Miguel Gonzalez: By the Numbers

Just a short piece on Miguel Gonzalez' night.

With three fifths of the Orioles' Opening Day rotation solidifying Norfolk's rotation these days, the Orioles were scrambling around for options to replace them.  One option, Jamie Moyer, likely would have been last night's starter if he had not been impatient enough to opt out of his deal and sign on with the Blue Jays only to be tormented by the long ball in the Pacific Coast League (not the best teetering career move).  Last night, the Orioles turned to Miguel Gonzalez.  Gonzalez has moved around quite a bit during his career.  He suffered injury issues in the Angels system and lost two years, was selected in the minor league portion of the rule 5 by the Red Sox and stumbled, tried to keep his career alive in Mexico, and now is throwing for the Orioles.

Gonzalez showed five pitches last night: four seamer, two seamer, curve, slider, and change up.  He depended on his four seamer and his slider predominantly.  Over half of his pitches were four seamer.  Gonzalez was able to put them in for strikes, but he did not overpower or trick pitchers with them.  He threw in the low 90s (92.4 average) with about 70% thrown for strikes.  Of the 12 four seamers that batters swung at, they made contact every single time.  Gonzalez was able to work his slider for swings and misses.  Out of 21 sliders, 14 came in for strikes with 5 swing/misses and only 2 balls put into play.  His change, curve, and two seamer were more change of pace pitches.

There was some concern over stamina as Gonzalez has spent much of the year and much of his career as a reliever.  He seemed fine with his velocity through 80 pitches.  His last inning saw his fastball drop about 2 mph.  If he remains in the rotation, then he will need to be able to going about 15 pitches longer with full effect. 

The graph below gives some indication of how his fastball changed over the course of the night:

Midseason update: Shadow System Rankings

Introduction
Over the All-Star break we will provide an updated ranking of the top 25 Orioles prospects.  For the time being, we thought it would be fun to recap our Shadow System and provide a snap shot as to where the Orioles's system would be were Jon and I in charge of making decisions to draft/sign amateur talent over the past four or five years.

As a recap, each year since 2008 we have made a "shadow" selection at each point that the Orioles have had a draft pick in the first ten rounds (only the first five rounds for 2008).  As far as international signings are concerned, we have generally just gone along with Baltimore's signings.

In our most recent piece touching on Baltimore's international efforts, we mentioned that Camden Depot has only strongly endorsed going after two high profile international prospects -- Miguel Sano (signed with Twins) and Ronald Guzman (signed with Rangers). In the case of Sano we would have offered more than he ultimately received; the opposite was true for Guzman. 

One reader pointed out to me that by not having Sano included in our Shadow System, we were essentially letting ourselves off the hook if he turns out to be a bad investment, but allowing ourselves to bring him up so long as he performs well.  Fair enough point -- he will now be included in our system with a price tag of $3.6 MM (he signed for just over $3.1 MM, so the extra $.5 MM should cover the "price" of buying him away from a system that is, at least on the surface, a bit more inviting to Latin American talent).

Below is a summary of our selections, and Baltimore's actual selections, since 2008.  Where necessary, we have noted spots where our spending on our picks would have prevented going overslot for picks after the first ten rounds (and those players have accordingly been left out of our Shadow System).

History of selections
We will update this table once the 2012 amateur draft signing period has ended. 

CLICK TABLE TO ENLARGE

There are two decisions of note that account for the discrepency in spending: 1) the signing of international free agent Miguel Sano in 2009, and 2) the conscious decision to try and max out on draft haul in 2011, which was simultaneously one of the deepest draft classes in recent history and the last "free market" opportunity for the draft, with new rules rolling into place in 2012.  Outside of those decisions, we attempted to stay in line with what we thought would be a reasonable budget for Baltimore's acquisitions.

Prospects of note that we missed out on; prospects of note we grabbed
The big two in the O's system right now -- Dylan Bundy and Manny Machado -- are easily the best players currently in the Orioles system but not in our Shadow System.  Camden Depot passed on Machado in 2010, selecting Karsten Whitson (rhp, Chipola HS, Fla.) instead.  Whitson decided to forgo the start of his pro career in favor of three years at the University of Florida.  Camden Depot received a comp pick for use with the third overall pick last year.  That pick was used to grab the top player on our board: Anthony Rendon (3b, Rice Univ.). 

Rendon has struggled to stay healthy over the past 18-months, but was easily the best offensive talent in the historically gifted 2011 draft class.  He is again on the disabled list, on while there is plenty of time for him to realize his emmense potential, the early nod has to be given to Machado and his solid showing at Double-A Bowie this year as a 20-year old.

Our second pick last year we passed on Bundy (who we had rated as a top 5 talent in the class) in favor of Derek "Bubba" Starling (of, Gardner-Edgerton HS, Kan.).  Starling was in extended spring training and working out at Kansas City's complex prior to joining up with the Burlington Bees (KC's Appy League team).  Starling has only played in seven Appy League games and currently sports a .321/.472/.607 triple-slash with 5 BB, 7 SO, 1 3B and 2 HR over his first 36 plate appearances. A solid showing, but again you have to give the nod to the Orioles's actual selection, Dylan Bundy, who is just two months older than Starling and more than holding his own at Advanced-A Frederick.

