12 February 2010

Pelotero: An interview with one of the film's creators about baseball in the Dominican Republic

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I made Jon Paley's acquaintance over a year ago as he and his colleagues work on a documentary about amateur baseball talent in the Dominican Republic came to my attention. I found their work very impressive in terms of film aesthetics, but also in the subject matter. Although most baseball fans are aware of the major flow of talent coming in from the Dominican Republic, few actually know anything much about it. The whole industry is quite interesting and works in a way that is very different from what domestic talent experiences. Jon was kind to great us an interview with him, which is printed in its entirety after the jump.

Below is an excerpt from a rough cut of his film. Be sure to visit their site Pelotero: the Movie to see more videos, pictures, and lots of information. One very exciting part of their work is that they were able to cover Miguel Jean as he went through the process of undergoing age related issues and finally earning his first pro contract with the Minnesota Twins.



Click on the following link to read the full interview with Jon Paley.


Camden Depot: Could you introduce the film and describe how you have been able to acquire access to these prospects and any difficulties you have faced?

Jon Paley: Our film, titled Pelotero, tells the story of four Dominican ballplayers, ages 16-19, working day in and day out trying to get signed by an MLB team. We provide a complete look into their lives; at home, with their trainers, at MLB academies where they hold tryouts...everything. We bridge these intertwined stories with a look into how the system works to help give context to the characters and the odds that they face.

We spent 8 months down there which is a big reason why we were granted such amazing access. Scores of reporters and journalists make brief visits to the DR following scandals or hyped players but they never set up shop and try to learn what the motivations and consequences are behind the scenes. By showing up every day to the same fields and hanging around during practice, we gained the trust of trainers, and scouts.

Getting access to MLB teams academies could be a little trickier. Some teams were very receptive and gave us full access. Others were a little wary of having a camera crew hanging around.

We produced Pelotero independently under our company Guagua Productions, by myself, Ross Finkel, Trevor Martin and Casey Beck. We are all young, hungry, aspiring filmmakers who were looking for a story to tell and found that and more in the world of Dominican Baseball.

CD: How one becomes a buscon and the process of identifying and training players. What relationship does a buscon have with the estbalished academies, and what role does a buscon play in promoting his trainees?

JP: Quick clarification—the term ‘buscon’ has become something of a derogatory term implying corruption, lying and cheating. The majority of trainers in the Dominican Republic prefer the term 'entrenador' or trainer.

There is no barrier to entry to become a trainer in the Dominican Republic. The are thousands of trainers across the country ranging in seriousness and experience. Some begin grooming their sons or nephews in the streets and will hand that player off when they begin to show some promise, while others have neatly manicured complexes with state of the art facilities. Many of the thriving programs are run by ex-players who know how to teach kids, and who surround themselves with talented specialized coaches. Trainers will begin scouting players as young as 12, and enrolling them in their program. Trainers find players in two main ways. First, they maintain a close network with other coaches of little leagues for younger ages who will alert them to any special talents. Secondly, once a trainer is established within a community family members will bring their eligible players to try out. Spots in the better programs are highly desired and often competitive.

Every MLB team has a network of area scouts which travel the country scouting players. These scouts visit several programs a day looking for the best talent. If they like a player they will have the trainer bring that player to the academy for a tryout. The more experienced trainers have signed many players in the past and have close relationships with area scouts and academy directors. The better these relationships the easier time they will have getting attention for their players.

CD: What is the daily routine for an academy ball player as opposed to the daily routine for a prospect with a buscon? Are there differences in resources, amenities, equipment, etc.?

JP: The MLB academies are a huge step up for almost all players in the DR. They are equipped with perfectly maintained fields, experienced coaches, dormitories, nutritional food, and all the amenities one needs to stay focused on playing baseball. Very few independent trainers' programs can match this.

In the majority of programs, kids live at home with their families who may struggle to put food on the table. They will come to their field in the morning and do drills for 4 or 5 hours that focus on fundamentals: hitting, fielding, running, etc. In the afternoon they will continue with more drills or occasionally play an organized game against another program. Some of the better trainers' provide dormitories for the kids as well as food and equipment. Scouts are looking more and more for players with game experience and there is a growing trend for better trainers to emphasize playing games.

Within the academy the schedule is not too different. Players wake up early, practice for several hours, come in for lunch and to lift weights. In the afternoon they will continue with drills or a simulated game. In the summer there is a short season that pits academy teams against each other.

The main differences are the level of professionalism in the academies and the focus. In general the academies teach kids to play baseball while the trainers programs teach kids to excel at tryout skills (batting practice, 60 yard dash, fielding grounders).

CD: Do certain organizations have a reputation for being more friendly/accomodating/inviting for young Latin American players? Are there certain organizations that are viewed more positively than others? Negatively?

JP: Different teams in the DR have different ways of doing things. Some have nicer academies with better coaches, and others are seriously underfunded. One of the biggest disparities between academies is their focus and helping their players assimilate when they get to the States. Every academy is required to have an english program that teaches kids the language, and about American culture. These classes help players acclimatize when they get to the states and help them perform better on the field. Some teams do a far better job of this than others. The Rays for example have a complex system set up where they continue to have classes for Latin American players all the way through the Minors. In some other academies, the teachers barely speak english.

CD: Are families compensated in any way as a result of the academy/buscon/player relationship (monetary, employment opportunities, etc.)?

JP: When a player signs a contract with a team, the trainer will usually take between 30-35%. While this seems extraordinarily high Dominican trainers have far greater responsibilities than anything a coach in the States has. They often pay to house and feed the player for up to 5 years. They pay for the fields to practice on and the equipment to play with. They have a staff of specialized coaches. The expenses are indeed great, and for every player that signs the trainer is fronting the cost for 20 that don't. If the trainer brings in an American agent, a phenomenon becoming more and more common, the agent may take another 5-10%.

The remaining money goes to the the players family. The first thing nearly every player does is buy his mother a house. Its both a gift of gratitude, and a right of passage. For many players this may be their only payoff, so saving the money is crucial. Many trainers and teams provide financial advisers who will help their players families manage the money once they sign.

CD: What are your future plans for this film and beyond?

JP: We are still putting the finishing touches on Pelotero. We are currently fundraising to finish a re-edit of the movie. We will then being the lengthy process of submitting to film festivals and seeking distribution.

We also have plans to continue following several of the players form Pelotero. Miguel Angel Sano (now Miguel Jean) signed with the Minnesotta Twins for $3.15 Million, the second highest bonus ever paid to a Dominican prospect. We have been given access by the Twins to the academy and spring training facilities and will begin following Miguel's story again very soon. We hope to be able to follow him and our other characters all they way to the Majors.

If this is something that anyone out there is interested in seeing, please help make it happen and make a tax deductible donation to the project through our website: Peloterothemovie.com.

CD: I would like to thank Jon Paley for spending the time answering a few of our questions. This is a great project and I greatly anticipate watching this documentary. Be sure to check out the Pelotero site. There are more videos, pictures (those included in this post are from their site), and loads of information to digest. Very exciting.


11 February 2010

How did 2008 DNSers Fare in the 2009 Draft?


In the first ten rounds of the 2008 draft, these players were drafted, did not sign, and reentered into the 2009 draft:

Aaron Crow 1:9
Tanner Scheppers 2:48
Scott Bittle 2:75
Chris Dominguez 5:167
Billy Morrison 9:282
Kyle Thebeau 9:285
Chris Herrmann 10:296
Trevor Holder 10:298
Kevin Castner 10:303
William Wilson 10:311
Nathan Newman 10:312

Of these eleven draftees, four went on to receive greater signing bonuses, one wound up with the about the same, three wound up with significantly less, and two were not drafted at all. As a population, supposed income (assumed as slot if actual team offered value is not found) was 5.74MM in 2008 while resultant sum of the signing bonuses in 2009 was 5.52MM. Although, these differences do not appear greatly different, less than half were helped by not signing.

After the jump, a more detailed list of who gained and who lost.

Draftees who benefited from not signing:
Chris Dominguez 165k -> 411k
Chris Herrmann 75k -> 135k
Trevor Holder 75k -> 200k
William Wilson 70k -> 408k

Draftee who lost from not signing:
Aaron Crow 3.5MM -> 3MM
Scott Bittle 550k -> 75k
Kevin Caster 65k -> ~10k
Nathan Newman 65k -> ~10k

Players not drafted the following year:
Billy Morrison
Kyle Thebeau

Just from this list, it appears that players who benefit most from not signing are players from rounds 8-10 or so. Players in a situation like Aaron Crow's have very little incentive in delaying the signing.

08 February 2010

2009 Draft Did-Not-Sign Players


Every draft there are a handful of players in the first ten rounds who are drafted and do not sign. In the past, a draft and follow strategy would allow teams to sign draftees up until the night before the draft. This was how the Orioles were able to secure Adam Loewen when they countered his desire for more money with a slot on the 40 man roster, which would hurry him to the majors. Nowadays, draft and follow no longer works with rule changes with compensatory picks being issued instead for did not signs for the first three rounds.

