Former Tides Now Minor League Free Agents

by Joe Reisel

Five days after the conclusion of the World Series, all players who (1) are not on forty-man rosters and (2) not under contract for the following season become what are known as “six-year minor league free agents.” Earlier this month, Major League Baseball declared 549 players minor league free agents. Twenty-five of them ended the year in the Orioles’ organization.  

Of those twenty-five, nineteen had played for the Norfolk Tides at some time, seventeen in 2012. Most were low-level non-prospects used who played for the Tides when they desperately needed pitching; or long-term veterans who re-entered the minor league baseball with the Tides in mid-season, and who may decide to retire; or players signed as minor-league free agents before the 2012 season and are free agents again. But six were recent prospects who have been squeezed off the roster or have fallen out of favor. I’ll take a look at those six, four of whom were 2012 Norfolk Tides.

Ryan Adams was once considered the Orioles’ best bet to succeed Brian Roberts at second base; after the 2010 season, Baseball America ranked him as the Orioles #8 prospect. He projected to be a .280 hitter with doubles power, but with marginal defense at second base. But Adams had a terrible 2012. After getting off to a slow start at Norfolk, he broke his thumb in a fit of frustration. He came back after the all-star break and rebounded a little, but for the season he hit .224 with a .665 OPS and worse-than-ever defense. After the season he tested positive for amphetamine and was suspended for fifty games. Adams has clearly fallen out of favor with the Orioles, and needs a fresh start in a new organization to restart his career. He’ll be 26 in 2013.

Blake Davis was a lower-tier shortstop prospect who has spent at least part of the last four seasons with the Tides; after the 2008 and 2009 seasons, he was named the best defensive infielder in the Orioles system.  He played 25 games with the Orioles in 2011. His glove is steady, rather than spectacular; he’s a .250-range hitter with neither great speed nor real power.  Davis’ major-league upside is that of a utility infielder, and at age 29, he’s most likely to be a career AAA middle infielder. The Orioles have apparently decided that he’s replaceable if he leaves the organization.

Brandon Erbe is a right-handed starting pitcher. He was drafted by the Orioles out of a Baltimore high school and was rated the #2 prospect in the system after he struck out 133 in 114 innings in A-ball at age 18. Although it took him two years to work through High Class A Frederick, Erbe was progressing on the normal prospect path (at age 21 in AA) when he got hurt and missed half the season.  He started 2010 in the Norfolk rotation and suffered through a terrible half-season – 0-10 with a 5.73 ERA in 14 starts. He was diagnosed with a torn labrum and missed the second half of 2010 and essentially all of 2011. He struggled to regain his control pitching relief at Frederick last season, although he did strike out nearly a batter an inning. Erbe, who’ll be 25 in 2013, has been surpassed by many other pitchers in the Orioles’ system and the Orioles don’t think they need to protect him.

Rhyne Hughes is a first baseman, originally acquired from Tampa in a 2009 trade for Gregg Zaun. In 2009, Hughes hit 25 home runs for three teams, and when he got off to a hot start in 2012 was promoted to the Orioles. He didn’t hit well in the majors and cooled off when he returned to Norfolk. He split time with Brandon Snyder and Michael Aubrey and didn’t establish himself.  After the 2011 season he was suspended for fifty games after testing positive for amphetamine use and became a minor-league free agent. He re-signed with the Orioles, served his suspension, and was sent to Bowie. Although Hughes performed well, he didn’t become one of the 75 players on the 2012 the Norfolk Tides -- with Joe Mahoney playing first, there wasn’t a spot for him. Hughes is limited to first base and designated hitter, and doesn’t project to hit well enough for either position. He didn’t have a future with the Orioles and will likely be Triple-A roster filler for the rest of his career.

Zach Phillips is probably the new six-year free agent the Orioles most want to keep. Phillips was acquired from the Rangers in July 2011 for Nick Green in a trade whose circumstances remain murky. Phillips had struggled as a starting pitcher and was converted to the bullpen in 2009. He’s been consistently effective as a relief pitcher, and has a 3.21 ERA in fourteen major-league innings. He’s not just a left-handed one-out guy; he’s consistently averaged over an inning per appearance in the minors. But the Orioles have a lot of pitchers and unproven left-handed relief pitchers are plentiful; the Orioles probably think that even if Phillips goes elsewhere they can pick up a replacement. 