So, has the Shadow system been a failure on the Starling/Rendon : Bundy/Machado comparison alone? Not exactly.  We scored big when we selected Zack Wheeler in 2009 (now a top 15 prospect in all of baseball) while Baltimore appears to have swung and missed with Matt Hobgood.  Additionally, our decision to invest $3.6 MM in Miguel Sano may or may not work out long term, but the young Dominican slugger is currently showing perhaps the best raw power in all of Minor League Baseball (albeit with a "work-to-be-done" hit tool).

Other names we like in Baltimore's system include LJ Hoes, Clayton Schrader, and Xavier Avery, all of whom we have touted since their drafting by the O's.  Avery has broken through to the Majors this year, and Hoes looks to be not far behind.  Schrader is a high risk/solid reward arm that has progressed to Bowie off the strength of a plus 1-2 punch in his fastball and power curve.  How he handles control and command issues will determine his ultimate worth to the big club.

There are a number of names of note that we feel we did well to grab, though most of them remain in the low minors as high school picks out of the draft.  Ty Buttrey and Dillon Howard may wind-up in the pen, but carry with them #2/#3 upside in a rotation if things click.  Garin Cecchini, Todd Glaesmann, Tanner Rahier, Avery Romero (provided he signs), and Jake Cave are high upside offensive talents at A-ball or lower, but could be five-ninths of an impressive upper-minors squad at Double-A within two years. 

Josh Rutledge has nowhere near the upside of Machado, but gives the Shadow System a Double-A shortstop that has a chance to be an above-average offensive producer at a middle-infield position by 2013 (even if he has to slide over to second base).  Roger Kieschnick has exploded in the Pacific Coast League this year, already dropping 14 bombs through his first 50 games, but is only a fringe prospect because of the swing-and-miss in his offensive game and his corner profile.  Josh Elander (c, TCU) could turn out to be a steal in the 6th Round of this year's draft -- he should see time in A-ball this year and could be ready to tackle Double-A as early as next year if he shifts out from behind the plate to right field.
Top 25 prospects for the Camden Depot Shadow System
For purposes of this list, we are assuming Gausman and Romero both sign before next Friday. To the extent they do not, we'll update the list when we run our comparison piece on the updated O's top 25 and the updated Shadow System top 25.  All ages listed are as of July 1, 2012.

1. Zack Wheeler (22y1m, Double-A)
2. Kevin Gausman (21y6m, 2012 Draft)
3. Bubba Starling (19y11m, Rookie)
4. Miguel Sano (19y2m, Class A)
5. Anthony Rendon (22y1m, Class A-Adv.)
Notes:
It's a very nice top 5 as far as upside is concerned, but Starling and Sano carry with them a good amount of risk associated with their respective hit tools and refinement.  Rendon is as safe a bet as you will find on the field, but he needs to show he can actually stay on the field.  Gausman and Wheeler both have front-end upside but need to continue to refine their command.  These five could all be on an All-Star team in four years, but this upside comes with both risk and a heavy financial investment (about $25 MM total).

6. Jonathan Schoop (20y9m, Double-A)
7. Garin Cecchini (21y2m, Class A)
8. Josh Rutledge (23y2m, Double-A)
9. Dillon Howard (20y0m, Rookie)
10. Ty Buttrey (19y3m, 2012 Draft)
Notes:
A very solid second-half of the top ten, providing offensive upside with Schoop and Cecchini, some offensive production up-the-middle with Rutledge, and two power arms that could grow into top 20 prospects or eventually find their way to the pen.  Rutledge and Schoop could make an interesting tandem up-the-middle, though both might best fit as second basemen.

11. Tanner Rahier (18y9m, 2012 Draft)
12. Avery Romero (19y2m, 2012 Draft)
13. Todd Glaesmann (21y8m, Class A)
14. Josh Elander (21y3m, 2012 Draft)
15. Roger Kieschnick (25y5m, Triple-A)
Notes:
Both Kieschnick and Glaesman have seen hiccups in their development but have enjoyed a successful start to their respective 2012 seasons, totaling 26 homeruns through a combined 127 games.  Both have struggled to overcome some holes, offensively, but could project as product corner outfielders with some pop.  The trio of 2012 draftees all carry their value in their bats, with Rahier and Romero likely to tackle short-season ball this year and Class A next year.  Elander is advanced enough with the bat to jump to Class A-Advanced, but might be eased into pro ball at the Class A level so that he can continue to work on his receiving behind the plate.

16. Brody Colvin (21y11m, Class A-Adv.)
17. Logan Verrett (22y0m, Class A)
18. Bobby Bundy (22y6m, Double-A)
19. Lex Rutledge (21y0m, 2012 Draft)
20. Eduardo Rodriguez (18y3m, Class A)
Notes:
Colvin was an expensive oversign back in 2009 who has struggled to harness his stuff through his first two-plus seasons of pro ball.  Colvin retains his mid-rotation upside but is more likely to provide value as a late-inning power arm.  Verrett has been eased into pro ball but is old enough, and has shown enough success at Class A, to start moving up the chain. He tops out as a #3 but, like Colvin, might fit best in the back of a pen.  Bundy is a workhorse that struggled to start the 2012 season but has seen a steady lowering of his FIP over the last three months. He projects as a back-end innings eater but will need to find the breaker he had pre-draft to stick as a starter. Rutledge is a power arm best suited for relief, where his stuff plays much better than it does as a starter.  He could be an 8th-inning guy. Eduardo Rodriguez is surviving Delmarva at a young age, but his stuff looks to project better to the back end of a rotation.