This year those will go to:
Tampa (picks 31 and 79 for not signing LeVon Washington, who will be eligible this year, and Kenny Diekroger, who will be eligible in 2012)
Toronto (picks 39, 69, and 112 for not signing James Paxton, eligible this year, Jake Eliopoulus, who is also eligible, and Jake Barrett, who is not)
Chicago White Sox (pick 113 for not signing Bryan Morgado, who is eligible)
Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim (pick 114 for not signing Josh Spence, who is eligbile)

After the jump, we will list players who did not sign last year and are eligible this year along with rankings from PNR Scouting.

2009 Draft (top ten rounds) DNS Eligible for 2010 Draft:

Levon Washington rank:12
Drafted 30th overall in the first round, Washington turned down a 1.1MM deal from the Rays, which was just around slot. It may work out for Washington as he is in line to double his signing bonus. As a high school player, he most likely has not delayed his development by attending a JuCo for a year. This is important as it means that any potential free agency is unlikely to be delayed (as opposed to DNSer Aaron Crow who not only received 500k less from the Royals than from the Nationals . . . but also will probably have his free agency delayed a year because of the hold out.

James Paxton rank: 25
Paxton was one of the non-signs of the Blue Jays 2009 draft failure. He turned down a 1MM contract and is not embroiled in a legal fiasco with the NCAA in an attempt to pitch for Kentucky in 2010. The ranking suggests that he would see a raise in his signing bonus of 250k, but the bet he is making is that his senior season will be good enough to elevate his worth into the from half of the first round.

Jake Eliopoulus rank: 115
PNR Scouting is not favorable on Eliopoulus who went 68th overall (2nd round) to the Blue Jays last year. I was unable to find any reports on the negotiations between the Jays and Eliopoulus. If that ranking changes matches a change in draft slot, then he would be looking at a decrease from 520k to 225k.

Bryan Morgado rank: 29
White Sox selected Morgado in the third round with the 102nd overall pick. I cannot find any information on the negotiations, but the going rate at 102 is 330k whereas a 29th selection would be roughly 1MM. If he can stay around the backend of the first round or better, not signing will have been a solid move.

Josh Spence rank: 78
Spence was chosen by the Angels last year in the third round with the 110th pick. The going rate for a 110th pick was 320k while a 78th pick would see about 450k. It probably makes sense for someone at this level to try to raise the price.

Damien Magnifico rank: 215
Magnifico was drafted in the fifth round last year (164th overall). Signing bonuses were going for about 150k at that point. Again, I have no knowledge of the numbers they were discussing. Magnifico decided to go to college and will be eligible again. A signing bonus around 215th overall would be around 125k. For a pitcher, it seems any drop would result in a minimal loss of the bonus. The hope for him is to perform well enough to see him move up to the second or third round.

Ryan Woolley rank: 163
According to PNR's preseason ranking, Woolley is right about where he left off as he was drafted only 15 selections behind the ranking. He has another season of college ball if he chooses to punt again. Usually that does not work out well . . . this is probably the last year he will have any significant leverage.

Devin Harris rank: 173
Early in the process last year the Orioles figured out that Harris would be unsignable given their level of interest. He went in the 8th, 236th overall which correlates to about a 125k signing bonus. The goal is for him to break out and, with PNR's ranking, it shows that a breakout is not assumed. Harris will be earning it as is true with most draftees.

San Dyson rank: 43
All indications are that Dyson is healthy and ready to pitch. He was selected in the 10th round last year, but was not offered anything in line with what he could earn by going back. Right now he is pegged as a compensatory round selection if healthy, but he he starts showing more consistency he could peak in the mid teens to late twenties.

05 February 2010

International Draft Addendum: Free Agent Compensation Part II


This is the final part of a series looking at a potential international draft and free agent compensation.

Aspects that work well?
1. Subdivision of positions.
It makes sense to value players by subgroups.
2. Taking into account the value of a player for his current team.
At bats and innings pitched connotes a players worth to his own team.

Why is the current system not very accurate?
1. Poor statistics are used.
The numbers used are either of dubious use (fielding percentage, chances) or are rather useless (RBIs, winning percentage).
2. Undervaluing/overvaluing certain positions.
A major issue often encountered are free agents who flounder around due to unrealistic compensation statuses attached to them. For instance, Jose Valverde is struggling to find a decent market for his services because he is a type A reliever, but no team is willing to offer both the cash and loss of their first unprotected pick for him. The same thing happened to Orlando Hudson, Adam Dunn, and Juan Cruz last year.
3. Potential over-compensatory approach for players on disabled list.
There really is little reason why a player like Erik Bedard would qualify for compensation even though he has only seen 164 IP over the past two years. Being able to stay healthy should be a consideration as it affects a player's future cost.

But what is the major failing of the system?
Value lost is not value gained. Losing a top free agent results in getting two players who are, at best, 4 years away from the free agent signing to making a difference on the big league club. This is the most glaring issue with the current approach. The other failings need to be corrected, but making the adjustment closer to real time is a better solution.

After the jump, a better way to identify type A and B classifications and a more fair way to compensate.


How to better classify free agent classes:
Use a condensed statistic like WAR. This system would use all of the attributes from the current one and place them in a more defensible construct. It also incorporates health as a attribute as opposed to assuming a players health is a constant. For defense, the system should use a three year weighted average to determine UZR for fielders. Assume all catchers are average defensively until a dependable measurement technique is devised to measure that.

What is a more fair way to compensate teams?
Get rid of the draft pick compensation scheme. It makes no sense. I think the best way to do it is to issue a signing tax on any type A or type B free agent on the team that signs the player. A type A player contract would be taxed 20% and a type B player contract would be taxed 10%. The tax would be paid from the signing team to the one who lost the player. That team has the option of beginning the program that year or waiting until the following off season to begin. This tax money must be spent on a free agent and must be at least on a 1:1 dollar shared ratio. Any unspent money is forfeited back to the player on which the tax was issued.

For instance:
Lets say Mark Teixeira signed an 8 year deal for about 180MM. That is a yearly average of 22.5MM. Assuming that yearly sum is what the Yankees are willing to offer him, under the new scenario he would be paid 18MM with 4.5MM being sent to the Angels. This would happen in years n to n+2 or n+1 to n+3. The Angels would have that 4.5MM allotment to spend on 9MM or more for a single free agent. If they only spend 8MM on a free agent assigned to this allotment, they can only receive 4MM in compensation and 0.5MM goes to Teixeira.

Why would this be good for teams?
Compensation for a type A players generates on average about 5.6MM in value. In order for a team to get similar compensation a player would need to sign a 3/27MM contract. That is about what an average baseball player would sign for if 1 WAR is worth about 3.5 to 4MM. That seems about right. The better the player, the higher the compensation. The value of that compensation is also more immediate and more dependable than draft picks would be.

Why would it be good for players?
It would probably push for players demanding long term contracts as well as forcing teams to spend money on MLBPA free agents. Money cannot disappear from the market if a team wishes to get compensated. It also encourages the teams to sign a player for 3 years so they can fully really that compensation. Likewise, a team/player is only taxed for three seasons and it is based on his lifetime contract, so it is not a great burden.

04 February 2010

Draft Top 20: Mayo on James

Jonathan Mayo put out his first MLB draft top 20 prospects. Below are the rankings along with where Nick James at PNR Scouting puts them in parentheses.

1. (3) Anthony Ranaudo, RHP, LSU
2. (7) Drew Pomeranz, LHP, Ole Miss
3. (2) James Taillon, RHP, The Woodlands HS, TX
4. (1) Bryce Harper, C, College of Southern Nevada
5. (13) Dylan Covey, RHP, Maranatha HS, CA.
6. (11) Chris Sale, LHP, Florida Gulf Coast University
7. (10) Jesse Hahn, RHP, Virginia Tech
8. (8) Zack Cox, 3B, Arkansas
9. (30) Manny Machado, SS, Miami Brito HS, FL
10. (21) Kaleb Cowart, 3B, Cook County HS, GA
11. (25) James Paxton, LHP, Kentucky
12. (6) Deck McGuire, RHP, Georgia Tech
13. (4) A.J. Cole, RHP, Oviedo HS, FL
14. (22) Kevin Gausman, RHP, Grandview HS, CO
15. (20) Brandon Workman, RHP, Texas
16. (12) LeVon Washington, 2B, Chipola JC, FL
17. (60) Micah Gibbs, C, LSU
18. (15) Stetson Allie, RHP, Olmstead Falls HS, OH
19. (9) Christian Colon, SS, Cal State Fullerton
20. (18) Yordy Cabrera, SS, Lakeland HS, FL

Mayo might be crossing the line that has been established by conventional wisdom placing Bryce Harper at number 1. We saw something similar with Kevin Goldstein suggesting that Harper would not go number 1 (though not outright saying he is not the best prospect). Stotle (Nick) ranks it differently. True, much time remains between now and the draft, so things could change. The rest of the list appears similar enough until we reach the 9th slot.