Pedro Viola joined the Orioles in early 2010 on waivers from the Reds. Viola is a left-handed pitcher with an outstanding fastball, subpar secondary stuff, and terrible control. He’ll turn 30 next June. In his AAA career (with Louisville and Norfolk) he has walked 7 batters per nine innings, leading to a 7.30 ERA. When you see Pedro Viola throw his fastball, you can dream that if he just figures it out he can be a possible Mitch Williams-type closer. But at some point you have to stop dreaming, face reality, and accept that he’s just not going to figure it out. The Orioles are facing reality.

2012 Orioles Retrospective: Lew Ford

Before the 2012 season, the last time Lew Ford played in the Major Leagues was in 2007. The last time Lew Ford had even 300 plate appearances in the Major Leagues was in 2005. So when the Orioles signed him to add some outfield depth to the team, it was largely viewed as a joke by many.

The 35 year-old Lew Ford then proceeded to hit .331/.390/.500 with 11 homers in 62 games in Triple-A. He was called up at the end of July to help fill some in when Nick Markakis got hurt, and ended up hitting just .183/.256/.352 for the Orioles in 79 PA.

Ford actually didn't play that poorly - his walk and strike-out rates (9%, 16%) were virtually identical to his minor league numbers and were both better than average. His .169 ISO was also above average. The main difference after his promotion was the nose-dive his batting average on balls in play took, from .365 to .182. Part of that was bad luck, and part of it was him hitting as many pop-ups as Joey Votto has in the last four years (combined).

Used mostly as a platoon guy, Ford posted an above average .330 wOBA against lefties compared to a .123 wOBA against righties. Part of that was BABIP-fueled, but he also walked twice as often against southpaws and hit all 3 of his home runs off of them (CC Sabathia, Chris Sale, and Francisco Liriano, no less).

Add in some decent defense in outfield corners, and Ford was a replacement level player even with the horribly low BABIP ("freely avialable talent" indeed). It's very possible - maybe even likely - that he showed enough to catch on with some team as a fourth-outfielder and righty bat, which is certainly a pretty neat story.

Given the current roster make-up though, I doubt it's worth bringing him back for 2013 on anything more than a minor league deal. But that doesn't at all take away from the fact that Lew Ford started a playoff game for the Orioles - as the designated hitter! - or that he hit  .375/.375/.500 in the post-season overall.

Examining the trend: Two hitting coaches

After John Farrell was acquired by the Red Sox to be their manager he set to work, as any manager does, to round out his coaching staff. After hiring Juan Nieves to be his pitching coach, he made a statement in an interview that piqued the curiosity of the media. When asked who he was considering for hitting coach, Farrell said that it depends on who the first guy is, but they are looking at hiring two hitting coaches, as that position has evolved over the years into more of a two-person job. There has been a lot of coverage on the subject, as it was being considered to be a radical idea, however there are already six teams in MLB that employ two hitting coaches, with BOS looking to become the 7th.

For years teams have been employing two pitching coaches, having an assistant pitching coach is fairly common these days, using the Red Sox for example, late last season when they fired their lame duck pitching coach they promoted their in-house assistant pitching coach to fill the role for the remainder of the season. For a few seasons now some teams have been adding assistant hitting coaches to the team as well. These assistant coaches aren't listed on the team's roster of coaches, and have to watch the game from the stands as there are MLB rules on the number of coaches allowed in the dugout, but assistants are a  trend. Currently, the Tigers (Lloyd McLendon, Toby Harrah), Padres (Phil Plantier, Alonzo Powell), Giants (Hensley Meulens, Joe Lefebvre), Braves (Greg Walker, Scott Fletcher), Phillies (Wally Joyner, Steve Henderson) and Royals (Jack Maloof, Andre David) are the teams with two hitting coaches, and St. Louis is temporarily without a second as Mark McGuire left for LAD, promoting assistant John Mabry to hitting coach. Matheny has said that he will continue the trend set forth there by Tony LaRussa and they will add an assistant hitting coach at some point. Boston isn't exactly breaking the mold by hiring an assistant coach, but they are part of a growing trend.

