How Much is Jeremy Guthrie Worth?

It has been mentioned by quite a few that Dan Duquette is entertaining offer for Jeremy Guthrie.  However, a major issue with Guthrie is that the team wants pitching to come back in return.  This sounds foolish and wrong headed, but this is exactly what happened when Koji Uehara was dealt.  A starting pitcher (depending on your definition of a starting pitcher) and a buy low corner infielder came back in return.  Guthrie is one face value worth more than Koji as he is a starter.  Guthrie will also cost more than Koji (~7MM vs 4MM).

What is Jeremy Guthrie worth?

From 2007-2011, Guthrie is the pitchers with the most losses in baseball with 65.  The top ten behind Guthrie is Derek Lowe (64), Paul Maholm (62), Bronson Arroyo/Barry Zito (61), Matt Cain (60), Livan Hernandez (59), and John Danks/Edwin Jackson/Fausto Carmona (56).  The next slot at 55 is James Shields and Wandy Rodriguez with Mark Buerhle at 53 behind them.  I think the basic point when looking at this is when the electronic and media furor questions the worth of Jeremy Guthrie, the losingest pitcher of the last half decade, it rings analytically lazy.

The bulk of Guthrie's losses have been over the past three years with 17, 14, and 17.  That looks bad, but you also have to consider his team.  The Baltimore Orioles have been an awful team.  They have been awful offensively and defensively.  During that stretch, only 2009 looks bad for Jeremy Guthrie when he earned a 1.3 fWAR.  It was the only time in his past five years that he had an fWAR under two. 

For all intents and purposes, let us say that Guthrie will have his second worst season ever and produce a 2 fWAR.  That would put his value around 10 MM.  He would also be worth a 12 MM offer next year and therefore could bring back a draft pick that would be worth about 2 MM.  With a 2012 cost of 7 MM, I see that as 3-5 MM in surplus value.

What does 5 MM get you?

Victor Wang determined the value for different prospects.  The numbers are a bit dated, but not by much as he did account for inflation that wound up not happening in baseball due to the economic stall out and drop.  I do not agree with his methods though as they take averages of value.  I think risk plays a greater role here and there should be a discount.  I would not go as far as to suggest using the median as that ignores the potential to have a player who achieves star status.  That said, I would probably take Wang's values, adjust them for today's market, and simply cut them in half.  It is not a very elegant method, but one that feels more in line with hypothetical value vs. more certain value.

With that in mind, I see Guthrie worth a back end top 100 pitching prospect or two second tier pitching prospects.  The Orioles could also look toward manipulating the value and bringing back an MLB ready arm that has unfulfilled upside and is a change of scenery player.  That is what Tommy Hunter was in the Uehara deal.  Hunter's unfulfilled upside though is that of maybe a 3 slot pitcher on a second division team if we are being kind.  That has use because teams need those kinds of players to round out the innings, but it was something the Rangers could afford to lose as they needed better performance out of the bull pen.

Potential Deals?

Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim
The Angels have been rumored to be in contact about Guthrie, but he appears to be Plan B or C.  Tyler Chatwood would have been a target, but he was deal in the Ianetta deal.  Other MLB ready arms to look at would be journeyman Jerome Williams or the potentially dependable Garrett Richards.  Michael Kohn could be an interesting arm in the pen if Jerome Williams was the MLB ready arm as Kohn can hold his own in a pen right now.

Texas Rangers
The Rangers need an MLB ready arm to fill in for the absence of CJ Wilson and they have built up a strong working relatonship with the Os.  Scott Feldman would be the MLB ready arm here.  He is at best a back end starter for second division team and really only has one good season to his name.  Feldman is also costing about 4 or 5 MM after arbitration.  I could see Feldman paired with Cody Buckel or Tanner Scheppers.  Both of those pitchers are prospects with a mid-rotation ceiling, but a strong middle relief floor.  Personally, I'd want Robbie Ross and Christian Villanueva as a good southpaw prospect and a corner infielder with some breakout potential.