21. Cody Kukuk (19y3m, Extended ST)
22. Jake Cave (19y8m, Extended ST - Injury)
23. Ian Krol (21y2m, Class A-Adv.)
24. Tim Melville (22y10m, Double-A)
25. Glynn Davis (20y8m, Class A)
Notes:
Kukuk has yet to leave extended spring training but should make a short-season appearance this summer and tackle full-season ball in 2013.  He profiles as a potential mid-rotation or back-end arm but is a ways away.  Cave has tools for miles but has been slowed due to minor surgery early in 2012. He could make a big jump after he gets a year or so of pro ball under his belt.  Krol has been slowed by an elbow injury and some off-field antics costing him playing and development time.  He could be back-end starter, but has some growing up to do.  Melville was a seven-figure investment in 2008 but has struggled to find consistency in mechanics and stuff. Like Krol, the bullpen is the most likely point of entry to the Majors.  Davis remains a speedy athlete with a solid feel for the game but needs to get much stronger in order to avoid having the bat knocked out of his hand at the upper-levels. He profiles as a potential 4th outfielder. 

It's not an elite system, but there is big upside at the top and lotto tickets sprinkled throughout the 11-25 range.  After we unveil the updated Orioles Top 25 list next week we will examine whether, as of today, this collection of players is worth the additional $9 MM-plus of investment over the crop currently in Baltimore's system.

Scouting the Birds: Chris Tillman 2012 Debut

History with Tillman
It has been a long road for Camden Depot with Tillman, so we wanted to take a few paragraphs to highlight the last four years we've spent covering and evaluating Chris before we jump into a review of his 2012 debut.  Feel free to skip down to the "scouty" report at any time.

*     *     *



Camden Depot has been an unabashed supporter of Tillman for sometime. Our history in evaluating Chris has been interesting in that we've found ourselves on the opposite side of "mainstream" fan opinion dating back to pre-Bedard trade talks.  Essentially, our view of Tillman has, rightly or wrongly, stayed the same throughout the last four years, meaning at the height of his popularity in prospecting circles we were seen as "too light" on him, and at the depths of his struggles we were seen as "too high" on him.

At the time of the Bedard trade, much of the Orioles blogging world, and message board world, was consumed with names like Carlos Triunfel and Jeff Clement as the "second piece" behind what everyone was sure would be the crown jewel -- Adam Jones.  Our take on Jones at the top was similar -- after all he made the most sense as a young, highly-touted and high-ceilinged prospect already breaking into the Bigs with an impressive pedigree to back up the scout card. 

After Jones, however, we posited that Chris Tillman would be, and should be, the second target in the transaction, and even pointed out that Andy MacPhail's reported insistence that Brandon Morrow be included in the deal (never going to happen) was primarily a negotiating tactic to allow Baltimore to "fall back" on Tillman.  At the time, Tillman was still just a projectable arm at A-Advanced High Desert, showing flashes of promise but often being burned by the hitter friendly environment in the California League and his inability to yet command his stuff.  It turns out that we saw the same thing Baltimore saw -- a prototypical pitcher's body with an easy motion and a chance to grow into front-end stuff.

The other names we threw into the package were Tony Butler and Mario Martinez, who we viewed as comparable to Triunfel but without the bloated "prospect ranking" value -- both are currently struggling to advance up the ladder, sitting in A-Adv. High Desert as 22- and 23-year olds, respectively. The actual trade, of course, involved Jones, Tillman, George Sherrill, Butler and Kam Mickolio -- hey, three out of five ain't too shabby.

Upon coming over, Tillman dazzled in Double-A for Baltimore and was labeled by many (including Baseball America) as a potential rotation headliner for the O's, and their top pitching prospect. Message boards were sky high on Tillman and we took some minor grief for giving the nod to Matusz, who we believed had a slightly better overall arsenal and much better command (that general opinion remains, and we would love to see the O's fans jumping back on the Tillman train to keep in mind Chris's developmental curve when they are trampling upon Matusz's potential on the message boards and blogs).

Chris had up-and-down showings during partial years with the Birds in 2010 and 2011, showing some inconsistencies in his mechanics and the effects of developmental tweaking "in progress" at both the Major League level and at Triple-A.  Our take remained largely the same, mostly because the raw material was still there for Tillman to be what we always considered his to be -- a potential number two starter, with a good chance of fitting in as a good mid-rotation arm. 

Last spring my updated filed report on Tillman contained an OFP of 57 with a 54-59 range. Essentially, I was very confident Tillman had the goods to deliver number three starter production and a shot at developing into a true number two.  The grade was slightly ahead of what we filed for Zach Britton, which obviously was met with skepticism from various readers and message boards.

Our biggest gripe with Tillman as of the end of 2011? He wasn't making use of his potential physicality and, likely tied to the lack of physicality, he wasn't maintaining his mechanics.  The motion and arm action was always easy, but Tillman had yet to tighten everything up, so the arm action, temp and release had not found a steady fit. 

The result was inconsistent stuff that didn't generally hold-up through the course of a game.  Tillman's velocity hadn't taken the expected step forward.  Tillman's curve and change-up, however, were still flashing plus, and he still had an ability to be a mid-rotation starter even with an average fastball.  It was a different Tillman than I expected to see develop, but not necessarily a worse Chris Tillman if he could find more consistency.