It will be interesting to see how these rankings change over the course of the year.

02 February 2010

Keith Law on the Fan Tonight

Keith Law appeared on the Fan with Jeremy Conn's Playmakers tonight to talk about prospects on the Orioles.

On Matt Wieters:
Law said he was not surprised that Wieters needed time to adjust. Few players come out and perform when they hit the big leagues . . . there are few Ryan Brauns. He thinks he will be a star by 2012 and 2013 when the Orioles will be ready to compete in the AL East.

Thoughts on the Orioles not signing a big name this offseason:
Law said he has been a supporter of Andy MacPhail devoting money to the minors leagues and developmental system. You won't win by trying to outspend the Yankees and Red Sox. The GM needed patience for the system to replenish itself and prepare them to having waves of talent rising up every year. In a year or two guys like Wieters, Jones, Reimold, and Matusz will be performing at a high level. A year or two after that another wave of talent will arrive in the form of guys like Britton and Joseph. Then another wave will come with guys like Hobgood, Coffey, and others.

On Brian Matusz:
Matusz is a player who was not going to develop in the minors. He secondary pitches are very good and overmatched HiA and AA batters. Add that to an above average fastball and it was clear that he would need to develop in the majors. The only aspect of his game that needs work is fastball command. When he solidifies that he will profile as a no. 2 starter or even as an unconvential no. 1 starter. He has a David Cone style approach where he uses his secondary pitches against both right handers and left handers to set them up on his fastball.

On Zach Britton:
Law is high on Zach Britton. He is a traditional sinker/slider pitcher with a good slider and a plus sinker. He uses these quite well to miss bats and induce groundballs. He should be able to be a top of the rotation pitcher. The high grade (no. 25) in this year's rankings is in large part due to his improving changeup which makes him more of a threat to batters on both sides of the plate. Law then talked about how he talked to three scouts who each said he was one of the best if not the best pitcher they watched all season. They gave very high praise including one who joked with Law not to place him too high on the list because he is trying to talk his GM in trading for him. Law mentioned that that won't happen as the Orioles are high on him as well. It may take about a year and half more development, but if Britton cuts down on his walks and improves the changeup he could be very special.

On Josh Bell:
Bell needs some developmental time. He has one of the best left handed swings in the minors, but his right handed approach needs a lot of work. His defense is a work in progress. His feet and athleticism are there, so Law thinks he can make it. He views the Dodgers system as one where players do not get a high level of instruction and that the Orioles do a better job of that. He thinks Bell is good enough that it would have been foolish for the Orioles to lock themselves in place with a 3 to 4 year deal at the corners and block Bell.

On Brandon Snyder:
The big question is if Snyder will have enough power. His swing is very nice, but it has never produced any power. His defense is solid at first, too. The power needs to show up if the Orioles are going to slot him in at first. If he does start hitting home runs he will clearly be an everyday player.

Jake Arrieta
Law sees him as a fourth starter, but mentions that the O's brass think higher of him than that. He has improved his control, which was the big knock on him. The consensus from scouts is that he is a 4th starter and that is not a bad thing as there are several pitchers in the pipeline that will challenge him for a slot in the rotation.

On Chris Tillman:
He looks light a number 2 pitcher, but has more development to go. The Orioles were somewhat forced to promote him before he was ready and will need to do that development in the majors. His curve has good depth on his curve and he has a good body. His command needs improvement. Very high potential.

bergesen
Law thinks Bergesen is a bottom of the rotation type of pitcher. He does not miss enough bats, but he does work down in the zone so that minimizes the damage of batted balls. His main role on the team will wind up being someone who can hold a rotation position warm on the cheap until another arm pushes him out of the way. He could be a 5th or possibly a 4th starter on a good team.

01 February 2010

Connecticut would do good for a bad team.


This past week NESN's own Peter Gammons stated that there have been some (probably minimal) discussions about relocating the Tampa Bay Rays to either New Jersey or Connecticut. The idea is spurned by the fact that the Rays have been around for about two decades and have been recently successful, yet they have proven to be a tough draw. They were 11th in the AL with a draw of 1.875 million people. Their average ticket price was $18.35 and their premium seats were averaged at $59.82 last year. In comparison to the Orioles, the average ticket price is cheaper ($23.42), but the premium price is more expensive ($42.86). The final price index shows going to either the Orioles or Rays games to be rather similar in cost.

Again, the problem is that the best the Rays can do when they are coming off a World Series is the best the Orioles can do after more than a decade straight of losing records. That is pretty much the definition of a poor market. Moving to an area with more cash flow would be ideal. The is where New Jersey and Connecticut come up first. They have money and they have well established markets to set up in. Problem is though that they will be in the Red Sox and Yankee markets in Connecticut or in the Yankee/Mets/Phillies market in Northern Jersey. It would seems that the people in these markets who would follow a team probably already have sworn allegiance to a club. Furthermore, the Yanks and BoSox have been incredibly successful, so even the band wagon fans are appeased at this point. The money generated by a new club will probably be more about siphoning money already in the market as opposed to generating a new, money laden fanbase.

The big negatives:
1. Yanks, BoSox, Mets, and Phillies may need to be given a monetary incentive for letting another team in their markets. It would probably be cost prohibitive for any owner to meet these prices and set up shop in a new locale and it might not be something the MLB office wants to handle.
2. Little new revenue. MLB probably won't get richer because the money in these markets is probably already spoken for.
3. Stadium and infrastructure construction. No MLB ready existing facilities are available in the region, so new facilities and infrastructure related to those would need to be built. We are probably talking somewhere between 700-1000 MM. Neither state would be willing to help out.

So, knowing all of that . . . it is unlikely that the Rays will move in either of these locations. It will probably take a building/tax boom as well as the Rays outright tanking and watching their awful attendance halving before a move would be considered.

That would not make this a fun column though, so after the jump . . . what may be the most cost effective way to get either of these places to work. Be weary, this is kind of long and rather rambling.


The first assumption is that the Rays would be able to get tax cuts to equalize Tampa and their new home. This might be a faulty assumption. The second assumption to be made is that there will be little to no money available for stadium construction. In light of this, it will be necessary to use existing stadium that would be modified slightly to fit baseball uses. Stadium size will also be an issue because the team would rely greatly on Red Sox and Yankee travel to boost income. This will help on a couple fronts as it would prevent the need to immediately invest a great deal of capital into construction and it would allow the team to saunter around and find a suitable place to build a stadium several years down the line.

So, what level of support would make the Rays break even?

As mentioned earlier, the Rays pulled in about 1.875MM fans last year. Each person paid roughly $41.35 based on the fan cost index (FCI). In comparison, Yankees fans FCI was $102.75 and the Red Sox FCI was $81.61. As this is an Orioles blog, I'll note that the average cost for an Oriole fan is $40.92. So you can see why Camden Yards is full of BoSox and Yankee fans, particularly on weekends. You can get much closer to the action and break about even if you carpool and get a room with a person or two next to the stadium. The way a Connecticut team would work would be by bankrolling on these two fan bases. As this region only has a population of 3.5MM, it probably makes sense to use more than one stadium. Smaller stadiums for non-BoSox/Yanks games and temporarily convert a football stadium for BoSox and Yank games.

So, if the FCI for premium games was set at $70 with the non-premium games at $40, what would be needed for the teams to break even?

Assuming, at $70 you are able to pull in 50,000 for Yankee games and 40,000 for Red Sox games then, in those 18 games, the Rays will have earned 73% of their current annual revenue. Although incredibly unlikely, if the premium games were sellouts at 57,000, that would account for 92% of the current income. An average of 61,250 would generate the same revenue that the Rays currently enjoy. Under the 45,000 average assumption, the rest of the home games can depend on a relatively small fan base for the remaining money (20.8MM).

Stadiums to use for non-premium games:

New Britain Stadium in New Britain , Ct
capacity 8,200
14 years old

The Ballpark at Harbor Yard in Bridgeport, Ct
capacity 5,500
12 years old

McCoy Stadium at Pawtucket, RI
capacity 11,800
64 years old

Sixty three non premium games will be played each year. A non premium game is defined as a game played against someone not named the Yankees or Red Sox. Each stadium here would serve as a home field for 21 games. The specific series for each stadium would be decided before the season and adjusted for what the team desires. For instance, the season may be split into three sections with each stadium serving as the home field for two months.