Washington Nationals
The Nationals would be helped by being able to provide a veteran boost to their starting rotation and fill the role Livan Hernandez and Jason Marquis have provided.  A problem though with this matchup is that the Nationals do not have many tweener starting pitchers that could be a buy low proposition for the Orioles.  It could also be argued that with Strasburg, Peacock, Zimmerman, Detwiler, and Lannan among other they already have enough depth.

St. Louis Cardinals
Cardinals have been rumored to be on Mark Buerhle, but the Albert Pujols sweepstakes is locking up a great deal of their ability to spend.  Jeremy Guthrie may prove to be a good secondary option for them.  Setup man Lance Lynn I would think would be the guy the Os would zero in on.  He works in the low 90s as a starter and mid 90s as a reliever.  He would provide the Os with a player with a solid base as they try to make a starter out of him.

Cincinnati Reds
The Reds have Yonder Alonso and no place to play him.  The Orioles could find him a place at first with Mark Reynolds returning to third or going to left field or even DHing.  They could also add another fringe piece like a Nolan Reimold and see if they could wedge Edinson Volquez out.  I think the Reds would be better off just making Volquez into a reliever.  I think Guthrie would be a great fit for the Reds.

Los Angeles Dodgers
The Dodgers have a good number of older pieces and high upside young players.  The only pitcher I could see meeting the Orioles' needs is Nate Eovaldi.  He profiles more as a reliever, but the Dodgers are trying to use him to spell a rotation slot.  The Orioles could take back Juan Uribe to offset cash costs, but would likely get a prospect added.  Chris Withrow would be who I would want as the added prospect.  He has been passed by other arms in the system, but has a plus breaking ball and can produce high heat.

Conclusion
With the new CBA rules, Guthrie's value is at its highest now as any team who trades for him would not be able to pull back compensation draft picks.  If he is dealt now, the receiving team will receive that protection.  That single item has a value of about 2 MM attached to it.  As much as Guthrie means to the team with his mid rotation arm, he likely has more value being dealt out to another team.  The hope is the Orioles do not sell themselves short as they may have done in the Uehara deal by chase 'now' value as opposed to seeking 'future' value.

Cup of jO's (December 2, 2011): O's and Yoenis Cespedes

Taking a break from the Orioles Top 25 Prospect list, this morning I wanted to give a quick write-up on Cuban outfielder Yoenis Cespedes -- the top international free agent currently on the market (technically, he will not hit the market until his residency is officially established in the Dominican Republic). Baltimore was recently linked to Cespedes by Roch Kubatko at MASN, who wrote on Wednesday that the O's were "interested in Cuban outfielder Yoenis Cespedes and will watch him work out in the Dominican Republic."

While Cespedes has been closely followed by international evaluators for the last five years, average baseball fans were made aware of his presence this November when his "publicity video" went viral on YouTube (a copy of the video available here), leading to drums of e-ink being spilled by sportswriters around the net. He has been a fixture on the Cuban National Team and was rated by Baseball America as the sixth best prospect at the 2009 World Baseball Classic.

Putting aside the likelihood of Cespedes electing to sign with Baltimore, is he a target Baltimore should consider? To answer that question as best we can we must look at two items: 1) his skillset and projection, and 2) his likely price.

Scouting Snippet

I haven't seen enough of Cespedes to stand firmly behind a full evaluation -- really my exposure has been limited to video feeds and television broadcasts from international tournaments. The following is my take based on about six or seven in-game views, so assign the requisite level of weight to these thoughts. Also, be sure to crosscheck this report with whatever you can find at BaseballAmerica.com, who routinely leads the pack in coverage of international talents.

Physical Description:
Listed 5-foot-10, 200-pounds. Thick, strong, athletic build. Broad chest and wide, strong hips and trunk. Agility and explosiveness to excess. Moves very well underway; can drag out of the box.

