Just a short post, but I saw some folks quite excited as Jake Fox hit his 9th home run of Spring Training. I do not mean to be pessimistic, but just to temper expectations. Since 2007, there have been 26 instances of a player hitting at least six home runs in at least 50 at bats. Actually, there have been 28. I did not include two players who did not appear in any regular season games.
I compared HR per At Bat from Spring Training to Regular Season. Players had a 56 +/- 18 % decrease in home run rate. Jake Fox is averaging 7.22 at bats per home run. A 56% decrease would mean a home run every 16.4 at bats.
That translates to 30 home runs every 500 at bats.
The 95th percentile would put him between 18 and 42 home runs per 500 at bats. Anything above or below would be significantly different.
A collection of items and links about the Baltimore Orioles . . . sometimes, baseball in general.
26 March 2011
25 March 2011
With or Without Crowley: 2011
This is a simple statement of intent. It will be more interesting after the season.
For many an Oriole fan, the presence of Terry Crowley in the dugout has been a sore point. A long time ago, I tried to loosely determine to what extent Crowley affected hitters. This year, I am going to trying another way of exploring to what affect his absence from the everyday running of the clubhouse will have on the players. Wanting a robust sample size, I have chosen to compare the projected performance of Orioles who played last season currently on the team as well as those who have left against their performance last season. Why am I including the castoffs? In order to determine if there are any lingering effects of Terry Crowley roaming the underbelly of Camden Yards.
The metrics I will be most interested in will be % walks, % strikeouts, number of pitches, and your basic slash line (AVG / OBP / SLG).
So I guess we will see after the season.
For many an Oriole fan, the presence of Terry Crowley in the dugout has been a sore point. A long time ago, I tried to loosely determine to what extent Crowley affected hitters. This year, I am going to trying another way of exploring to what affect his absence from the everyday running of the clubhouse will have on the players. Wanting a robust sample size, I have chosen to compare the projected performance of Orioles who played last season currently on the team as well as those who have left against their performance last season. Why am I including the castoffs? In order to determine if there are any lingering effects of Terry Crowley roaming the underbelly of Camden Yards.
The metrics I will be most interested in will be % walks, % strikeouts, number of pitches, and your basic slash line (AVG / OBP / SLG).
So I guess we will see after the season.
24 March 2011
Orioles Franchise Value: 1990 - 2010
It is well known that for the most part owners make money by selling a team, not by holding onto one. When Peter Angelos negotiated with MLB to let the Expos move to Washington D.C., he set himself up with a minimum payment of 360MM (if I remember correctly). It made me wonder how much the team's value has changed over the years and what that value was at the end of 2004 when he made that deal. I've taken data from Forbes and Financial World from 1990 - 2010 provided neatly over at the Biz of Baseball and decided to do a few things.* This span will show how the value of the Orioles has changed durng the entire Angelos era and what the 360MM line means for the Orioles. Additionally, I will also compare the Orioles against other teams in the current AL East over the years. So, first things first, how has the Orioles value changed over the year:
As you can see from 1997 to 2003, the Orioles (according to these sources) decreased in value with each season. It would make sense that Peter Angelos was concerned about the long-term value of his club and how the moving of the Montreal Expos would affect that. It is also interesting to see that after 2004, the team value has made the deal with MLB to be simply a safety net as the value is now about 50MM above the secured minimum value of the team. It makes me think that efforts are being made to make the team a more valuable commodity, which would run opposed to the idea that Angelos is merely trying to bring in a short term profit on the club. However, it may be true that over this time period an increase in worth is almost unavoidable.
What is also interesting to see is how the value of the organization denotes the Orioles as one of the most valuable teams in the 1990s (4 straight years of being the second most valuable team in the league) to being a mid-market value club in the 2000s. Three possible reasons for this would include: 1) Continual losing decrease attendance and then worth (however, the value crashed after 1997 even though the team was no awful during those first few years after winning the AL East), 2) Baltimore's market had fewer unexploited resources than the other markets, and 3) other teams caught up to the boon that was Oriole Park at Camden Yards. I imagine it is a mixture of those and, perhaps, other causes I am neglecting.