Perhaps the nicest stadium of those three will also be the most difficult to include. The Ballpark at Harbor Yard has a capacity of 5,500. Each game has to make 330k to break even with the Rays mark assuming the Yanks and BoSox can average 45,000 for each game. That would make a FCI of $60.60, which would be a very expensive ticket. Based on the current design of the ballpark about 1,000 temporary seats could be erected for games. That would bring the cost down to $51.28, which is still rather expensive. More serious construction could probably maximize the stadium at 7,500, which would drop the per game FCI to $44.44. That would need to include a solution to add 500-1000 seats to the outfield corners and maybe left field. This is the weakest one of the three, but may be a good idea as it would reach another location to generate interest in the team.

The other two stadiums would suit the team fine (which may mean ignoring Harbor Park and just settling in on New Britain and Pawtucket). In New Britain, existing infrastructure allows for an FCI of $40.65 to break even. Temporary stands could raise the capacity to roughly 10,000 which would drop the FCI to $33.33. In Pawtucket, existing infrastructure allows for an FCI of $28.25. If only New Britain and Pawtucket were used with a $40 FCI, then with 80% and 70% fill of their respective stadium (8,250 tickets sold per game) would break even with the Rays current system. If they would be able to sell out their home schedule in those stadiums, they could make another 7.5MM. That is a 10% increase over their current draw based on the FCI.

Premium Games:

Yale Bowl in New Haven, CT
64,246
97 years old

The east end of the stadium would have to be closed off as those seats would be too far away from the action. Some replacements could be placed out into the right field. A reasonable estimation would be that the stadium would be able to fit about 57,000 fans. If need the far end of the stadium could be opened up to allow for another 10,000 fans to congregate in the stands and field. In addition to this, a see through fence would need to be erected in left field to make the short distance playable. Otherwise, you will have a 215 ft porch. It would quickly recess back to about 370-380 is left center, so the wall would only be needed for a short distance. An example would be the Los Angeles Coliseum when the Dodgers first moved out west. Another potential fix would be to put home plate at one end and have two extremely short porches that quickly move back. Essentially the porches would be about 195-200ft, while the alleys could be as deep as 430 feet. In this scenario the high walls would be present for about 25-30 ft. It would also make it easier to seat the fans close to the infield. It is not an ideal situation, but it has been done before. The hope would be that Red Sox and Yankee fans would be interested in coming to a road game within driving distance of home with a ticket price that is less than what it would cost in their respective stadiums.

Benefits:
1. Minimal cost in temporary seating and field adjustments.
2. Current infrastructure is already designed to meet attendance levels.
3. Greater region to draw fans. It may be easier to get one person to buy season tickets in New Britain and someone else to buy the other other season tickets in Pawtucket as opposed to one person buy a full season slate in New Britain.
4. Provides greater scarcity of a product in some locations. Fewer games means that the games take on more importance as an entertainment good.
5. If it is a complete fiasco, nothing large and expensive has been built to keep the team staked down to an area.
6. Greater cost efficiency in running a game as larger venues could be sought for larger crowds and vice versa.

Detriments:
1. Entire plan is based on the assumption that Boston Red Sox and New York Yankee fans would be willing to travel 1.5hr to New Haven to spend 30-40% less while potentially getting better seats than they would have gotten at home.
2. Few box seats.
3. Modifying a football stadium for baseball is somewhat difficult as one or both foul lines will provide for a short porch.
4. Local populace is not very large.
5. Local populace is largely divided amongst Yankees and Red Sox fans with the rest mainly consisting of Mets fans. Baseball is awash in this environment and there are probably very few fans who have no affiliation.
6. Fans are willing to watch MLB in minor league parks where the FCI is probably twice what it costs to watch a minor league game in the same park.
7. That the facilities could be upgraded well enough to provide proper clubhouse amenities for the players.

How would it make sense?

I think there would have to be an increase of about 20%. By using Pawtucket and New Britain, you could probably average about 8000 tickets sold per night. If their FCI was $40 and the premium games were $70, the premium games would need to have an average attendance of 57,000. That does not look very good. If both Pawtucket and New Britain could sustain sell outs every night, then an average premium attendance would be 53,000 to meet the 20% increase goal. I think the 20% goal would be far easier to make if the team was not good at all.

In 2005, the Rays had a season draw of 1.14 million tickets. According to the FCIs, that would be an income of 47MM, 30MM less than they are receiving right now. To get the 20% rise under such a scenario, if the non premium games averaged 8000 tickets, then 29,000 would be needed for the premium games. If the non-premium games were sold old, about 26,500 would be needed to the premium games. In terms of FCIs, with a draw of 1.14 million tickets, if the premium games had an attendance level of 38,000 . . . they would break even. In 18 home games, they would break even with what they could do in Tampa. All else would be increased profit. That should be pretty simple. I think it is pretty easy to say that if the Rays don't move and have a period of about ten years where they have difficulty to compete, their attendance will fall and a place like Connecticut and Rhode Island would look nice.

What about New Jersey?
I think it is more difficult here. First, it would be either going into the AL and depending primarily on Yankees fans to arrive as opposed to Yankee and BoSox fans. They could also try to draw on the Phillies and Mets fans. Also, there are no large minor league stadiums here. They are all in the 5,000 to 7,000 range. Assuming you could fit about 40,000 Yankee fans up in Giants Stadium. If you could get average 37,000 for Yankees and Red Sox games at Giants Stadium, to hit the 20% mark the FCI would have to be $22.68 in those non-premium games for those stadiums. The problem is that if the team is more successful and capable of selling more tickets in Tampa, an FCI of about $110 would be required for non-premium games . . . so you can see that this arrangement is even more limited than what Connecticut and Rhode Island could offer.

If you try to draw on the Mets and Phillies, you probably have to reduce the FCI to about $55. In this scenario, you can reach a 20% increase over what the Rays would make with a 1.14 million attendance mark if you can pull in an average of 35,000 fans in the Mets/Phillies games while hitting 7000 in the non-premium games with an FCI of $45.35. The assumption of Yankee fans being more present and willing to travel to watch a game in addition to the slightly higher draw of a BoSox game and you have a higher attendance rate and higher FCI. New Jersey is probably a better place to have a bad team, but not a better one to have a good team without a larger capacity stadium being built.

So in conclusion, the Rays would do just as well in Connecticut by drawing an average of 45,000 fans for premium games and 8,000 for non-premium games. Under 2005 attendance levels in Tampa, just 18 games of 37,000 attendance for the BoSox and Yanks games would have accounted for all of the revenue Tampa generated that season in 81 home games. An NL team would have very little draw in this region and should not be considered. If the team was placed in New Jersey, a 1.8 million ticket presence in Tampa could not be reciprocated in Jersey with the existing infrastructure. On the lower end of the spectrum, a team could probably get by in the NL, but would probably have a much easier time of it in the AL.

29 January 2010

It takes a village . . .


Daniel Moroz over at Camden Crazies (nee Frost King Baseball for the old school types) brought to light an incidence of plagiarism and copyright infringement on a blog site. Jordan ran Orioles Prospects, a site that specialized itself as a hub for Orioles prospects with him self-identified as an individual qualified to provide top notch insight on players in the Orioles minor league system. To be brief, it was clearly evidenced that Jordan was copying and pasting (sometimes changing a word or juggling parts in a sentence) thoughts and ideas originally printed from Baseball America, PG Crosschecker, and Keith Law.

Now, the first inclination when a story like this breaks is to tar and feather the person who broke ethical and legal rules about use of content. To some extent, I think that is fair. Jordan should be held accountable for his actions. He is 15 years old and probably lacks some capacity to understand the ramifications of his actions and is still of an age where concepts of right and wrong can be muddled. These are reasons, not excuses. For this, he needs correction, which I hope is being accomplished in the aftermath of Moroz' piece. I also hope he takes to it as easily to it as he did after the piece was published as opposed to his actions before. Having to face up to defrauding people is difficult and most would try to get out of it just like he tried to do.

That said, I think this is also a time for many of us in this community to look at what we do. One common link I found in comments and in conversing with others is that for a while many of us were rolling our eyes at Jordan's content. I, myself, was brought attention to his work roughly around the Haiti tragedy although I had nonchalantly put him on my Twitter follow list. After the earthquake, Jordan was trying to increase follows on Twitter to help with selling his guide as well as donate money to Haiti by promising a dollar for every new follow, which is probably a somewhat ethically shady way to help people. I decided to take a look at his site and found it to be highly questionable. I could tell from the sentence structure and turns of phrase that it was ripped from other content. I had better things to do at the time and decided to just remove him from my follow list.

Looking back on that, was that enough? I think as a community we need to be more honest with each other. This does not mean an aggressive hunt for any offending fraud offense, like Jordan's. I think what it means is that when there is a member in our group who is obviously posting shady material, we need to engage instead of eye rolling. We need to accept that other bloggers challenging our information is good for our community, ourselves, and our audience. Personally, I could sit in my own world here and just go on and on about my own studies, but I find it much more rewarding when there is a conversation about posts published between Camden Crazies, Dempsey's Army, and us here at Camden Depot.