Hitting:
Cespedes's calling card is power and he has lots and lots of it. Because of his physical strength, particularly his monster core, he does not need much load or seperation to give his barrel time to accelerate. With a basic, fairly compact swing he is able to produce enough torque to drive the ball out from pole-to-pole. He doesn't need to sell out for homeruns, but his approach in the box can noticeably falter when he gets too focused on trying to force hard contact. This isn't evident in a loss of balance, head pull, or leak, but you will see some backside collapse at times and, more often, he'll extend early and come around the ball, creating holes and some lag in the barrel. There is significant bat wrap, but he seems to overcome it with his bat speed. Raw power grades at a 65, though his in-game realization could be closer to 55 against advanced MLB arms. Hitting could be anywhere from a 40 to a 55 depending on how capable he proves at making adjustments at the Major League level.

Fielding:
Cespedes has more than enough footspeed to cover gap-to-gap in center, and shows a very good drop-step back on balls. He isn't a natural fielder, but shows comfort in the outfield. He can try to do too much at times, and could possibly benefit from pro instruction as to how to play more within his tools -- not getting overly aggressive with his throws and setting up his routes a little better. His arm is an easy 60, though his accuracy can come and go due to his set-up and arm action. I would have no issue believing his glove can grade as a 60 if told so by someone who has spent more time sitting on him, but my limited views lead me to give a more conservative 50 grade.

Summary:
Cespedes is a difficult assignment for evaluators. His physical tools are phenominal, and he has a track record of performing against high level competition (albeit inconsistent and varying talent levels from player to player) both in Cuba and through international tournaments. Still, there is a large degree of uncertainty as to how a player in his situation ultimately reacts to the change in culture, lifestyle, on-field pressure and media scrutiny when making the adjustment from life in Cuba to life as a professional baseball player in the United States.

The safest course of action is likely providing him the opportunity to spend at least half of a season at Triple-A, allowing him to adjust to the pro game outside of the national broadcasts and nightly highlight wraps that accompany MLB games. With limited looks, it is very difficult to wager a guess as to the likelihood that Cespedes is suited to make the transition to the Majors with his production intact. For purposes of this exercise, we'll slap a consertive grade report as follows:

Hit: 45
Power: 55/60
Speed: 60
Arm: 60
Fielding: 45/50
Feel: 45
OFP: 52-56

*Click here for primer on Grades

What we have, for purposes of this exercise, is a potential first division starting center fielder, with some risk that he will not make enough contact for his power to fully emerge at the highest level.

Price Tag

Aroldis Chapman currently holds the record for initial contract given to a Cuban defector, with the Reds handing him a deal $30.25 million over six years. Cespedes figures to easily eclipse that contract, and is rumored to be looking for more than $60 million over six years. At 26-years old, he is entering his physical prime, with his signing Major League team getting his best years for the term of their investment. Significant interest from some potentially big spending clubs (including the Yankees, Red Sox, Tigers, Phillies and Nationals) would seem to all but ensure a big pay day for the standout Cuban outfielder -- for purposes of this exercise we will use a conservative estimate of $60 million over six years. Keep in mind that if Cespedes ends-up at Triple-A for three months, you are eating away part of the value of that first year -- in effect driving the annual price up to around $11 million a year.

Conclussion

Our "scouty" report projects Cespedes to a solid to above-average first division starter, and his upside is that of a five-tooled multiple all-star talent. A 6/60 deal for that type of player would seem to be a steal, particularly for a player entering his best four or five years of production and physicality. The sixty-million dollar question, however, is one of probability.

While evaluators can find comfort in Cespedes's successful track record in Cuba and on the international scene, it is a tall order to ask that evaluator to stake $60 million dollars, maybe more, on that production translating against the best competition in the world. Add to that an inconsistent track record for Cuban defectors and the larger issue of cultural adjustments and the ability to perform under the weight of the media scrutiny and expectations that accompany a record-setting contract, and the evaluator's task of filing a suggested price starts to more closely resemble a game of darts (skilled darts, but darts nonetheless).