Tillman worked with Brady Anderson this off-season to improve his strength and stamina, both to improve his overall explosiveness and to better equip him to endure the long Major League season.  This spring, Baltimore (wisely, I think) started Tillman back in Norfolk and worked to simplify things, mechanically.  Last night Orioles fans were treated to the "new" Chris Tillman, who is really just the old Chris Tillman with a slightly more compact delivery, believe it or not.

We will get into the details below, but as we do so let's all keep in mind a couple of things: 1) pitching prospects rarely develop on a linear path, meaning Tillman's "ups and downs" are more common than uncommon among even high-level pitching prospects, and 2) a good start does not set a new baseline for expected performance, it simply gives you a positive data point to add to your overall evaluation of a young baseball player. 

On to some quick notes on last night....

Scouting Tillman: Short form report
Game:
July 4, 2012 (at Seattle Mariners)

Velo Chart (short form):
Pitch (AVG/Max)
FB (95/97)
CU (77/79)
CH (83/84)
CT (90/92)
SL (83/85)

Grades:
Fastball:  55/60
Curve:  55
Change-up:  55/60
Cutter: 50/55
Slider: 45/50
Control/Command: 50
Feel:  55

"Scouty" report:
The biggest area of growth for Tillman over the past 18 months has been the simplification of his step in and arm circle.  The result has been a better tempo, more consistent release, better arm speed and a slight improvement in command (though the command is still a work in progress).  Tillman has completed a conversion to a phone booth motion (meaning he is compact enough to perform his step-in and leg kick inside a phone booth) and has paired that with a simplified drop on the backside of his arm action. 

In the past, Tillman has had a little more rock to his motion and more swing in his arm, which had the duel impact of flashing the ball on the backside (which can give hitters a look at your grip) and creating an inconsistent path from the backside to release, throwing off command and consistency of stuff.  This spring, both in camp and at Norfolk, Tillman showcased his more compact delivery and immediately saw the benefits through an increase in arm speed and a bump in velo (about four miles per hour higher, on average, than 2011). 

The other benefit of his simplified drop, or soft stab, on the back side is that he is shielding the ball much better from hitters, creating deception in his secondaries which almost assuredly will result in more swings and misses from MLB hitters.  That helps the secondary stuff but also causes the hitters to perceive a more explosive fastball.

His arsenal was largely what we have seen in the past with a couple of positive developments.  First and foremost, the import of the velocity bump cannot be understated.  Tillman, at his best, can utilize plus off-speed and breaking stuff down to help his fastball miss bats up.  The increased velocity will allow him to be more aggressive in all parts of the zone. 

The secondary stuff, as discussed above, benefited from an increase in deception.  It was also a little more consistent than Tillman has historically shown at the Major League level (though he has flashed plus stuff throughout his limited career). The change is, at its best, a plus pitch with hard fade. The curve is a 12-to-6 hammer at its best, and he got on top of it with a little more frequency last night than he has in the past. It wasn't any better than it had previously shown, but it was more consistent, and he showed comfort with it as both a drop-in pitch and a bury pitch.

It is a packaged deal, fastball and secondaries (one reason why I still am not certain why people mention "pitch values", a FanGraphs stat, individually as some sort of gauge for evaluating overall pitching performance).  Last night Tillman showed how dramatically slight improvements across the board can help all aspects of a pitcher's performance.

More deception and more consistency led to secondaries that were better executed and more consistently "there" for him when he wanted them. It also meant hitters were less able to sit fastball.  Increased velocity (while maintaining his almost always solid velo delta between the fastball and change-up) meant hitters had to be teed up for a true above-average to plus heater, increasing the odds in Tillman's favor when he decided to drop an off-speed or breaker.

Tillman hit his spots often enough to overmatch Seattle -- an offense with limited punch.  It is unlikely his line would have been quite as eye-popping against a more dangerous nine, and that is important to understand and keep in mind when revelling in last night's box score.  It was a very nice step forward, but not a signal that Tillman has "arrived". There is work to be done in his ability to spot his stuff, and that will be highly important in determining whether Tillman ultimately settles in as a dependable mid-rotation arm, a shut down number two, or somewhere in between. 

The good news is that a more consistent execution of his pitches will give him and Wieters a broader set of strategies to implement, and we should see an increase in changes and curves called by this duo as we progress through 2012.

Conclusion
The bottom line? It was a nice first step for Tillman at the Major League level in 2012.  It was not the performance of an ace, but it was more evidence that the front-end stuff we have always seen in there could manifest more regularly, and be implemented more effectively, moving forward. He still does not project as a plus command arm, but he can be better than average in spurts, and more importantly he has the look and feel of someone more confident in his stuff than he has ever been.

Once the Orioles return from the break, we will provide an in-depth breakdown of Tillman against either the Tigers or Twins.  There is much more to say than we've covered in the brief summary here.

Amateur Acquisitions: Analyzing unsigned picks in Shadow Draft

Earlier today we took a look at the current state of amateur acquisitions on the international market and vis-a-vis the remaining unsigned picks in the June Amateur Draft.  Before continuing with this entry it might make sense to peruse that piece if you haven't alreadyThe loose conclusion of each respective discussion was that:

1. fans should hope Baltimore does more on the international front but be comforted in the efforts of the remaining AL East teams being limited starting next year; and
2. it doesn't just matter that Baltimore is able to sign Gausman (1st), Poche (5th Rd), and Velasquez (15th Rd over-allotment), it matters how the Orioles sign them.

