Expanded Roster: Can Wieters Put it Together

During the month of September, Camden Depot will expand our rosters beyond Nick Faleris and Jon Shepherd.  This will enable our audience to speak directly outside of the comment box as well as shine a light on other Orioles writers.  The first up in this series is Ben Feldman who writes for OsWARhouse.blogspot.com

Can Wieters put it together?

.311/.395/.544

That slash line (BA/OBP/SLG) is what PECOTA, Baseball Prospectus’s Projection system declared Matt Wieters would bat as a rookie in 2009; the best catcher in baseball, Mark Texeira as a backstop. Of course, not all projections were so optimistic, ZIPS (available at FanGraphs) projected that Wieters would hit .274/.352/.439. That was the low end of the range of projection.  It was offered that by many that Matt Wieters would be the best offensive catcher in baseball the day he stepped onto the field in the Major Leagues. As Ryan Glass at Fangraphs wrote, “at worst, it seems like he will be a top 5 offensive catcher next year”.

Matt Wieters has not lived up to that lofty offensive expectation. The christened “Joe Mauer with power” has grown to be excellent behind the plate, but merely average beside it.

His rookie year, he hit .288/.340/.412; well below PECOTA’s lofty forecast, but a league average line from a rookie catcher in the AL East; facing the pitching staffs of Boston and New York was still quite impressive. His overall line was brought down quite a bit by his struggles from the right side of the plate. Wieters’s overall batting lines, as well his numbers from each side of the plate in his first three seasons (see the figure below). Note OPS+ is adjusted for park effects and league averages to show how a hitter’s line is relative to league average (100 = average; >100 is above average; <100 is below average). 

 

In 2009 and 2010, Wieters performed as a league average hitter, or slightly above from the left side of the plate, and he produced a line equivalent to former Oriole Brandon Fahey from the right side. This year, those splits have been reversed. Could the turn around from the right side of the plate be for real? Could the decline from the left be a mirage?

Let’s look at Wieters’s line drive, ground ball, and fly ball rates for the last three years. Line drives are the most likely to turn into hits (and specifically into extra base hits), fly balls are more likely to go for extra bases and ground balls tend to end up as hits more, but not for power. I’ve also included the percentage of fly balls that go for homeruns, and batting average on balls in play. A normal batting average on balls in play is .300, but can vary quite a bit for hitters (less so for pitchers).

 

A couple things seem clear from the above chart. In 2011, Wieters has been unusually lucky from the right side of the plate, and unusually unlucky from the left side. His rates in 2011 from the left compare favorably with those from 2010, yet his Batting Average on Balls in Play is 41 points lower.  His line drive rate from the right is the highest of his career, and while his HR/FB and Babip both seem unsustainable, some of the improvement could be genuine.

Hardball Times has a tool that calculates Expected Batting Average on Balls in Play (xBABIP). Using this tool, gives Wieters an expected .315 BABIP from the left, and a .321 BABIP from the right side.

If Wieters had hit in normal luck, his individual, and cumulative lines, would be as follows:

 

Wieters’s adjusted OBP of .361 would be 5^th among MLB catchers with at leat 300 plate appearances (he is currently 9^th) and his adjusted SLG would be 3^rd (currently 7^th). Still not quite to the level expected of him, but a much closer approximation. Adjusted for luck, Wieters quickly becomes the third most productive offensive catcher in baseball, after only Alex Avila and Brian McCann in 2011.

Of course, offense is only part of the story. The aspect of Wieters’s game that has not disappointed is his exceptional defense. Even with his middle offensive numbers, Wieters’s defense has contributed to him rankings as the third most valuable catcher in the game according to total WAR.  He has been worth 3.1 wins above replacement according to Fangraphs (behind 3.5 for Brian McCann and 4.9! for Alex Avila). Wieters has been the best defensive catcher in the game according to Fangraphs, worth 9 runs above an average catcher, and Beyond the Box Score (5.7 runs). It isn’t only advanced statistical analysis that rates Wieters’s defense so highly, a recent Baseball America of all 30 managers declared Matt the best defensive catcher in the sport.

Even if Wieters never becomes the offensive force many of us thought he would, his gold glove defense makes him one of the most valuable properties in the game. If Wieters’s gains are legitimate adjustments – rather than chance – 2011 could be something of a breakout year, just one clouded in poor luck. He may never be Joe Mauer with power, but he may yet become the best catcher in Major League Baseball.

Footnote - fun with WAR (or, the Orioles have been how bad for HOW long!?)

The best single seasons the Orioles have gotten from centerfielders in the last ten years belong to Corey Patterson and Luis Matos (3.6 and 3.5 WAR – although Adam Jones may eclipse them both this year with 3.3 through August 24^th).  Every other team in baseball has gotten at least one 3.6+ year out of centerfield. Corey Patterson. It says quite a bit when the best performer at a position is also a symbol (one of many) for what is wrong with the team. 