Ultimately, for Baltimore, the likelihood is that so long as the big spenders remain interested the price tag will be problematic when considering the risk you are taking on. Additionally, the Orioles may be looking at a situation where they are forced to overpay the market in order to convince Cespedes to turn down a better competitive and higher profile situation in New York, or perhaps a more Cubano-centric situation in a city like Miami.

Cespedes is worth a long look from Baltimore, and the return on investment has a chance to be the type of "hit" that the Orioles will need to have if the organization hopes to turn things around any time soon. Unfortunately, the potential of having $10 million or so tied-up in a fringe-average regular (if things don't break right for Cespedes in his transition), in addition to the combined approximately $47.5 million owed to Roberts and Markakis over the next two seasons, and escalating prices for Baltimore's arbitration-eligible youngsters, could severely limit spending in any other areas, including extending some of the younger Birds.

Were Baltimore a more complete team at the Major League level, or a more wealthy team in terms of prospects in their system, this may be a risk worth taking. But the Birds need to focus inward on systemic changes before a high risk/high reward investment like Cespedes makes sense.

2012 Top 25 Prospects: #10 Dan Klein

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Player: Dan Klein
Position: right-handed pitcher
Ht/Wt: 6-2/190
B/T: R/R
Age at 11/2011: 23y3m
2011 level(s): Advanced-A Frederick; Double-A Bowie
2011 statistics: Baseball-reference; Minor League Central

Grades - Now (Future):
Motion: 50 (50)
Fastball: 50 (50)
Curveball: 50 (55)
Change: 50 (50/55)
Slider: 40 (45)
Control: 50 (60)
Command: 50 (55)
Feel: 50/55 (55)
Overall Future Potential: 46-52
Prospect Grade: B-

*Click here for primer on Grades

Background:
Drafted in the 3rd Round of the 2010 Draft, out of UCLA, and signed for almost $499,900. Multi-sport athlete in high school and national level prospect in both baseball and football. Missed sophomore year at UCLA after shoulder surgery and pitched exclusively in relief thereafter.

Physical Description:
Broad upper-body, well developed and tapered to a medium waist. Athletic build. Durable physique but history of shoulder issues. Good athleticism and body control.

Motion:
Klein utilizes a simple step-in motion, staying udner control and repeating well. He shows a quick arm with fairly easy action, though he comes close to a hard stab, dropping the ball low to his hip before entering a semi-short arm circle. There is potential for some shoulder strain with that pairing, and with his shoulder surgery in 2009, and now again in 2011, it is worth monitoring. He stays relatively quick to home, often clocking sub-1.3s on the watch.

Stuff:
Fastball - Klein gets good life on his fastball, running it in on righties with late action. It generally sits 91-93 mph and can come with good bore. He spots it well to each side and shows an understanding of how to use it to set-up his curve, change and slider, depending on the situation.

Curve - a 12-to-6 breaker, Klein's curve is at its best when he throws it in the 76-78 mph range, getting solid shape and depth. He can use it as a freeze pitch but is most effective at this point when he buries it. Klein shows a high level of comfort with wthe offering, and there is enough spin to project it as a potential above-average pitch.

Change-up - Klein's change is generally 85-86 mph, showing drop and even some late fade. It is most effective down in the zone and he has found some success working it under the hands against lefties. The pitch was inconsistent at UCLA, turning flat and hittable up in the zone, but he has since improved his execution. A feel pitch, he will need to demonstrate his latest trip to the surgeon has not set him back.

Slider - The least effective of his offerings, Klein's slider is an 84-86 mph breaker with below average depth and bite. It works well as a change of pace pitch with tilt, breaking opposite his change and inducing soft contact. Like his change, when he misses the pitch it is hittable, though that doesn't stop him from getting aggressive with it. His arm speed produces plenty of spin, so reps should help the pitch reach Major League average in time.