We are focusing on the second point for this piece and applying to your humble ESPN SweetSpot blog the same standards we levied on the professionals in the Warehouse.  So we ask ourselves -- did Camden Depot spend efficiently and effectively in the Shadow Draft?

Here is a breakdown of our signings thus far and a note as to our current status vis-a-vis pool allotment:

1:4 -- Kevin Gausman (rhp, LSU): Unsigned (allotment $4.2 MM)
2:4 -- Tanner Rahier (ss/2b, Palm Desert HS, Calif.): Shadow bonus $700,00 (allotment savings $93,700)
3:4 -- Avery Romero (3b, Menendez HS, Fla.): Unsigned (allotment $481,100)
4:4 -- Ty Buttrey (rhp, Providence HS, N.C.) Shadow bonus $1.3 MM (overage $950,100)
5:4 -- Lex Rutledge (rhp, Radford) Shadow bonus $200,000 (allotment savings $62,000)
6:4 -- Josh Elander (c/of, TCU) Shadow bonus $196,200 (allotment savings $0)
7:4 -- Jeremy Rathjen (of, Rice) Shadow bonus $25,000 (allotment savings $125,000)
8:4 -- Zach Cooper (rhp, Central Michigan) Shadow bonus $15,000 (allotment savings $115,000)
9:4 -- Michael Boyden (rhp, Maryland) Shadow bonus $10,000 (allotment savings $120,000)
10:4 -- Chris Kirsch (rhp, Lackawanna College) Unsigned (allotment $125,000)

Total savings: $515,700
Total overage: $950,100
Current status: $434,400 over allotment
Available taxable amount without losing pick: $341,000 (with tax, $597,350)

Provided Kirsch signs (he was drafted by the Nats in the 31st Round), we should realize around $120,000 in savings there, which means we would have the money to sign Romero and Gausman to their allotted amount while incurring a tax of about $250,000. 

Now, keep in mind that Romero could be an over-allotment signee, given his option to attend the University of Florida.  That means that, if Kirsch doesn't sign, we would have to sign Gausman at enough of a discount to cover the additional $90 K to cover Buttrey's overage, as well as any other overage required to sign Romero.  If Romero does not sign, we would target signing Gausman for $3.75 MM so as to avoid paying tax on the Buttrey overage.

If we were required to pay the extra $250,000 or so in tax, I would view this as much more tolerable as applied to Buttrey than it would be as applied to Vasquez (discussed in this morning's piece).  Why? the overage essentially bumps Buttrey's cost to a little over $1.5 MM (with $1.3 MM going to the player).  That difference is the difference in spending allotment for the 33rd overall pick and the 40th overall pick.  Essentially, it is negligible. We had Buttrey valued as a supplemental-1st round talent, including risk profile, and regardless of whether we pay the $250,000 tax or not we are getting him for early-supplemental-1st round money.

Any overage required to sign Avery (provided he signs) would be covered by savings on Gausman and on our 7th, 8th and 9th round picks.  The tradeoff, of course, is that we went for cheaper senior signs in these spots as opposed to Baltimore essentially playing the board with selections willing to sign for around slot allotment.  Our analysis was that the difference between our expected return on our senior signs and our expectation for return for Baltimore's "play the board" picks are far outweighed by the greater upside we get in the form of Rahier/Romero/Buttrey over Baltimore's 2nd, 3rd and 4th Round selections of Branden Kline (rhp, UVA)/Adrian Marin (2b/ss, Gulliver Prep, Fla.)/Christian Walker (1b, South Carolina).

The risk, of course, is that Romero and Buttrey require more overage than we can cover, which means we have to either decide not to include one in our Shadow System, or forfeit our first round pick next year.  We certainly pushed the envelope as far as draft spend is concerned, but I feel strongly that our approach did a better job of leveraging our pool allotment to bring in the best collection of talent possible.  It will be interested to see how it all plays out and you can be sure we'll be spilling more internet ink on this topic in the coming weeks.

As a final note, if the Gausman signing goes right, Kirsch signs, and Romero signs for an amount that is not much more than allotment, we could have enough left over to ink Velasquez as well:

Current status: $434,000 over allotment
Gausmen signing $3.7 MM (allotment savings $500,000
Romero signing $600,000 (allotment overage about $110,000)
Kirsch signing $10,000 (allotment savings $115,000)
Updated status: $71,000 savings
Taxable overage available: $341,000

That would give us $412,000 to add to the $100,000 allotment currently in place for Velasquez.  Were Romero to sign for slot allotment, or were Gausman to sign for $100,000 less, we'd have over $600,000 to offer to Velasquez. Keeping in mind the tax makes sense in the context of our Buttrey overage, and this would be quite a draft haul.

Amateur Acquisitions: IFA signings; remaining Draft signings

International Signings -- Day 1 Wrap
Yesterday marked the first day that first-time eligible international free agents could sign with Major League organizations. Ben Badler at Baseball America kept folks abreast of all the action over at the BA Prospect Blog (check it out if you haven't already).  One quick note -- the BA rankings discussed are to anchor the piece and any resulting conversation.  In no way should the rankings be taken as gospel.  Badler does as good a job as anyone at compiling info on these players, but the opinions on these 16-year olds vary greatly from organization to organization.  We use the rankings as a useful cross-section of talented international players; that is enough for this exercise.

