prospects and skills in black prospects. Likewise, athletes from other countries are often maligned as being unintelligent which often is simply a product of English not being a first language as well as organizations having little interest in providing academic education to 16 year olds that they sign. Of course, this is speculation based on anecdotes.
Another point to consider is that this is a historical study. It informs us a little bit, but not excessively, about what will happen from 2013 to 2032. Youth leagues are beginning to sprout up in the Dominican Republic along with talk of MLB focusing more on the island. Additionally, more and more organizations are starting to realize that foreign born players often need more assistance in acclimating to new environments and have been developing more useful instruction in language and cultures in order to make it easier on players to focus on developing their baseball abilities.
18 December 2012
Are Domes a Knuckleballer's Paradise?
Ideally, we would use real data to determine how well R.A. Dickey can pitch in a dome vs. outside of one. However, he has thrown only once in the past three years inside such a structure. Last year, he tossed nine innings against the Rays in Tropicana Field. The result was a one hit shutout with twelve strikeouts. That simply won't do in terms of sample size, so I decided to take a look at the last four great knuckleballers: Phil Neikro, Joe Niekro, Charlie Hough, and Tim Wakefield.
The lowest number of innings in a dome for the above pitchers was 375 innings. Only Joe Niekro exceeded that with over 1,300 IP...thanks to many a game in the Astrodome. That said, Joe Niekro appeared to really benefit from pitching his home games in the Astrodome while Charlie Hough also performed well out of the elements. Wakefield and Phil Niekro did not appear to show much of a difference. It should be noted that the four above never threw a knuckler the way Dickey does. Hough would occasionally try to let go of a hard knuckler, but all four of them typically stayed within the 50-70 mph range with their pitches.
RA/9 Inside Outside Phil Niekro 3.98 3.90 Joe Niekro 3.47 4.07 Charlie Hough 4.02 4.29 Tim Wakefield 4.95 5.01
So...what does this all mean? There seems to faint evidence that "knuckleball" throwing pitchers pitch the same or better when pitching inside a dome. It will be interesting to see next year how Dickey fairs inside the Rogers Centre. Some have noted it as a launching pad, but that seems to potentially be hyperbole borne out of a couple of seasons where Blue Jay hitters performed awfully well there while being bookended by relatively average home run seasons. Citi Field actually saw an increase in home runs hit with them moving in their fences last year. Although the first season in Citi Field played about league average for home runs. Below are park factors for HR:
If I was forced to guess, I would say that Dickey will be worth anywhere between 3-4 wins next year. Some have called this deal a mistake on the Blue Jays part in giving up an offensive catcher who most scouts feel sure will be a major part of the Mets lineup to come along with a few interesting parts that may boost the Mets pitching or outfield. There is truth in that. The Jays gave up a lot, but when you look at the vulnerability in the AL East at the moment...it is hard not to try to go for it. There certainly is a good deal of risk in the Jays roster with guys who have been somewhat uneven in performance and injured, but, with the money behind the Yankees and Red Sox, if you can strike then you strike. That is what the Jays are doing and, to me, it makes complete sense. As of this moment, they are my favorite for the division.
Rogers Citi 2009 0.99 1.06 2010 1.36 0.72 2011 1.19 0.74 2012 1.03 1.07
17 December 2012
The Aging of Bad Outfield Arms
A few weeks back, I took a look at how elite arms age in the outfield. What was interesting in that little study was that performance peaked in year two and then collapsed. There was some question as to whether it was merely a regression to the mean sort of phenomenom (although if that was the case the trend should be flat instead of a concentrated and significant increase in year 2). There was some interest in how poor outfield arms aged and whether it looked like a mirror image of the good arms or if bad arms gain a reputation and will be exploited by runners.
If you did not click on the link above, here is what the elite arm graph looked like.
I used the same methodology of the previous post, but used the nine worst outfield arms as defined by Defensive Runs Saved.
I am not sure what this means with respect to this population or the statistically significant differences observed in the elite arms group. No trends can be measured here or inferred. Bad arms do not seem to improve as a group and neither are they exploited. The explanation eludes me. It may well be that the elite arms group was genuinely a unique occurrence.
If you did not click on the link above, here is what the elite arm graph looked like.
I used the same methodology of the previous post, but used the nine worst outfield arms as defined by Defensive Runs Saved.
This yields an insignifiant p value (0.39) and the following averages and standard deviations:
Runs by Arm per 1400 Innings 1 2 3 4 5 Andre Either -9.0 -3.6 -5.1 -6.1 -2.6 Coco Crisp -3.8 -4.4 -3.1 -1.2 -6.3 Chris Young -2.2 -6.0 -6.9 3.1 -3.1 Justin Upton 1.6 -1.2 -6.3 -5.1 -3.3 Ryan Braun 1.1 -2.1 -4.2 -6.7 -1.1 Corey Hart -6.4 -3.1 -3.0 -1.2 -5.2 Jason Bay -2.9 -9.0 -8.2 -2.3 -4.2 Grady Sizemore 0.0 -3.0 -4.0 -2.1 -8.7 Matt Holiday -9.2 -4.0 -5.2 -1.0 -2.3
What does that all mean?
1 2 3 4 5 Average -3.4 -4.0 -5.1 -2.5 -4.1 StDev 4.1 2.3 1.7 3.1 2.3
I am not sure what this means with respect to this population or the statistically significant differences observed in the elite arms group. No trends can be measured here or inferred. Bad arms do not seem to improve as a group and neither are they exploited. The explanation eludes me. It may well be that the elite arms group was genuinely a unique occurrence.
16 December 2012
Sunday Comics: Christmas Lists...
At some point, we all realize that we can't always get every single thing we want for the holidays.
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