Discussion:
2011 started about as well as it could for Klein, as he breezed through Advanced-A Frederick and Double-A Bowie with little trouble. Throwing exclusively from the pen, Klein utilized his four pitch mix effectively in posting a SO/9 rate of 10.3 and SO/BB rate of 6.17 over 32.1 innings. Unfortunately, his season ended prematurely in June due to tenderness in his shoulder. He was shut down and underwent surgery to repair a SLAP tear in his right labrum.

Regardless of Klein's timetable for return, this setback is a major blow to Baltimore's plans to transition the former UCLA closer to the rotation. Klein has yet to surpass 52 innings in a season since he did so between his high school junior spring and summer, back in 2006. He will pitch most of 2012 as a 24-year old, and it would likely be another three years before he builds up the arm strength and endurance necessary to log 150+ innings.

When healthy, Klein is essentially ready to tackle Major League hitters in a limited relief role. He lacks the putaway stuff to make him a viable shutdown arm, but his solid pitchability and stable of average or above offerings could make him an above-average reliever with 8th inning potential. His health will be the primary determinant in how Klein ultimately develops, and his setbacks in this department are the primary discounting factor in his OFP grade of 46-52.

Ceiling: Late-inning reliever
Floor: Non-prospect
Projected: Useful middle reliever

A second look at Yu Darvish

A few weeks back we looked at how to translate Yu Darvish's performance in the Japanese Player's League to Major League Baseball.  That projection system put Darvish as being capable of throwing an FIP of 2.82 in a league average environment.  That is rather exceptional and seemed unrealistic.  Instead, after looking at the limited data I had at hand...I suggested that he looked more like a 3.50 FIP pitcher.  A couple issue with the translation is that it was based on three data points and those three data points were awfully successful data points with greater weight being given to the pitchers who threw more innings.  In other words, there was a bit of a survivor bias.

To make a different and potential better system, I compared that model's prediction to the actual performance of six recent transitions from JPL to MLB: Hiroki Kuroda. Dice-K, Kenshin Kawakami, Colby Lewis, Koji Uehara, and Ryota Igarashi.  These six pitchers were given equal weight in the translation.  Last time, I present the coefficients as values to divide.  This time to make things less confusing in the future, these values are to be multiplied by the JPL numbers.

Original System Coefficients
K - 0.93
BB - 1.81
HR - 1.24

New System Coefficients
K - 0.98
BB - 2.6
HR - 1.93

15th Percentile Coefficients
K - 0.83
BB - 3.34
HR - 2.53

85th Percentile Coefficients
K - 1.13
BB - 1.83
HR - 1.33

One of the improvements here is that we now have a range that covers 70% of the possible outcomes.  Here is what Darvish's projections look like now over 200 IP:

15th percentile - 177 K, 137 BB, 15 HR, 4.49 FIP
50th percentile - 209 K, 106 BB, 12 HR, 3.47 FIP
85th percentile - 240 K, 75 BB, 8 HR, 2.43 FIP

If Darvish maintains this performance over five years, these are the following WARs and associated values he would be worth:

15th percentile - 5.9 WAR, 29.5 MM
50th percentile - 13.9 WAR, 69.5 MM
85th percentile - 24 WAR, 120 MM

It appears that my first approximation of Darvish's value may have been a bit bullish.  It was based on an aggressive projection and an aggressive assumption on contract inflation (about 10% as opposed to my normal 5% assumption).  That said, it was a pretty decent approximation of value given that I did not think long about it.  Now, I would say the a more reasonable approximation would be some a mix of 70 MM between the posting fee and a five year deal.

What will make it worth Yu Darvish's time?