The down and dirty details? Out of the Top 20 IFA prospects listed by Baseball America, 14 have been announced as coming to terms with MLB clubs. Out of that group of signing prospects, seven are headed to farm systems in the AL East. Out of those seven, none are heading to Baltimore.  Here is the breakdown (including BA ranking):

Blue Jays
Franklin Barreto, ss/cf, Venezuela (BA Rank #1)
Luis Castro, ss, Venezuela (BA Rank #9)

Rays
Jose Mujica, rhp, Venezuela (BA Rank #3)
David Rodriguez, c, Venezuela (BA Rank #14)

Yankees
Luis Torrens, c, Venezuela (BA Rank #2)
Alexander Palma, of, Venezuela (BA Rank #4)

Red Sox
Jose Almonte, rhp, Dominican Republic (BA Rank #17)

In previous years Baltimore has shied away from swiming in the deeper waters of high bonus international free agents due to expected return on investment.  This year, MLB has placed a soft cap on international spending for all teams, whereby teams cannot spend more than $2.9 MM on international free agents without incurring a penalty.  This $2.9 MM soft cap can be tweaked a little with up to six $50 K signings being permitted without counting against the overall allotment.

In 2013, it is expected that pool allotments for signing IFAs will be handed out on a sliding scale in similar fashion to the June Amateur Draft, with the best records from 2012 receiving smaller allotments than those teams at the bottom of the standings.  MLB hopes to then transition to an International Draft in 2014, though the details surrounding such an endeavor still remain convoluted.

With more cost certainty this year in the top tier of international signings, it is somewhat disappointing to see Baltimore still on the sidelines -- at least after Day 1 of the signing period.  Next year the O's will have a built in advantage over a number of teams, depending on their final record.  While the preference is for Baltimore to flex this advantage next year, at least fans can take solace in the fact that the other four AL East teams will be limited in their spending options.  So even if Baltimore continues to sit out the IFA feeding frenzy, at least the rest of the AL East won't be getting quite as far ahead as they have in years' past, and thus far in 2012.

Draft Signings
As of this morning, Baltimore still had yet to ink two of their top ten selections -- first rounder, and fourth overall selection, Kevin Gausman (rhp, LSU), and fifth rounder Colin Poche (rhp, Marcus HS, Flower Mound, Texas).  Thus far, Baltimore has spent just under $2.5 MM of their allotted $6.8 MM (assuming all top ten round selections sign).  The following is a breakdown as to what is available for Gausman and Poche, as well as a quick look at whether the O's should be looking to signing any of the remaining selections after the tenth round for over the $100K allotted amount -- most notably fifteenth rounder Derick Velasquez (rhp, Merced College).

Gausman's pick is allotted $4.2 MM by MLB.  When we selected Gausman in our Shadow Draft, we did so with an estimate that we could sign him for $3.5-3.75 MM.  That estimate looks pretty spot on in comparison to other top six picks that have signed thus far:

1:1 Carlos Correa (ss, Astros) - Signed for $4.8 MM (allotment $7.2 MM)
1:2 Byron Buxton (of, Twins) - Signed for $6.0 MM (allotment $6.2 MM)
1:3 Mike Zunino (c, Mariners) - Signed for $4.0 MM (allotment $5.2 MM)
1:4 Kevin Gausman (rhp, LSU) - Unsigned (allotment $4.2 MM)
1:5 Kyle Zimmer (rhp, Royals) - Signed for $3.0 MM (allotment $3.5 MM)

The O's have saved $120K by signing various of their top eight signees for under allotment, which ups Gausman's "allotment" to around $4.3 MM  They could spend an additional $341 K (approx.) without losing a pick next year, but would be taxed 75% on the overage (this is important).

If Gausman signs for the full allotment of $4.2, Baltimore will have $120K untaxed to tack on to Poche's allotment or the allotment for fifteenth rounder Velasquez. Ideally Baltimore will save more money on Gausman in order to increase the allotment for these other two picks.  Why? Once we dig into the taxable overage for these two players, we push closer to the area where risk and reward get more uncomfortable.

Poche's allotment is $262 K.  Velasquez's allotment is $100K.  Adding another $120 K to either bumps the allotment into an area that is still bearable from a risk reward standpoint (about fourth round money for Poche and fifth round money for Velasquez).  Anything over that comes at a 175% rate, which quickly drives up the respective price of these two.  Here is how it shakes out assuming Gausman were to sign for $4.2 MM and Baltimore is willing to spend up to their allotted 5% overage:

Poche
Actual Allotment/Round Selected - $262,000/5th
Bonus w/$120K saved from other signings/Round Equivalent - $380,000/4th
Additional $100 K to player - $555,000/late-2nd
Additional $150 K to player - $645,000/mid-2nd
Additional $200 K to player - $730,000/early-2nd
Additional $300 K to player - $905,00/supplemental-1st

Velasquez
Actual Allotment/Round Selected - $100,000/15th
Bonus w/$120K saved from other signings/Round Equivalent - $220,000/5th
Additional $100 K to player - $395,000/late-3rd
Additional $150 K to player - $485,000/early-3rd
Additional $200 K to player - $570,000/mid-2nd
Additional $300 K to player - $745,000/early-2nd

While both Pouce and Velasquez have upside, Poche is not a second round talent from a risk profile perspective and it is debatable as to whether Velasquez should be considered more than a third or fourth round talent form a risk profile perspective.  Further, if Velasquez was signable for around $350-400 K, one would think he would have come off the board around the fourth or fifth round. My guess, having been witness to negotiations of this type first hand, is that Velasquez is looking for something closer to $600-650 K.  Above, Baltimore had room to give him $520 K without losing a pick. Assuming they save $200 K by signing Gausman for just $4.0 MM, that would make the total cost for Velasquez, tax included, $875,000 (with $650,000 of that going to the player).  That would be top sixty overall money.