As Farrell has said in interviews, one of the reasons for an assistant hitting coach is that the job has become more of a two-person job, and there aren't enough hours in the day for one person to be everywhere preforming the duties that a hitting coach should. In Spring Training alone, there are multiple fields, underground cages, and side sessions where hitting is taking place and it is hard for one person to see all of these guys with the grueling schedule Spring Training dictates. During the season, there are cage sessions for each player that the coach needs to be present for, and those sessions eat time away from time he could be meeting with players that need more individualized help, breaking down tape or meeting with the manager to report and discuss various players. In this new role, the assistant is the guy who usually watches each cage session for each player, while the coach handles the other day to day duties. Another possible reason for multiple coaches is that not every player is made for a certain coaches hitting specialty. Some guys are better at getting more power out of guys, some are better at teaching contact and small ball, and some are better at teaching patience and strike zone recognition. Every hitter is different, and a leadoff guy whose skill set is aimed at on base percentage and contact might not get the most he could out of a coach that specializes and focuses on driving the ball and hitting for power. For instance when Keven Seitzer was let go from KC this offseason, part of the reasoning given was that KC was looking for a coach that could help bring out more power from their hitters, they were also looking for guys that had success with young hitters coming up from the minors, even guys that worked directly with those young hitters when they were excelling in the minors. Hosmer, and Moustakas for instance, worked with both of the new hitting coaches they hired in the minors. Maybe it's just a case of the same general philosophy but a different approach to teaching that is required, not every person learns the same way, and that holds true for baseball players.

In PHI, Steve Henderson, formally hitting coach for TB, was hired with the agreement that he would be taking on an assistant hitting coach. Even though the Rays set team records in runs, HR, OBP, and walks, Henderson was let go out of a concern that their team situational hitting wasn't where it should be, anyone who has watched Joe Maddon manage a game completely understands that point. Wally Joyner was brought in as Henderson's assistant exactly for that reason to give a different point of view and get information across in a different way. Phil Plantier, in SD has a philosophy that you have to adapt to the hitter to bring out what they do best, and for him he learned a little bit from everyone he worked with, so the more people to get input from the better. His counterpart, Alonzo Powell spent years overseas in Japan, while he was there he mastered the art of studying and breaking down video, which made him an excellent assistant candidate. The Rays replacement for Steve Henderson, Derek Shelton, earned praise from manager Joe Maddon, who values situational hitting which suits his managing style. Shelton earned the ire of fans however when the team settled into the bottom half of baseball in hitting statistics, and now going into next season, they are considering hiring an assistant for Shelton for many of the reasons listed above.

For years, talk of reuniting pitchers with pitching coaches they had success with has been made when a pitcher struggles under a new regime, and adding assistant coaches to the major league staff allows teams to have the hitting or pitching coach they would like as a team, and also allows a spot for a guy that maybe had success with a young group of the teams hitters or pitchers in the minors, or a guy that specializes with a different type of learner than the main coach does. More variety on a staff means more knowledge to share with players, and more knowledge can't be a bad thing, not to mention having a replacement ready in case a move needs to be made as in the Red Sox case last season or St. Louis this offseason.

2012 Orioles Retrospective: Robert Andino

Robert Andino was pressed into duty last year with the loss of Brian Roberts, and acquitted himself relatively well. A solid walk rate and an OK strike-out rate can play at second-base when they come with some defense. Brian Roberts wasn't expected to play much (if at all) this year, leaving Andino as the starter at second again. Things went... less well.

On the plus side, the improvements Andino made with his plate discipline were solidified and extended. He upped his walk rate from 8% to 8.6%, and did an even better job of not swinging at pitches out of the strike-zone. He also showed a bit of pop early in the season, with 3 homers in his first 27 games (after hitting only 5 in 139 games in 2011). As late as May 15th, the home run leader-board read Robert Andino - 3, Albert Pujols - 1. (Pujols then homered in consecutive games, and finished with an impressive - given his start - 30 on the season).