Scouting the O's: Pedro Strop (rhp)

Yesterday the Orioles and the Rangers consummated a trade deadline deal that swapped-out strong-armed relievers, sending Mike Gonzalez (lhp) down to Arlington and Pedro Strop (rhp) up to Baltimore. Here's an introduction to Strop in scouting report form, based on six looks from this year (ML and AAA). Photo from Wikipedia.com creative commons files: http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Archivo:Pedro_Strop.jpg


Pedro Strop
Position: Relief Pitcher (rhp)
Born: June 13, 1985
Height: 6'0"
Weight: 175
B/T: R/R


Grading Out:

Current (Future)
Mechanics: 35/40 (45)
Fastball: 50/55 (60)
Splitter: 50 (55/60)
Slider: 40 (45)
Control: 35 (40)
Command: 30 (35/40)
Feel: 35 (40)
Overall: 45 (50)
OFP Range: 47-53 (potential 7th or 8th inning arm)


Physical Description:

Strop has a strong, athletic build, with a sturdy trunk from years as an infielder. He shows clean actions off the mound and moves around well on it.


Mechanics:

Strop began his pro career as a shortstop, converting to the mound in 2006 while in the Rockies organization. It is not surprising that the hard-throwing righty lacks a "classic" set of mechanics. It is interesting, however, that the former infielder utilizes such a long and whippy arm action out of a high three-quarters slot -- the opposite of what you would see coming from the six-spot. Strop's primary mechanical issues come from this arm action/slot combination, and are exacerbated by a high effort lower-half and periodic stiff landing. All of this leads to great inconsistency in his release, affecting the consistency of his slider and his control over the whole arsenal. When he lands stiff on his front leg (usually failing to get over top) he cuts off his motion and causes his arm to come across his body, which in turn causes him to push the ball up in the zone and also leads to first base fall-off. He can also overthrow -- especially when ahead in the count -- though this is tied more to his mental approach, as it isn't a mainstay in his motion. Finally, he flashes high and early, giving the batter a clear look at the ball for an extended period of time.


Throws:

Fastball - Strop uses both a four-seam and a two-seam fastball, capable of dialing-up to 97/98 mph with the four-seamer. He will get solid armside life on the two-seamer around 92-93 mph, and creates good downhill plane with both variations. He struggles to command his fastball, but when in the zone it is a legit plus pitch that will miss bats.

Splitter - Strop's splitter is a mid- to upper-80s vanisher when he hits his release. It's a bury pitch that loses effectiveness when he tries to drop it into the zone, so it is almost exclusively a chase weapon to be utilized ahead in the count. The velocity and break qualify it as a potential plus pitch, but the limited utility drops a half step for me.

Slider - The breaker is the biggest victim of Strop's failure to consistently hit his release point. When he does, he snaps off a nice solid average low- to mid-80s slider with excellent tilt and good deception. Unfortunately, his inability to repeatedly execute the pitch leaves too many spinners out over the plate, making it a questionable ML offering at this point.


Summary:

Strop has a special arm, and should be commended for reinventing himself as a power arm in the pen after struggling with the stick earlier in his professional career. Ideally, he can rein in his mechanics enough over short spurts to provide valuable innings in the 7th and 8th. The heavy downhill plane on his pitches, high slot and diving fastball and splitter will produce plenty of grounders if Strop can find a way to catch the strike zone more consistently. It is unlikely he will produce many sub-10 pitch innings, and baserunners are going to be mainstays. But the raw stuff is good enough to miss bats and help Strop carveout a solid career in a Major League pen. He just needs to push the control dial a little further from "where is it going" and a little closer to the strikezone with more frequency. With in-and-out mechanics, he'll also need to maintain a steady head on the mound and create a mental rhythm to assist him in hitting his mechanical checkpoints. It will be on the Orioles developmental staff to help him to create that internal routine.

Adam Dunn Might Edge Mark Reynolds

A little known record Mark Reynolds hold is one that is exceptionally difficult to do.  He has the greatest number of strike outs over hits in the history of baseball.  He set it last year with 112 by striking out 211 times and getting a hit 99 times.  Before this year, the next closet would be the immortal Rob Deer at 175 Ks and 80 hits in 1991 as a Detroit Tiger.  Behind him was Melvin Nieves at 75 with 157 Ks and 82 hits.  The difference between first and third is 37.  That is a pretty incredibly difference.  You need to be quite an unusual player to accomplish this feat.  You need to be a three true outcome hitter.  That is what you call a player who can do three things: hit home runs, walk, and strikeout.  Those first two outcomes typically need to be good enough for clubs to stomach the last outcome.