As much as this was about some teenager pretending to have the experience and know how that takes others at least a decade to acquire, it is also about the community of knowledgeable individuals who let this continue. I think it is also about how maybe we have the chance to take someone who is eager enough to try to cheat his way into the conversation and somehow make him useful to the dialogue. I guess it might be a situation where Jordan grows from this or learns to defraud people in a more competent manner; and how we, as a community, respond to it or to others who find themselves on that path.

28 January 2010

Keith Law's top 100 - Orioles

Last night, Jonathan Mayo put out his top 100 list, which I mentioned to be rather peculiar. Today, Keith Law unleashes his own (subscription required). It makes more sense to me than Mayo's. I think Law is too bullish on Britton and too bearish on Arrieta, but I understand why he thinks the way he does.

His opinion of Zach Britton has improved greatly in the past three or four months. Back in September, Law's view of Britton was more in the 100-125 area of prospects. It seems after reassessing the player and talking with professional talent evaluators, his opinion changed. Britton is now listed at slot 25. His belief in Josh Bell seems a bit tamer in its translation to the list as number 60. Arrieta free falls down to the 90th slot.

Law seems to think it is likely to expect a solid rotation of Matusz as a 1/2, Tillman as a 1/2, Britton as a 3, and Arrieta as a 4. In addition to those players, he rates Camden Depot's 1st round shadow pick in last year's draft, Zach Wheeler, as a potential 1/2. If the Orioles also spent money on Miguel Jean and Aroldis Chapman that would have put them in with seven of the top 100 prospects. Of course, they did not do what we suggested.

Here is his ranking of the Orioles top ten:

1. Brian Matusz, LHP
2. Zack Britton, LHP
3. Josh Bell, 3B
4. Jake Arrieta, RHP
5. Brandon Snyder, 1B
6. Brandon Erbe, RHP
7. Caleb Joseph, C
8. Brandon Waring, 3B/1B
9. Matt Hobgood, RHP
10. Xavier Avery, OF


After the jump a listing of the Orioles who have made the list with some quotes.

The Orioles listed:
11. Brian Matusz
25. Zachary Britton
Britton is a true sinker/slider pitcher with enough velocity to work as a starter and a potential out pitch in the slider to miss bats when he's not getting ground balls...His control remains below-average and his command of all pitches and feel for the slider need to improve, as well, but he would slot in very nicely as a No. 2 starter behind Brian Matusz, or as an outstanding No. 3 behind Matusz and Chris Tillman.

61. Josh Bell
He's improving at third base and projects as an average glove there, with solid hands and an above-average arm. He should be able to take over in Baltimore sometime between midyear 2010 and the start of 2011 depending on how well he fares against left-handed pitching, regardless of how he does it.

90. Jake Arrieta
Two scouts with whom I spoke saw Arrieta in 2009 and tabbed him a No. 4 starter, but I wouldn't rule out him becoming a solid No. 3 with some command improvements and his feel for adding and subtracting from his fastball.


Shadow System
Our shadow system only had one more player listed in addition to the ones above:
84. Zach Wheeler
He has No. 1/No. 2 starter potential, and given how aggressive the Giants were with Madison Bumgarner and Tim Alderson, there's reason to believe Wheeler will start out in full-season ball in 2010.


27 January 2010

Not always in the mood for Mayo . . .

Jonathan Mayo put out his top 50 list for MLB.com tonight. He placed only one Oriole in the top 60: Brian Matusz at 5. Where Piliere and Law both found the team to be top ten in terms of organizational talent, I think Mayo would be hard pressed to put the Orioles there. Based on his rankings, the team would be more around 15-18. This would be in line with the Wang approximation, but Mayo seems to be grading prospects differently. Mayo may actually be implementing this method in his assessment as hitters populate the top 50 list in a 3:2 majority.

Some comments:

32-34. Moustakas, Myers, and Teheran. Really? I am surprised he views these players so highly. Especially surprised because Moustakas has looked awful and Myers has not really done much of anything. In my opinion all three of these are incredibly aggressive rankings and I do not agree with them.

Where are Dan Hudson, Fernando Martinez, and Aroldis Chapman? Chapman's exclusion from even the top 60 seems to be a massive oversight. I have no idea how he would not be there. As a lefty starter working in the lower 90s or a lefty bullpen arm in the upper 90s . . . he is a top 50 guy. There is just no way around it. F-Mart has a disappointing year, but he is 21 and pretty much Major League ready. How is Moustakas who has been outright awful in significant time in the low minors worth more than him?

Bell, Arrieta, and Britton? I can understand leaving these guys out in the 60-80 range. Bell might not be able to handle third base (though he right now can hit MLB righties . . . how does Moustakas rank above that?). Arrieta might not be able to start (but he would rate out as a pretty solid reliever and would have to rate out rather similar to Drew Storen who has been a bit susceptible to long fly balls). Britton survives by inducing poor contact with grounders, so there is a question as to how that will transfer at higher levels (though below Nick Hagadone? Really?).

I don't know. The list seems peculiar.

I am not Andy MacPhail: 2010 Off Season


So the 2010 offseason is coming to a close. We can probably expect about 5-6MM more in contracts to be doled out. Erik Bedard is expected to eventually sign here. Mark Hendrikson or Takahashi are also supposed to come in as the lefthander in the pen. Andy MacPhail's moves are summed up as:

Kevin Millwood 1/9MM (or ~11MM considering that Chris Ray has value)
Garrett Atkins 1/5MM (essentially with the buyout)
Mike Gonzalez 2/12MM (essentially 14MM with the incentives or 15MM with the loss of the draft pick)
Miguel Tejada 1/6MM (essentially 6.5MM with incentives)

A total of 26MM for 2010 (28MM with incentives) or 32-34MM by the end of the off season.

I would not have done the above. The moves MacPhail completed were largely short-term without much effect to the future. All of these millions could be spent on future parts. The best case scenario is for Millwood and Tejada to reestablish their value and qualify as type B level free agents.

After the jump, what I would have done.

1. Sign Miguel (Angel Sano) Jean for 3.5MM (down to 30.5MM).
The money used to sign Garrett Atkins is better placed in someone who may actually help the Orioles in the field or in a trade. Jean is considered to be a fringe top 100 prospect. He has amazing raw tools and has more worth to 2013-2017 than Atkins does. Atkins has really no above average tools left.
2. Sign Dallas McPherson to a split contract to compete for 1B (30MM).
McPherson fills in for another bat to compete for the first base position with Aubrey and Wigginton. He is a low cost option who could DH at AAA or just be released if he cannot make the parent club out of spring training.
3. Sign Matt Capps as closer 1/3.5MM (26.5MM).
Is Capps as good a closer as Gonzalez? No. But, a closer is really one of the last pieces to add. For a team with no hope of competing . . . paying twice this amount would be inefficient. Capps is also just 26 and under team control.
4. Sign Brad Penny 1/7.5MM (19MM).
Brad Penny had good peripherals last season even though his straight numbers looked poor in the AL East. If Penny gets injured, there are suitable replacements in the pen (i.e. Hernandez, Berken) or at AAA (i.e. Arrieta).
5. Sign Aroldis Chapman 5/25MM (14MM).
Chapman is a large investment, but not considerably so when you consider the added cost of players like Atkins, Gonzalez, and Millwood. By scaling back on those salaries, two seasons of Chapman are paid for already. His addition to the club would put another B+ arm in the system that fits in at worst around the 50th best prospect in baseball.
6. Sign Mark Hendrickson 1/1.5MM (11.5MM).
Hendrickson is a cheap, yet effective lefty situational pitcher.
7. Sign Adrian Beltre 2/23MM+1/14MM w/4MM bo.
This might be the more controversial idea that I have here and assumes that Beltre would be open to signing here. The reason why I think Beltre would be a good fit here is because he is a great defensive 3B with average to above average hitting ability. SafeCo is tough on right handed hitters and Beltre should do much better outside of Seattle. I also think this gives Josh Bell a full season in AAA to play third base and, occasionally, first base. Bell's rookie season (2011) will be a competition between him and Snyder with Bell also being able to back up third base. The tricky season will be the option year. If both Snyder and Bell distinguish themselves, then buying out the last season makes sense. If neither or only one distinguishes themselves, then it makes sense to pick up the option.
8. Trade Felix Pie, Chris Ray, and Kam Mickolio for J.J. Hardy.
J.J. Hardy was traded for another failed prospect in Carlos Gomez. The Brewers have some need for a centerfielder as well as more depth in their bullpen. This deal gives the Orioles two years of J.J. Hardy as their shortstop. At worst, he is Izturis and at best he is a premier offensive SS with Izturis' glove. It is a move that have major upside and resolves a major hole in the Orioles infield.