Every else was not so good. Andino's contact rate fell to 80%. That, in and of itself, isn't terrible - it's actually a touch above average. The problem is that pitchers had no reason to fear him (they weren't checking the home run leader-boards, apparently), and just pounded the strike-zone. Of Major Leaguers with at least 400 PA, Andino saw the third highest proportion of pitches in the zone. And on those pitches, he swung and missed more than the average batter. Seeing strikes + swinging and missing them = strike-outs, and Andino's K rate jumped to over 23%.

Often, strike-outs will come with power production. That was, sadly, not so much the case here. Though Andino hit a career high 7 home runs and improved his isolated power from .081 to .094, that second figure is still poor. Of the 39 batters who struck out more often than Andino did, only one had a lower ISO (Everth Cabrera, who was to play half his game at PETCO).

And while more strike-outs will obviously hurt the batting average, Andino's plunged even further with the drop in his BABIP from .311 to .266. That'll happen when you hit fewer line-drives and more pop-ups, I guess.

So at the plate, Andino went from a perfectly respectable .263/.327/.344 to just .211/.283/.305. He couldn't even be platooned that effectively, as he couldn't hit lefties (67 wRC+) or righties (57 wRC+). Piling on even more, he made 13 errors at second (up from 4) which put his UZR underwater (-2 runs; plus another -2 from his time at third).

In a season where he could have established himself as a decent starting position player, it was unfortunate to see Robert Andino go from 1.8 fWAR to -0.6 fWAR and contribute to the black hole that was the second-base position for the Orioles this year. But hey, credit to him for being one of the few players on the team to remember to bring his (or someone else's) bat to the post-season, where he hit .417/.417/.500. He can probably still be a productive bench player, but it might behoove the O's to actually find a good second-baseman if they want to be competitive next year.

Measuring Bullpen Management: Bucking Up the Bullpen

A common thought among many of us is that much of the Orioles' success in 2012 was largely dependent on the bullpen.  An fWAR breakdown shows that the bullpen (6.4 fWAR, 5th) was better ranking-wise than either batting (15.3 fWAR, 25th) or starting pitching (10.2 fWAR, 19th).  The bullpen was largely constructed with existing pieces, half of the return for the Guthrie trade, and a small late winter free agent signing.  A more thorough discussion of the various pieces of the bullpen can be found in an article Jon Bernhardt wrote in August.  This post however will take a look at whether bullpen performance can be attributed to a manager.

Generally, conventional wisdom has it that individual relief pitchers are a widely varying lot in terms of performance.  These pitchers put up about 50 innings or so each year, which really is not enough time on the mound to statistically inform an assessment of future performance.  However, it may well be that a manager (or perhaps a manager with his General Manager) may actually be able to create a high performing bullpen on a relatively consistent basis.

A Hardball Times article suggested using WPA - WPA/LI as a measure of bullpen performance that would be useful in assessing bullpen management.  WPA is the acronym for Wins Probability Added.  This is calculated as the difference in win expectancy before and after an event. LI is the Leverage Index.  It is a measurement of how consequential a specific scenario is based on the inning, outs, score, baserunners, and baserunner position.  By using the two statistics in concert, you arguably have a measure that gives you a context neutral wins added metric.

To test whether this metric would give an indication that managers have skill associated with using a bullpen well, I decided to take the last five seasons of several recent managers.  I compare each manager's mean for WPA, WPA/LI, and WPA-WPA/LI (ANOVA).  WPA will inform us simply if certain teams wind up with better outcomes for winning based on reliever usage.  WPA/LI will neutralize all situations and measure reliever ability in general (similar to wOBA).  WPA-WPA/LI is being used to inform us about whether relievers actually perform better in clutch situations.  If one of these statistics indicate an actual skill then the numbers associated with a manager should be (1) repeatable and (2) result in managers being different from each other.  Of course, this assumes that these things are, in fact, measurable.