What's the point of all of this? It's not as simple as "there is money to sign Gausman/Velasquez/Poche."  If Baltimore saves $500 K by signing Gausman to a $3.7 MM deal, that $500 K, with the $120 K already saved through other signings, should in and of itself give Baltimore the money to sign Poche and Velasquez to $300,000 and $675,000, respectively, without incurring any penalty.  If Gausman signs for the full $4.2 MM, and we assume Poche and Velasquez can be had for around $275 K and $500 K, respectively, it would end up costing Baltimore an additional $525,000 (or about 7.75% of their draft budget).

Yes, it's just money. But in reviewing the formulation and implementation of a draft strategy, a resulting class in which Poche and Velasquez comprise a total of 18% of your budget ($775 K in bonus and $525 K in taxes levied) is simply not going to score very high from an "efficient and effective" standpoint. 

Beginning this year, the draft is about a lot more than "get your guys". The teams that thrive in this environment are going to be the teams that best utilize their bonus allotments.  O's fans should not simply be hoping to see Gausman, Poche and Velasquez signed -- they should be hoping to see them signed such that a large chunk of tax is not required.  The alternative is a potential indication that Baltimore was not as effective in their draft spend as they probably could have been. That means talent was likely left on the table.

2012 International Signings -- Day 1

Ben Badler at Baseball America will be updating the BA Prospect Blog with news on signings today -- the first day that eligible international free agents can sign with MLB clubs (this is the "new" crop of eligibles, each of whom are 16-years old).

Click here to follow updates from Ben, one of the better providers of international coverage on the baseball front.

We'll have some thoughts this evening in a Day 1 summary post.  I have not scouted the vast majority of these players, and accordingly will not be offering thoughts on the particulars.  As a reminder, Camden Depot has only recommended two signings of high profile international players.

The first was Miguel Sano (for whom we set a $3.5 MM price tag and would have gone up to $4 MM).  Sano received $3.15 MM from the twins and likely would be in the Camden Depot "Shadow System" considering how much more we would have offered.

The second was Ronald Guzman (for whom we set a $3.0 MM price tag and would have gone up to $3.5 MM).  Guzman signed with the Rangers for $3.45 MM and likely would not be in the Camden Depot "Shadow System" considering the almost identical sum of money and the preferential landing spot in Texas's system, which is flush with Latin talent.

We did not recommend any players for signature this year, though the new soft-cap system strongly encourages teams like Baltimore to jump in the game with some level of cost certainty (each team can spend up to $3.2 MM without penalty if they play the game correctly, per Jeff Passan at Yahoo).  2012 will strictly be an analytical year from the sidelines for the Depot and our Shadow System; hopefully the real Orioles will have something more exciting up their sleeve.

UPDATE -- Courtesy of Badler and Baseball America, here is a running scorecard of AL East high profile signings today. Please click on this link and peruse their blog for details on these players and their signing bonuses (Baseball America does the lifting, they should get the page hits).

Blue Jays
Franklin Barreto, ss/cf, Venezuela (BA Rank #1)
Luis Castro, ss, Venezuela (BA Rank #9)

Rays
Jose Mujica, rhp, Venezuela (BA Rank #3)
David Rodriguez, c, Venezuela (BA Rank #14)

Yankees
Luis Torrens, c, Venezuela (BA Rank #2)
Alexander Palma, of, Venezuela (BA Rank #4)

Red Sox
Jose Almonte, rhp, Dominican Republic (BA Rank #17)

Orioles
None

UPDATE -- The original entry was updated to correct the description of the pool allotments for this year.

Here comes Thome!

Yesterday I posted an opinion piece where I stated that the Orioles are ripe for a downfall.  That the team has been overachieving with holes at 1B, 2B, 3B, LF, and SP.  These were too many holes to be aggressive in trading.  I doubt anyone in the front office read anything I wrote yesterday, but they sort of met halfway to nowhere with my perspective yesterday as they acquired DH Jim Thome for a pair of minor leaguers in RHP Kyle Simon and C Gabriel Lino.

Jim Thome
DH
Jim Thome is an excellent hitter.  He has always been an excellent hitter.  Age has ruined many of his skills and his ability to stay healthy, but he still has a great eye and enough bat speed to punish any pitch that enters his zone.  He probably has about 250 plate appearances left in him this summer where he will likely hit in the .820 to .860 OPS range.  That should be worth about 1 WAR coming from him.  The other 100 plate appearances will come from existing players and produce about an additional 0.1 or 0.2 WAR.  That stands as an improvement of about 0.7 WAR over what Mark Reynolds, Wilson Betemit, Nick Johnson, and Chris Davis have managed at the position (.781 OPS).  A 0.7 value for about 700k is a $ per win rate of 1MM.  Current market value puts it around 4.5MM per win.  In a vacuum, this is a very efficient trade.  If you think this team is truly a .550 winning percentage team, then it is also likely an effective move.  Every little bit that pushes you in the right direction is worth a great deal or, at least, can be worth a great deal when the playoffs are involved.