C Matt Wieters
1 Aubrey/McPherson/Wigginton
2 Roberts
3 Beltre
S Hardy
L Reimold
C Jones
R Markakis
D Scott

P Guthrie
P Penny
P Bergesen
P Matusz
P Tillman

The projected wins for this team is 81.1. That is greater than the projected wins for the current team while using the same resources and devoting 8MM to future players. The odds are:
332:1 against losing 100 games
1:1 breaking even
13:1 against 90 wins
82:1 against 95 wins

I think MacPhail has been inefficient in his use of resources. There are no glaring errors in terms of locking down players long term (i.e. Aubrey Huff, Danys Baez, Jaime Walker) or dealing away useful young player (i.e. John Maine), but the upside on these deals are minimal. Basically, the hope is that players like Tejada and Millwood qualify as type B free agents. Nothing more than that. Very average, uninteresting moves in my opinion. At least, when given with a valuable veteran, MacPhail tends to get good value (i.e Tillman, Bell, Jones).

26 January 2010

MLB Fanhouse's Organizational Rankings

Frankie Piliere puts the Orioles as the 6th best farm system. I wouldn't go that high. The highest my ranking for the O's was 7th and that was by applying a somewhat arbitrary coefficient to Wang's methodology of prospect worth. A more scientific model yielded the Orioles as 11th.

Another team helped immensely by smart trades (see: Jones, Adam), the Orioles are only going to get better as another wave of talent appears to be on the way. Brian Matusz looks ready to stick in the big-league rotation, and others like Jake Arrieta are knocking on the door.


Strangest ranking?
Tigers as 21st. He has them with 5 guys in the top 100.

Second strangest?
A's at 3rd with only 3 guys in the top 100.

MLB Fanhouse's top 100 prospects

Frankie Piliere, formerly of Saberscouting and the Texas Rangers, put up his top 100 prospects over at MLB fanhouse. The Orioles make the list with:

8. Brian Matusz
42. Josh Bell
48. Jake Arrieta
55. Zach Britton

He had mentioned before in a chat that Erbe had just missed the 100 player limit.

Additional players from our shadow minor league system: None.

I would also regard this as a pretty fair assessment as well. It puts the Orioles system as average to very slightly above average. That fit in with our study modifying Wang's methodology to free agent cost efficiency. From Sickels' grades, Brandon Erbe was a tweener for a top 100 list. So were our shadow selections Tim Melville and Zach Wheeler.

25 January 2010

Depot Retro: Junichi Tazawa scouting report

Thursday, Oct 30, 2008

Scouting Report: Junichi Tazawa, RHP, Japan

By Nick James

We take a quick break from the US Amateurs to provide a scouting report on Junichi Tazawa. Japanese teams in the Central League and the Pacific League adhered to the amateur’s requests not to draft him in the amateur draft. Instead, Tazawa hopes to sign with one of the thirty Major League Baseball organizations. Peter Abraham’s September 14, 2008 article is an informative look at the situation.

So, what’s the deal with Tazawa? The 22-year old righty is a bit undersized at 5’11” / 180 lbs, potentially making him a better fit for a Major League bullpen than as a rotation. He has the makings of a starter’s arsenal, however, so we could see him go either way.

Grading Out

Motion – 55
Tempo – 55
Fastball – 50
Curveball – 50
Slider – 55
Changeup – 50

Mechanics

Overall Motion – Tazawa’s motion is a bit herky-jerky at its apex, but none of his mechanical ticks seem to interfere with his ability to command his pitches. He loses some energy as he exits his leg kick and enters his stride. Rather than extending into his stride, he kicks his stride foot out towards third base. The resulting recoil returns a bend to his leg as he strides forward and shortens his step. The result is a slight loss in momentum towards home, in addition to a limiting of the drive he’s getting out of his back leg. Smoothing this out could add some velocity.

Arm Action – Tazawa generates his velocity, as well as his spin on his breaking balls, through a quick and short arm that gives the ball the appearance of flying out of his right shoulder. Though he breaks his hands a little early, he does a good job of keeping the ball hidden from the hitter. The result is a playing-up of his fastball velocity and a breakingball/changeup that are difficult for the batter to ID. He’s able to throw his curveball, changeup and fastball out of the same slot, though he drops down ever-so-slightly on his slider.

Pace – Tazawa keeps a solid pace, with a delay at the apex of his leg kick that varies slightly in duration. This does not seem to throw-off his command, and can serve as a disruption to the batters’ timing mechanism. His arm plays catch-up with his lower-half, as his legs and hips rotate through before his shoulder. As discussed above, his quick arm is where he generates his velocity, so it works. The downside is added stress to the shoulder and arm, though his ability to throw with easy effort may assuage some fears.

Mechanics Grade – B-

Arsenal

Fastball – Tazawa comes with a low-90s fastball that has occasional arm-side run. He commands it well to both sides of the plate. His quick arm action allows the average velocity to play up and the ball really sneaks-up on the hitter. Though not overpowering, his fastball is above-average due to his arm action, command and velocity differential from his secondary stuff.

Curveball – The first of his breakingballs is a big, loopy curveball he throws off of his right shoulder (like his fastball). His curve sits in the mid- to upper-70s and serves as an offspeed pitch, as well. While he gets a nice bend and solid downward action, it’s still a bit too loopy and there isn’t enough late bite to make it a true above-average pitch. It remains effective as an offspeed offering and as a get-me-over pitch for hitter’s counts (to avoid having to throw his fastball).

Slider – He mixes in a slider with good bite and upper-70s to low-80s velocity. He doesn’t command the slider quite as well, but it is a much better swing-and-miss pitch at this point. While his curveball is a bit more refined, his slider has much more potential. If MiL coaching can’t get some of the loop out of his curve, it would make sense to focus on developing the slider as his primary secondary offering.

Changeup – Since his curve has a better velocity differential than his change, Tazawa doesn’t rely on his changeup as much as he should. It already has solid depth and can be a second true swing-and-miss pitch if he learns to command it. Generally a low-80s offering, the change is effective when down in the zone, but he can get in trouble when he leaves it up (where it also tends to flatten-out).

“Stuff” Grade – B – Tazawa is an interesting case. He gets the most out of an average fastball and a loopy curveball, despite his best potential offerings being his slider/changeup. Some mechanical tweaks may add velocity to his fastball, though it’d be nice to see more consistent run on the pitch. If he stays with a loopy curveball, he’ll need to do a better job of keeping it down, as professional hitters won’t be as thrown by the velocity dip. His slider and changeup are his best bets for plus-pitches, though both need improvement in consistency and command.

Nick’s Notes

Tazawa could be groomed as a reliever or a starter. Any team hoping for him to become a successful starter would be well advised to try and correct his kick-and-recoil coming out of his leg kick, and lengthening his stride. This may be too much, though, in which case his stuff could certainly play in short stints out of the pen (which is my projection). If he’s able to add some velocity to his fastball and/or develop his slider/change into plus-pitches, he could eventually turn into a mid-rotation guy. However, his size and the stress he places on his shoulder with his quick arm action raise durability questions. The best bet would be to switch him to the pen and focus on the fastball/slider combo. He has enough feel for the curve to use it as a “show me” pitch, and the change is serviceable as is. Depending on how the pitches develop, he could be anything from a seventh inning guy to a potential closer.

Prospect Grade – B-

24 January 2010

Miguel Tejada is back in Baltimore


Pending the results of his physical, Miguel Tejada will be rejoining the Orioles as their starting 3B. Shortly before the signing, Orioles GM Andy MacPhail had apparently narrowed down his choices to Joe Crede and Miguel Tejada. Speaking with Roch Kobatko, MacPhail said:

We would hope that next corner infielder we could add is a solid hitter. (But) there isn't a multitude of those power guys in the game, and I think the game is shifting a little bit away from the gaudy power numbers that were put up 10 years ago that we were used to seeing. The game is starting to shift and you can see, rightfully so, clubs starting to put emphasis on defense . . . There are also durability issues with Joe over the course of his career, and not so much with Miguel, who's had over 650 plate appearances in all but one season in recent memory . . .


It seemed somewhat obvious then what the Orioles preference was and that they hoped Tejada could take to the new position.

After the jump, thoughts on Tejada switching to third, his hitting, and the new projected win total.


Tejada will be learning a new position this year. He has not logged a single game at third base in the Majors during a career that has spanned 1846 games or 16097.2 innings in the field. His transition to the hot corner will be interesting as what has plagued him most as he has aged has been the reduction in his range. His hands and his arm still look sharp, the range has been the issue. Having not seen him much in Houston, I am not sure what is hurting that range. If it is just a decrease in speed (as was apparent in Baltimore) or a decrease in reaction time as well. The latter will have the most effect on him at third. We may see something similar to Melvin Mora where he actually played a few steps back to give himself more time to react to batted balls. Thankfully, no one really bunts anymore because Mora was often not in a position to field them well. Tejada might find himself in a similar place. I think we can probably expect something in the -5 to 0 runs above average defense from him at third. That might be slightly optimistic. It really all depends on his response time. I think his throwing motion is compact enough to not make that an issue.