Coming into 2011, it looked as though Reynolds record would be safe.  Only Carlos Pena and Chris Davis showed any proclivity to accomplish such things.  However, Adam Dunn's collapse has given Reynolds a true contender.  This year Dunn has 96 differential with 156 Ks and 60 hits.  He is on pace to finish with a differential of about 108, so he is going to have to pick it up a bit.  Dunn though is more of a two true outcome hitter, he strikes out and he earns a lot of money.  His salary is what gets him in the lineup.

We'll see.

What is the Value of a Compensation Draft Pick?

This past season Tyler Beede decided not to take a signing bonus north of 2MM with the Blue Jays and instead committed himself to college.  He was the 21st selection in the first round.  As compensation, the Jays will receive an unprotected pick in next year's draft, which is the 22nd selection in the first round.  A question quite a few asked was: what, if anything, have the Blue Jays lost in terms of value?  There are several considerations.

A pick being delayed a year.

A team often relies on waves of highly talented, cost-controlled players graduating to the Majors each year.  If these players are not available, the team has to utilize the free agent market where costs are significantly higher.  For instance, if a team loses it's 21st round pick it will have to supplement it's lineup roughly the cost of what that pick would have provided.  The 21st round pick is worth about 10MM on average over the course of his career.  If that first year needs to be covered, then it will cost the team arguably 1.7 MM.  This value is not uniform for all selections, of course.  The higher up in the draft a player is selected, the greater the expected value of a player as players with greater value are typically chosen earlier.  If it was a first round pick being lost, the expected loss of one year of value would be around 13.3 MM.  The graph below shows the relationship between cost-controlled (first six years) WAR and draft pick selection.  The drafts used for this graph are from 1991-2000.

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It may be argued that in the grand scheme, a one year delay on receiving value is largely inconsequential.  This is likely to be a rather accurate assessment.  The difficulty in projecting players into the future and when they may be able to help the Major League team means that teams largely are not relying on these players to develop.  In a general sense, they need these draftees to develop and contribute, but few teams will set their watches to players producing except at the front end of the draft.  Only there do you find truly remarkable talents that teams will expect to advance quickly and be productive members of the organization at the highest level.

Draft Budget and the Unprotected Nature of Draft Pick Compensation

In practice, the greater concern in practice is how having multiple draft picks in the first round affects the quality of talent being selected.  Additionally, compensation picks are unprotected, which has tended to cause teams to select players more conservatively and reach a little bit.  In 2009, the Nationals selected Drew Storen for 200k less than slot.  Storen has been incredibly successful in the Majors as a reliever.  However, one wonders how important it was for the Nationals, a team in need of impact players, to select a pitcher who throws an inning every few days.  This, however, is not a uniform strategy as this year the Diamondbacks drafted and signed top ten pitchers Trevor Bauer and Archie Bradley.  Both required significant investment and the Diamondbacks accomplished that.

So, how much more useful is one approach than the other?  In the graph below, picks are grouped in fives over the course of the first thirty picks in the draft from 1991-2000.  Those players' control year WAR is compared to players selected the following year a selection behind them or a more conservative ten places later.

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The graph shows that there is a negligible difference between the value of the initial selection vs a selection a year later and a pick later.  However, there appears to be a sizable difference if a team with a compensation pick in the first 20 selections decides to be conservative and draft a signable player (defined in this study as a player taken 10 slots later).  A conservative approach for a top 5 pick would result in a loss of about 4 WAR (~20 MM) while picks 6-20 result in a loss of about 2 WAR (~10 MM).  It appears to be a rather large misfire if a team does not fully utilize their picks.  A simple investment of an extra 1-3 MM results in a several fold return.  Even if an unprotected draftee recognizes his signing team is in a position where they need to sign him, it is highly unlikely the pick would ever receive more money than what the average pick would give back to the team.

Differences in Talent Between Draft Classes

However, this brings us back to the Blue Jays.  Are they worse off for not signing Tyler Beede?  According to this quick study, no they are not worse off.  In an average year, players available at pick 21 are typically equally available the following year at pick 22.  The assumption is though that this year is an average year and next year will also be an average year.  The following graph shows differences in total six year WAR for the first 30 picks in each first round from 1991-2000.

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This past year's draft was considered one that was quite full with talent.  The majority opinion would find that this year's draft is likely to be similar, in total value, to those in 1992, 1993, 1995, 1997, and 1998.  The early opinion for next year is that it will be an average class which would be similar to 1991, 1994, 1996, 1998, or 1999.  The difference between this and next year is about 30% if these opinions are accurate.  That assumed difference in draft classes between this year and next is illustrated on the following graph which takes the values in the second figure and adjusts them according to general draft worth.

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In general, if the talent level in the current draft appears to be significantly greater than the following draft then it makes sense to aggressively sign those players.  However, if the following draft appears to be more talented then it might make sense to be not so giving during negotiations and to feel free to utilize a compensatory pick the following draft.