However, this deal was not completed in a vacuum nor was it completed in a 5x5 league.  These guys have to put some collection of players on the field.  As it stands the Orioles have 5 DHs on the roster.  Mark Reynolds is a butcher in the field even though the press has heralded his defensive aptitude these past two offseasons.  He dropped some weight in the offseason, but it did nothing to affect his range and his rushed throwing mechanics.  His dives and snags look good, but the misses and throwaways mean more to his defensive value.  First base limits his ability to adversely affect the game, but he still rates poor over there.  His bat barely makes up for this deficiency.  Unfortunately, he has stated time and time again that he does not have the mindset to succeed as a DH.

Chris Davis is another player who makes some nice plays and gets some accolades for defense, but simply does not have the range or throws to make him an average first or third baseman.  His bat, when hot, makes up for these problems.  His bat is not always hot, so, like Reynolds, he often waivers between being above average and being below replacement level.  Like Reynolds, Davis is likely to be worth about as much as a bench player or a fill in when the rest of the team is much stronger in the lineup and on the field.

Wilson Betemit's bat has always shone great promise.  The hope was that his fielding would come around.  It never has and it simply gets worse as he ages and his agility decreases.  He still hammers righties and that is where his value comes from.  Unfortunately...that is what Chris Davis does and Nick Johnson does.  Nick is currently on the DL.  He has a good eye and some remnants of power, but he is not likely to be in the team's plans anymore because Thome is a better version of Nick Johnson.

So, what we have here are 5 DHs with none of them able to play the field and one on the DL, likely to be released.  This deal slightly improves the DH position and forces DHs to remain on the field.  Mind you, this does not make the Orioles' defense worse because these DHs were playing the field to begin with.  It does make it seem less likely that players will be acquired to push Reynolds, Davis, and Betemit to DH where they belong.  I think that would truly be the playoff run move.  It would also likely be a move that would require more than Kyle Simon and Gabriel Lino.


Kyle Simon
RHP
Simon was drafted in the 4th round in last year's draft.  At the time of the draft, Nick surmised:

Simon throws from a low, almost side-armed, slot, relying primarily on a fastball/change-up pairing. Like Wright, he is a big-bodied righty with some arm strength and a chance to start if things break right. Inconsistencies in his release and his low-angle make it difficult for him to command his slider right now -- improving that offering will be key in determining whether or not he ultimately ends up in the pen. Like Wright, he's tough to lift because of the sink on his heater and his change, allowing him to go 128.2 IP while allowing just two homeruns. He doesn't miss may bats right now, but the hope is that he will once he finds a more consistent breaker.

That is basically what he still is.  He is a groundball pitcher who does not miss bats.  A sinker that gets contact in A ball is not likely to be a solid pitch unless he is able to improve upon it.  He has been about league average this year and his stuff plays pretty similarly to both righties and lefties.  I have yet to see him throw, but to me he seems to have the makings of a fringe MLB reliever.  It would not surprise me if he peters out in AA with some splashes in AAA.  Considering Thome was last traded for a small transaction fee and before that a no hit minor league utility player, this would have been a perfectly fine price to pay for his services.

Gabriel Lino
C
Lino was also in the deal, which in my opinion technically makes this an overpay.  It is easy to get high on Lino because he is a 19 year old in full season ball with exceptional potential as a defensive catcher and a lot of pop.  It is important to remember that Lino does not have much of a contact tool and is being overwhelmed at the plate this season.  We had him rated as the 16th best prospect in the Orioles' system before the year began:

Backstop Gabriel Lino has some offensive upside and a strong arm behind the dish, but may lack the lateral quickness needed to stick at catcher long term, particularly if he gets any bigger. He has soft hands but lets his glove float a little too often when receiving, which he'll need to tighten. The power is still raw, and does not project particularly well to a corner infield spot. Just 18-years old this year, he has time to work on his problem areas. Should his power tool emerge, he could shift to first base in order to allow more developmental focus on his bat. He is on the large side for a catcher, and it still remains to be seen how he will hold up physically over the stress of a long full season ball season.

The projection was that he would become a fringe back up catcher, but that his ceiling was as a starting catcher on a first division team.  This is the kind of player I would not like to give up.  My perspective with prospects is that if you have any high ceiling catchers, short stops, or centerfielders that you do what you can to keep them.  To simply find an average player out of those positions is worth a great deal in value.  If (and it is a big if) Lino can find his bat, he could easily be a top 50 prospect.  There simply are not many catchers who can put that package together.  That said, he is not a top 50 catcher.  He is not a top 200 catcher.  There is promise there though.  Some, like Kevin Goldstein, agree that there is potential there.  Others, like Keith Law, do not see the ceiling.

The Likely Outcome
In all likelihood, I see this as happening.  Thome hits pretty well and leaves the team at the end of the year.  The Orioles will likely finish in fourth or fifth place, but with a record that is about 15th to 18th best in the league.  Kyle Simon will fade out in AAA at some point.  Gabriel Lino will eventually get a cup of coffee, impressing people on his defense and making them wish he could square up more.

What Can Change All of This
Another deal could be coming and this may change the outlook.  The team has five DHs.  Nick Johnson will likely be DFA'd.  With Thome on board, he serves no role.  It may be the end of the line for him.  I could see Davis being moved for a piece.  He does not have much value, but I could still see someone dream on him.  I do not think this would bring in a top tier talent, but it could bring something decent.  I cannot think of an obvious target though at the moment for him.  Maybe Arizona if they think he can play third (does anyone believe that he can?).  Maybe the Dodgers.  I do not know.