Tejada has seen a gradual decline in his offensive abilities from his 2004 career year. Starting with his last season in Baltimore and his two in Houston, he has displayed a couple of interesting changes. First off, although his ISO has been fairly consistent in the .130 to .140 range, his HR/Fly rate has been cut dramatically from the mid teens to about 8%. He has made up for that dropped by increasing his contact rate (mid 80s to high 80s) and has largely done that by increasing his swing rate (40s to low 50s). He is one of the most prolific ball players over the past couple years in terms of contact rate. As one would expect, an increase in swing rate will often be matched by a decrease in walk rate. Tejada is not a prolific walker with a career line of 6.3%, but his rate of 2.8% was a severe drop from his peak years. All in all, his the rates suggest the Tejada is feeling the effects of aging. His lines are entering the phase of his career where you could potentially see a complete and utter drop in performance. His success will depend entirely on his contact rate as he has pretty much lost his other batting skills.

With so many prediction systems up these days, we have stopped working on our own as it seems we were only reinventing the wheel. Our laborious excel program just required too much time to update and any of the big five (CHONE, ZiPS, PECOTA, Bill James, MARCEL) are just as good to use with minor variations. For the projections this year, we chose CHONE. CHONE predicts Tejada to have a 297/333/434 line with -12 fielding at shortstop. I kept the offensive portion and modified the defensive portion to be league average defense (i.e. 0) at third. I also predicted him being able to garner 600 PA.

This places the current win projection at 77.8 wins. Under this scenario we have the following odds (using binomial distribution):

82:1 against losing 100 games
5:2 against a .500 record
42:1 against 90 wins
332:1 against 95 wins

Assuming a playoff threshold of 95 wins, the Orioles have a 0.3% chance to make the playoffs right now.

22 January 2010

Cost Efficiency of Pitchers and Hitters in the Free Market

Remember to follow Camden Depot on twitter to receive any new updates (@CamdenDepot).

Yesterday I posted an analysis on organizational rankings using John Sickels' grades (AL, NL) and the Wang methodology to determine worth. In that column, I wrote my suspicion that Wang underestimated the value of pitching prospects about half of what they are truly worth. The basis of that thought was how free agent pitchers are typically a rather poor buy in comparison to free agent hitters (which was rather anecdotal) and that ranking systems and trades seem to view positional and pitching prospects somewhat similarly. Why would this matter? Buying free agent pitching may be so inefficient that having a stable of young pitching prospects may be twice as valuable even though they have a low success rate.

Upon that idea, I decided to engage in a quick study analyzing the cost efficiency of free agent pitchers and position players. It is all after the jump.


Method:
Players included in this study were all individuals that received more than 5MM in total salary signed in the 2007 off season (pitchers, n=26; positional players, n=34; t-test, alpha=0.05). Players with contracts longer than three years only had salary earnings to this point included meaning that the only seasons addressed in this study are the 2007, 2008, and 2009 seasons. Five pitchers and seven positional players are still under contract with more total money devoted to the positional players. This means the numbers presented here are still dynamic. Metrics used were MM/WAR and WAR/MM (to avoid issues with 0 WAR players. Cost efficiency based on previous WAR production was derived from information at fangraphs.

Results and discussion:
Cost efficiency was significantly higher (p=0.03) in the positional players (0.20 WAR/MM; 0.04 SE) in comparison to pitchers (0.092 WAR/MM; 0.026 SE). Both of these means are less than the rates by which they were paid (0.24 WAR/MM). This is to be expected as players are typically paid with respect to what they have accomplished as opposed to what they will accomplish. Some risk management is utilized, but the team with the most optimistic projection or the team who is positioned competitively to more greatly value wins will likely succeed in signing the player. Another way to look at this information is by MM/WAR, which is the typical way this information is expressed. For instance, pitchers from 2006 have wound up getting paid 10.66MM per WAR. Positional players, on the other hand, have earned 5.46MM per WAR.

After taking into consideration that several contracts have yet to end, it appears unlikely that the findings presented here would change greatly. We would expect though that the cost efficiency for both populations would decrease more. Based on projections of a 0.5 WAR decrease for every remaining season under contract, we see a reduction for pitching cost efficiency from 0.092 WAR/MM to 0.089 WAR/MM and for positional players a decrease from 0.20 WAR/MM to 0.19 WAR/MM.

Conclusion:
In no way is this a conclusive piece of research. It is just a simple study used a somewhat small data set. The preliminary indications are that the system has already taken into account the free market cost to acquiring a pitcher versus growing your own. Pitchers are 53% less cost efficient than batters. In Wang's valuing of prospects, he has batter worth 49% more based on a weighted average of the top 100 prospects as ranked by Baseball America. If this is true, it casts doubt on how many try to use the Wang methodology to determine organizational worth. Wang's work appears to be best suited in comparing absolute worth of two different players outside of the pressures of the free market talent available to teams . . . more or less a closed system only considering MLB projection of MiL talent.

UPDATE: How would this change the prospect rankings?
Well, one way to do it would be to multiply the prospect worth as designated by the Wang approach by the factor difference between the the cost efficiency of pitchers and positional players. There are probably better ways, but this is a quick way to do it. Using this approach, pitching prospect values would be multiplied by 1.93 (using the WAR/MM numbers). The following would be organizational worth of the top 20 pitchers in each organization.

1. Rays
2. Rangers
3. Indians
4. Braves
5. Giants
6. Angels
7. Royals
8. Athletics
9. Dodgers
10. Brewers
11. Orioles
12. BoSox
13. Cubs
14. Rockies
15. Mets
16. Tigers
17. Reds
18. Padres
19. Pirates
20. Blue Jays
21. Astros
22. Nationals
23. Yankees
24. Marlins
25. Twins
26. Mariners
27. Cardinals
28. Phillies
29. ChiSox
30. Dbacks

Of the three lists I have shown in the past two days . . . this one actually looks the best to me.

21 January 2010

Minor League Rankings (thoughts on the Wang Methodology)

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I was emailed at the Sun Board about this post by dougdirt over at Minor League Ball (John Sickels' blog - rankings: AL, NL). The numbers seems a bit screwy to me even when taking into consideration how Wang's methodology views pitching prospects. To clarify, I think Wang's methodology undervalues pitchers because of their injury incidence. You see Wang's values are a product of how well a positional or pitching prospect, ranked at a certain level, does after that point in time. There is more variation in pitchers than hitters in large part as a result of a higher incidence of performance affecting injury. That could lead to the erroneous (in my opinion) conclusion that hitters are worth more than pitchers. I disagree with that because it forgets the other end of the equation.

You see, pitching performance is a volatile commodity. It means that a pitching prospect is quite a risky venture. It also means that a free agent pitcher is also a risky venture. By focusing on pitching prospects, your cost efficiency (cost per run given/earned) will be less than if you ignored pitching prospects and focused on drafting or acquiring hitting prospects. In that regard, I think Wang undervalues the cost savings of pitching prospects. If the system was closed and free agency had no relationship to payroll, then I would say these numbers would be valuable.

Regardless, I decided to take Wang's numbers and run them my own way using the spreadsheet dougdirt came up with (click here to see post with table). All of that after the jump.


I figured the best way to compare different teams was to only look on their top 20 prospects. Dougdirt did not do this. He focused instead on C+ prospects and above. This means that some teams did not receive credit for having C level prospects. I think this unfairly devalues the system and ruins the spectrum for comparison. C level prospects do have value as Wang himself noted. I did not feel like going back through my database, so I assumed that summed prospect totals less than 20 prospects would be filled with C level guys worth 1MM, which is roughly the middle point between hitting and pitching prospects at the C grade.