After the jump...how has the Orioles value changed over time with other clubs currently in the AL East?
As you can see from 1997 to 2003, the Orioles (according to these sources) decreased in value with each season. It would make sense that Peter Angelos was concerned about the long-term value of his club and how the moving of the Montreal Expos would affect that. It is also interesting to see that after 2004, the team value has made the deal with MLB to be simply a safety net as the value is now about 50MM above the secured minimum value of the team. It makes me think that efforts are being made to make the team a more valuable commodity, which would run opposed to the idea that Angelos is merely trying to bring in a short term profit on the club. However, it may be true that over this time period an increase in worth is almost unavoidable.
What is also interesting to see is how the value of the organization denotes the Orioles as one of the most valuable teams in the 1990s (4 straight years of being the second most valuable team in the league) to being a mid-market value club in the 2000s. Three possible reasons for this would include: 1) Continual losing decrease attendance and then worth (however, the value crashed after 1997 even though the team was no awful during those first few years after winning the AL East), 2) Baltimore's market had fewer unexploited resources than the other markets, and 3) other teams caught up to the boon that was Oriole Park at Camden Yards. I imagine it is a mixture of those and, perhaps, other causes I am neglecting.
After the jump...how has the Orioles value changed over time with other clubs currently in the AL East?
20 March 2011
What if the Orioles had let Roberts walk?
As I have mentioned time and time again, the extension for Brian Roberts made no sense. The Orioles signed him in the winter of 2009 for an extension that would cover years 2011-2014. This would be his age years of 32 through 35. Not only was it a poor idea due to the historical evidence of second basemen falling apart in their early 30s, but it was also completely foolish in light of the market rate at that time. Whereas Brian Roberts of good offense and average to below average defense wound up locked into the Orioles for five seasons at 48MM, Orlando Hudson of good offense and average to below average defense wound up locked into the Dodgers for one year at 3.4MM. He then followed that up with a 1 year deal with the Twins in 2010 for 5MM. It is true that Hudson is not your typical leadoff man, but it is hard to fathom Brian Roberts as being worth twice as much as him.
I propose what Andy MacPhail should have done is let Roberts play out 2009 and then let him walk. The offers from the Cubs wound up with prospects that never amounted to much (e.g. Roger Cedeno). The only benefit in dealing for those players would have been to avoid the final year of his initial contract. I think the better move would have been simply to let him walk and reload the minors with two more picks in the 2010 draft. I think it would have been likely for the Orioles to have secured the 24th selection in the first round. That off season the Giants had some money to throw around and needed a second baseman. I could have also seen the Washington Nationals making a play, which would have netted the first selection in the second round. I think Roberts would have preferred the Giants though. Using the Elias Rankings projection, Brian Roberts would have resulted in a sandwich pick between Billy Wagner and Chone Figgins . . . the 40th selection.
Next, I will look at who the Orioles might have drafted . . . who I would have drafted . . . and just who might have been playing second base these past two years.
I propose what Andy MacPhail should have done is let Roberts play out 2009 and then let him walk. The offers from the Cubs wound up with prospects that never amounted to much (e.g. Roger Cedeno). The only benefit in dealing for those players would have been to avoid the final year of his initial contract. I think the better move would have been simply to let him walk and reload the minors with two more picks in the 2010 draft. I think it would have been likely for the Orioles to have secured the 24th selection in the first round. That off season the Giants had some money to throw around and needed a second baseman. I could have also seen the Washington Nationals making a play, which would have netted the first selection in the second round. I think Roberts would have preferred the Giants though. Using the Elias Rankings projection, Brian Roberts would have resulted in a sandwich pick between Billy Wagner and Chone Figgins . . . the 40th selection.
Next, I will look at who the Orioles might have drafted . . . who I would have drafted . . . and just who might have been playing second base these past two years.
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