Darvish made 6.6 MM last year for the Nippon Ham Fighters.  If he does not agree to a contract after this year or next, Darvish would be a free agent after the 2013 season.  If he was to stay in Japan, he could see 13 MM over the next two years and then come across the Pacific as a free agent.  If he maintains his play, he should be worth about 15 MM in the open market.  Over five years, he could earn 58 MM.  If I was his agent, I would be floating 12 MM per year as what to expect in order to sign a contract, but be willing to accept something as low as 45 MM.  There has to be some concern about getting injured in the next couple years.

Suggested move to get Darvish:
30 MM posting fee / 5 years, 40 MM

Likely move to get Darvish:
50 MM posting fee / 5 years, 50 MM

2012 Top 25 Prospects: #9 Clayton Schrader

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Player: Clayton Schrader
Position: right-handed pitcher
Ht/Wt: 6-0/200
B/T: L/R
Age at 11/2011: 21y7m
2011 level(s): Class A Delmarva; Advanced-A Frederick
2011 statistics: Baseball-reference; Minor League Central

Grades - Now (Future):
Motion: 35 (40/45)
Fastball: 50 (60)
Slider: 45 (55/60)
Curveball: 40 (45/50)
Change: Not scouted
Control: 25/30 (40)
Command: 20/25 (35/40)
Feel: 35/40 (45/50)
Overall Future Potential: 46-52
Prospect Grade: B-

*Click here for primer on Grades

Background:
Drafted in the 10th Round of the 2010 Draft, out of San Jacinto College(Texas), and signed for overslot bonus of $300,000.

Physical Description:
Broad build, wide hips. Strong, especially in core and trunk. Some room to firm up physique and improve conditioning.

Motion:
Schrader throws from an elevated three-quarters arm slot and matches it well with his fastball and breaking balls. Because he doesn't pair the slot with a corresponding tilt, there is some concern for future shoulder injury (though that is off course dependent on the structural specifics of his joint). His delivery, which produces mid-90s velocity, comes with a lot of effort, including a rigid landing and extreme head whack and arm recoil to finish. The result is well below average control and a limited number of pitches in his arm per appearance. While he will be able to smooth out his landing some, much of his mechanics "are what they are," and Baltimore will likely take the good (loud stuff) with the bad (control and limited profile).

Stuff:
Fastball - Big plus offering that runs low- to mid-90s with some life. Schrader will spray the strikezone with the pitch, but has little command to spots.

Slider - Mid-80s offering with hard bite and tilt. Arm slot deception and true swing-and-miss ability. Potential plus offering down the line.

Curve - Downer 78 to 82 mph offering utilized more at San Jacinto than in 2011. Serves as a useful counter to his harder offerings due to velocity delta.

Change-up - Not scouted.

Discussion:
"Clay Shray" is a big arm with big control issues at present, though a slightly softer landing can help him keep his momentum more consistently to home and prevent some off his swing-around. While his arm angle raises some potential red flags from a biomechanical standpoint, it helps him to create a solid downhill plane, even with his listed 6-foot frame. He does an adequate job of hitting his slot consistently and just needs to find a way to stay in the zone with a little more frequency.

While the walk rate is the critique most likely to be touched upon in internet reports, he should be able to survive with 4+ BB/9 at the Major League level due to his ability to minimize baserunning threats by missing bats. That said, he will walk hitters and, like Fernando Rodney, may actually fit better in the closer role than as a 7th or 8th inning arm. This would allow him to enter the majority of his games with clean bases and would help to minimize the potential damage resulting from his inevitable base-on-balls.

Perhaps most important, Baltimore will need Schrader to work on his endurance. While the effort in his delivery causes control issues, the drain on his energy is perhaps more impactful. He is noticeably less effective the more pitches he hangs on his arm per appearance, and as a result Baltimore endeavored to keep him from appearing on back-to-back days. Double-A Bowie will represent his first true pro challenge and will help to ground his projection. If he is able to maintain his power stuff on back-to-back days, and can clean-up his mechanics enough to get his BB/9 down between 4 and 5, he could be a useful bullpen piece in Baltimore as early as the second half of next year. He has the upside profile of a Jorge Julio.