Here are the rankings I came up with using the modified Wang method:
1. Cleveland Indians 127.1MM
2. Oakland Athletics 124.1MM
3. Tampa Bay Rays 122.7MM
4. Atlanta Braves 117.6MM
5. Texas Rangers 111.3MM
6. San Francisco Giants 111.1MM
7. Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim 107MM
8. Chicago Cubs 106.8MM
9. Milwaukee Brewers 103.6MM
10. New York Mets 100.6MM
11. Boston Red Sox 99.7MM
12. Cincinatti Reds 96.4MM
13. San Diego Padres 95.4MM
14. Kansas City Royals 93.7MM
15. Los Angeles Dodgers 92.3MM
16. Detroit Tigers 91.1MM
17. Pittsburgh Pirates 90.7MM
18. Baltimore Orioles 86.2MM
19. Florida Marlins 83.5MM
20. Toronto Blue Jays 81.6MM
21. New York Yankees 81MM
22. Washington Nationals 80.3MM
23. Colorado Rockies 78.5MM
24. Houston Astros 77.3MM
25. Seattle Mariners 72.6MM
26. Minnesota Twins 69.8MM
27. Chicago White Sox 54.5MM
28. Philadelphia Phillies 54.3MM
--. St. Louis Cardinals 54.3MM
30. Arizona Diamondbacks 48.5MM

The rankings somewhat pass the smell test, but I do think Wang's method undervalues the true worth of developing your own pitching. Taking that into consideration, I decided that we should make hitting and pitching prospects worth the same. This assumption is defined as saying that the loss of production in terms of performance volatility is canceled out by the benefit in not having to rely on the free market cost of pitching. Under these guidelines the list would be:

1. Texas Rangers 146.5MM
2. Tampa Bay Rays 144.2MM
3. Cleveland Indians 125.8MM
4. Atlanta Braves 121.9MM
5. San Francisco Giants 117.5MM
6. Oakland Athletics 116.4MM
7. Baltimore Orioles 111.8MM
8. Chicago Cubs 108.7MM
9. Cincinnati Reds 107MM
10. New York Mets 106.8MM
11. Boston Red Sox 106.4MM
12. Washington Nationals 106MM
13. San Diego Padres 104.8MM
--. Detroit Tigers 104.8MM
15. Kansas City Royals 104.4MM
16. Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim 104.1MM
17. Los Angeles Dodgers 102.5MM
18. Milwaukee Brewers 100.2MM
19. Colorado Rockies 94.4MM
20. Toronto Blue Jays 92.8MM
21. Florida Marlins 91MM
22. Pittsburgh Pirates 93.4MM
23. Houston Astros 78.4MM
24. New York Yankees 77.2MM
25. Seattle Mariners 72MM
26. Minnesota Twins 64MM
27. Chicago White Sox 62.4MM
28. St. Louis Cardinals 53.5MM
29. Philadelphia Phillies 50MM
30. Arizona Diamondbacks 47.3MM

These rankings actually look more accurate to me. It would be nice to see something a little more quantitative than just assuming that the market has figured itself out, but I have no time for that right now. An interesting note here, if Brian Matusz did not qualify for prospect status, the Orioles would have sunk to the 24th ranked system in baseball. This is pretty similar to the argument last year with Matt Wieters.

The Orioles have been pretty lucky to basically make up for the underlying talent. Next year will be another big test on the organizational pipeline. Potential A talent could come in the form of Josh Bell, Zach Britton . . . maybe Snyder, but I doubt it. I imagine the team will have several B and B+ players next year, but no As.

20 January 2010

Garrett Atkins Power



A few weeks back, Daniel Moroz over at Camden Crazies posted the observation that Garrett Atkins home runs have been whittled down to pull shots. He mentions that Atkins use to have more of an "all fields" power, which I do not think is very debatable. I think Moroz' point was not to say that Atkins utilizes all fields, but that there were home runs to right. As in, it was not a true talent assessment. It was a descriptive observation.

Atkins has always been a pull power hitter. It was just that sometimes he managed to hit a couple in right center. In my opinion a true power to all fields type of hitter would have more of a spread distribution. Such a hitter is also typically more of a level plane hitter as an uppercut swing is more difficult to alter timing on for outside pitches. It seems this sort of hitter more often comes early (grounders) or late (infield and short outfield popups) than getting meaningful contact.

After the jump, I'll go into my analysis of Atkins.


Here are two charts of Atkins hit performance. First is his 2008 season and second is his 2009 season. What you will notice is a general power depression. His hit dispersal is still roughly the same rate. It is just the average flight distance has dropped about 10 feet. This follows suit with the numbers. He still delivers a flyball rate just past 40% and his HR/Fly rate decreased from 9.9% to 7.3%. If you look at Moroz' graphs, you will get a similar conclusion just by looking at the proportion of balls leaving the park and traveling 400 ft. Atkins just does not have the power anymore.





I think it is fairly safe to assume two things:

1. Atkins will not reach back to his mid-aughts power days.
2. He perform slightly better than he did last year now that he has moved to a smaller park.

19 January 2010

AL East Best Under-26 Team: Part 3 - Second Base

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Series Links
Intro / C / 1B / 2B / 3B / SS / OF / RHP / LHP / CL

I'll be finalizing the rankings for Parts 3 - 5, with MJ coming back for the RHP. Second base isn't particularly deep in the AL East Under-26 grouping, with our top-rated player still profiling best as a utility guy at this point.

The full list with brief write-ups after the jump...

1. Sean Rodriguez / Tampa Bay Rays (AAA/Durham)

Height/Weight - 6-1/215 / Born - 4/26/1985 / Bats/Throws - R/R
Stats - Fangraphs / Baseball-Reference / MinorLeagueSplits

Rodriguez is a bat first utility man that fits best as a second baseman in a full-time role. Similar to Brandon Wood, Rodriguez boasts an above-average raw power tool with limited in-game value at the Major League level until he shows an ability to improve his contact rate (in 216 plate appearances he has picked-up 62 strikeouts -- or 28.7%). Also like Wood, there is little left for Rodriguez to accomplish at the AAA level, posting consecutive seasons of over 1.000 OPS in '08 and '09, while hitting a total of 51 homeruns in that same period.

Defensively, Rodriguez is the definition of average. He has limited range and just enough athleticism to turn adequate pivots. His arm strength plays best at the four-spot. With Zobrist in place at second, Rodriguez could compete for a utility spot, along with fellow middle-infielder Reid Brignac. His shortcomings in the strikeout department are tied more to an inability to control the strikezone than any issues with bat speed or holes. At this point, he'll just need to get the reps and either sink or swim. The potential is there for an average-fielding, 6-hole bat with some pop.


2. David Adams / New York Yankees (A-Adv./Tampa)

Height/Weight - 6-2/190 / Born - 5/15/1987 / Bats/Throws - R/R
Stats - Fangraphs / Baseball-Reference / MinorLeagueSplits


Adams was one of our favorite middle-infield targets in the 2008 draft, potentially providing Top 50 value out of the late third round. The former UVA Cavalier has taken his professional approach at the plate at the college ranks and transitioned well to the low-minors. Thus far, he's walked in a little over 10% of his professional plate appearances, posting just 1.5 strikeouts per base-on-balls. Adams has a lot of moving parts in his swing, and it remains to be seen whether or not it will continue to play at the upper-levels. A reasonable projection has Adams carving-out a career as a solid average regular, with no spectacular tools but enough defensive value to make a .750-775 OPS playable out of the bottom-third of the order. There is top-of-the-order upside if Adams shows enough gap-to-gap pop to force upper-level pitching to respect him (if not, his plate discipline will be negated by pitchers coming right at him looking for weak contact).


3. Brad Emaus / Toronto Blue Jays (AA/New Hampshire)
Height/Weight - 5-11/200 / Born: 3/28/1986 / Bats/Throws - R/R
Stats - Fangraphs / Baseball-Reference / MinorLeagueSplits


Despite an unimpressive slash line of .253/.336/.376, Emaus turned in an encouraging performance at AA/New Hampshire in 2009. The first positive sign was his ability to maintain the near 1:1 SO:BB ratio he'd posted the prior year at A-Adv./Dunedin, while again walking in
over 10% of his plate appearances. The second positive sign was that his linedrive, fly ball and ground ball percentages were each almost identical to previous year, while he saw a heavy dip in his BABIP of almost 50 points (.050). This could indicate that his 2009 slash line was negatively impacted by a disproportionate amount of poor luck on batted balls. This is somewhat backed-up by his solid showing in the Arizona Fall League (.317/.391/.417), albeit in just under 70 plate appearances. Defensively, Emaus will struggle to maintain average production, due to his limited range and athleticism. He'll be one to watch in 2010, as we look to see if his offensive production bounces back along with his BABIP. He could get a shot at Toronto as an end-of-the-season call-up if all goes well.



HM. Justin Turner / Baltimore Orioles
(AAA/Norfolk)
Height/Weight - 5-11/180 / Born - 11/23/1984 / Bats/Throws - R/R
Stats - Fangraphs / Baseball-Reference / MinorLeagueSplits


Turner (pictured) projected as a utility man at the start of
2009 and a solid, if unspectacular, season did little to change that. Turner continues to show an excellent understanding of the strikezone (34 BB/37 SO over 441 PA), while employing a semi-aggressive approach at the plate. He shows little in the way of usable power and will rely almost exclusively on OBP to provide offensive value at the ML-level. As mentioned above with regards to Adams, Turner will need to show enough gap-to-gap pop to make pitchers respect him, and if he does his solid footwork and range in the field should be enough to complete the picture. At best, Turner could be a serviceable regular at second base for a non-tier-one club. At worst, he tops out as a AAAA bat just shy of enough strength for his offensive approach to translate.

Derrik Gibson (Boston Red Sox) was also considered for this spot. A solid showing at Short-season Lowell was enough to put him on our watch list, but he's too far away to rank ahead of the four others mentioned above.