	WPA	WPA/LI	WPA - WPA/LI
Bob Melvin	3.75	0.83	2.92
Bruce Bochy	2.98	0.13	2.84
Joe Giraldi	7.37	4.88	2.49
Buck Showalter	5.61	3.67	1.94
Terry Francona	5.56	3.69	1.88
Mike Scioscia	1.94	0.13	1.81
Ozzie Guillen	1.86	0.31	1.54
Joe Madden	4.42	3.21	1.22
Ron Gardenhire	2.78	1.59	1.19
Charlie Manuel	2.60	1.49	1.11
Ron Washington	4.35	3.25	1.10
Bud Black	1.74	0.80	0.94
Dusty Baker	2.76	2.19	0.56
Joe Torre	2.81	2.28	0.53
Jim Leyland	1.16	0.90	0.26
Ned Yost	1.00	1.29	-0.29
Tony LaRussa	1.28	1.74	-0.46
Eric Wedge	-0.80	-0.15	-0.66
Bobby Cox	0.31	1.63	-1.31

Interestingly enough, both WPA (p=0.12) and WPA - WPA/LI (p=0.45) were not found to be significant in this study using this data.  However, WPA/LI was found to have significant differences within the population (p < 0.05).

So who typically has a good bullpen based on WPA/LI?

Joe Giraldi	123~5~~~~~~
Terry Francona	12345678~~~
Buck Showalter	1234567~~~~
Ron Washington	~234567~~~~
Joe Madden	123456789~~
Joe Torre	~234567890~
Dusty Baker	~234567890X
Tony LaRussa	~234567890X
Bobby Cox	~234567890X
Ron Gardenhire	~234567890X
Charlie Manuel	~2~~567890X
Ned Yost	~234567890X
Jim Leyland	~~~~567890X
Bob Melvin	~234567890X
Bud Black	~234567890X
Ozzie Guillen	~~~~~67890X
Bruce Bochy	~~~~567890X
Mike Scioscia	~~~~~~7890X
Eric Wedge	~~~~~67890X

The above table shows groups of similar performance.  The bold numbers indicate how managers differ.  Most managers belong to their own specific number, but 7 (Baker, LaRussa, Cox, Gardenhire, Yost, Melvin, and Black), 9 (Leyland and Bochy), and 0 (Guillen and Wedge) are shared.  For instance all 1s are not significantly different from Joe Giraldi and Joe Giraldi is significantly different from groups 4 and 6 through X.  Eye-balling it there are essentially three tiers:

Tier 1
Giraldi, Francona, Showalter, Washington, and Madden

All five of these managers get consistently good performance out of their bullpens and, as a whole, have significantly better performance than groups 9 through X.  Joe Giralid's pens have produced very well making his group significantly better than all of the others except 1, 2, 3, and 5.  This actually provides a potential argument for leaving Washington out of this tier.  However, the relationships of his performance with the other managers' performances appear to fit best in group 1. Only Showalter had multiple GMs in this grouping.

Tier 2
Torre, Baker, LaRussa, Cox, Gardenhire, Yost, Melvin, and Black

This group appears no different from anyone other than Joe Giraldi's bullpen.  Torre, Yost, and Melvin account for the managers for more than one GM.

Tier 3
Manuel, Leyland, Guillen, Bochy, Scioscia, and Wedge

The bullpen performance out of this group are notable in that they are not included in some of the upper performing groups.  In fact, their performances are significantly worse than everyone in Tier 1 except for Francona and Madden.  Only Wedge and Guillen were managers under different GMs.

The above study shows that good bullpen performance when measured as context neutral does tend to relate to specific managers.  However, it is unclear exactly what is resulting in these managers having good bullpens.  It does not appear that certain managers are adept at putting their pitchers in certain scenarios to get the most out of them, but that may simply be a limitation in how I tried to measure bullpen management.

Sunday Comics: Our AL Manager of the Year Finalist

Buck Showalter's a finalist for AL Manager of the Year. Now we just have to keep our fingers crossed and hope the man takes home the much-deserved award - he's got some fairly steep competition.

Anyhow, in honor of his nomination, I did this!