Ceiling: Late-inning reliever
Floor: Non-prospect
Projected: Useful middle reliever

2012 Top 25 Prospects: #8 Jason Esposito

Follow us on Twitter: @CamdenDepot

Player: Jason Esposito
Position: third base
Ht/Wt: 6-2/205
B/T: R/R
Age at 11/2011: 21y4m
2011 level(s): N/A
2011 statistics: N/A

Grades - Now (Future):
Hit: 35 (40/45)
Power: 40 (45/50)
Arm: 60 (60)
Defense: 55 (65)
Speed: 45 (40)
Feel: 50 (50/55)
Overall Future Potential: 46-52
Prospect Grade: B-

*Click here for primer on Grades

Background:
2nd Round selection in the 2011 draft, out of Vanderbilt University. Signed for overslot bonus of $600,000. Previously drafted and unsigned in 2008 by Kansas City.

Physical Description:
Solid, athletic build. Wide hips with strong trunk and core. Pro body with little projection left, but should be able to tighten physique as he finishes maturing.

Hitting:
Espo takes with him to the plate a solid approach, including a good feel for the strikezone. His swing is compact and he covers the quadrants fairly well. There is enough strength in his wrists to allow him to transfer power from his core to the bat, and he shows that pop by producing hard contact from pole-to-pole. Esposito's bat speed is the primary chink in his armor, and he has struggled mightily when armed with lumber against more advanced competition on the Cape and with Team USA. An issue tangential to his bat speed is pitch-ID. Because he needs to start his swing early to catch-up with better velocity, good off-speed offerings can give him trouble. Additionally, he utilizes a medium-high leg kick in his stride, which cuts into his ability to adjust his timing on the fly.

Defense:
Esposito shows easy footwork and soft hands straight on, though his lower-half can drag some on the move. This makes third base the best fit for him, and the former Vandy infielder has enough arm to man the hot corner at the Major League level. There is enough athleticism in Espo's game to allow him to hold down second base if so required, and he could even play a passable shortstop in an emergency (though extended exposure there would like prove his range and footwork to be lacking at the outer reaches of his zone). He is a below-average runner but moves well enough to cover an outfielder corner, completing his profile as a potential utility talent.

Discussion:
Esposito was a highly touted high schooler and a high follow entering his junior year at Vanderbilt in spite of back-to-back uninspiring summers on the Cape and a half-summer with USA Baseball's Collegiate National Team. His stock took a hit when his spotty offensive performance with the new BBCOR bats (which have a smaller sweetspot and less trampoline than the previous composite bats) forced evaluators to consider more strongly his average bat speed, and whether his impressive sophomore year with the 'Dores would eventually resurface in pro ball.

Despite the questions surrounding his offensive game, Esposito boasts a reasonably high floor off the strength of his glove. He can get a little clunky when forced to operate on the move and at the edge of his range, but could be a true standout defender if allowed to focus his efforts at third base. His pivots and footwork around the bag are solid, and his hands and approach will allow him to provide value at second base, as well as shortstop in a limited capacity, should Baltimore need him to log innings across the infield.

Esposito's well documented struggles to perform with wood, as well as the not-insignificant decrease in OBP (.453 to .403), SLG (.599 to .530), and BB/SO rate (0.97 to 0.38) from his sophomore to junior year, all raise questions about whether or not he will hit enough at the upper-levels to justify an everyday spot on a first division team. The glove could be double-plus quality at third, but he will need to find a way to barrel more off-speed pitches. He has enough raw power that he could be a 15-20 homerun bat if he squares-up enough balls.

Ceiling: Average third baseman on first division team
Floor: Four-A placeholder or injury insurance
Projected: Utility infielder/outfielder

The Orioles are a Small Market Team

That title probably brought a number of you here to read this column and tell me how I am wrong.  Not only wrong, I imagine some of you might call me blinded by Dan Duquette's words over the past few weeks that suggest he considers the team a small market ballclub ("I learned in a small market, I applied my skills in a small market, to put together a top-quality team").

Mind you, I did not feel that Baltimore was a small market town.  I have always bought into the idea of the Orioles being a sleeping baseball giant as Peter Gammons used to say.  However, my own personal journey challenging that thought emerged as I began as I began traveling around to other cities.  I began to realize how small Baltimore is and how much of the city is probably not all that interested in baseball or inclined to spend money on it.  Add that to some of the money from corporations, perhaps, being siphoned off to the Nationals who are trying hard to be a well liked team (to varying success).  At this point, I became comfortable with Baltimore being a mid-market town, which made sense with respect to information available on how money is dispersed in Major League Baseball.  However, they calculate these things, the Orioles (in the few years available) were right in the middle neither giving or receiving much of anything.  

Recently, Dan Duquette referred to the Orioles as a small market team in being introduced to the fan base and in several interviews thereafter.  Are these valid statements?  Have we been in a situation akin to the frog that sit in a pot of water slowly coming to boil?  Do we not realize we are being boiled...or fading as a city of importance.  It would seem to fit the motif of an old port and steel city that is being marginalized by outsourcing of materials and a trade deficit.  It is also something that was harped on with the Wire.

My methodology was simple.  I consulted four sources:

• TV Market Size (Nielsen estimates, August 2011)
• Radio Market Size (Arbitron Estimates, Fall 2011)
• Population (2010 US Census)
• Gross Domestic Product (2007-2009 Data, Dept of Commerce)

AL East Rankings

Baltimore
TV Market Rank: 27th
Radio Market Rank: 21st
Population Rank: 21st
GDP Rank: 19th

Boston
TV Market Rank: 7th
Radio Market Rank: 10th
Population Rank: 22nd
GDP Rank: 9th

New York
TV Market Rank: 1st
Radio Market Rank: 1st
Population Rank: 1st
GDP Rank: 1st

Tampa
TV Market Rank: 14th
Radio Market Rank: 19th
Population Rank: 55th
GDP Rank: 23rd

Toronto
(not in United States, so we have to use different sources)
TV Market Rank: Between 4th ranked Philadelphia and 5th ranked Dallas
Radio Market Rank: Between 14th ranked Seattle and 15th ranked Pheonix
Population Rank: Between 3rd ranked Chicago and 4th ranked Houston
GDP Rank: Between 11th ranked Miami and 12th ranked Seattle



Conclusion
The data tends to indicate that the Orioles are likely a low mid-market team or a high small market team.  Camden Yards, a greater population, and a history probably helps the Orioles sustain a higher revenue than the Rays have.  It also helps that the Orioles' regional market deal helps them siphon cash away from the potential gold mine of the Washington DC market.  Of course, DC has had issues with properly supporting the team.  The last time a DC team was dominant was probably back in the late 1860s and early 1870s when the Treasury Department bankrolled the team.

Back to Baltimore, we might have to get use to the idea that this team cannot spend as much money as teams in Arlington or Boston.  The Orioles are at a competitive disadvantage and it makes it difficult for the team to succeed.  It requires a top notch front office that is efficient with how it invests its money and that has not been the MO of the team over the past couple decades (or ever?).  Even the great teams of the 60s and 70s were built on a foundation of out spending teams for bonus babies prior to the implementation of the draft. 

The Orioles were big spenders back in the day, so how did their population size compare back then?

 

Baltimore does appear to have stabilized in population and one hopes the same is true about the amount of money the team is able to take in from the surrounding area.  During the 1990s Baltimore began successfully (to a degree) shifting from blue collar to white collar commerce and production.  The city is still well behind New York, Boston, and Toronto in terms of available money coming from media deals.  I boiled it down to two things: (1) the Orioles are a threshold middle/small market team and (2) they are in a worst potential revenue market than three of the five teams in the AL East.