Brian Roberts and the General Aging Curve

The recent talk about potentially acquiring Rickie Weeks for Brian Roberts has brought up an uneasy reality. Brian Roberts will not be an above average second baseman for much longer. Many of us remember when he was battling Jerry Hairston, Jr. for playing time or impersonating a home run king. Many of us remember him breaking his arm and the 18 months it took for him to get back to his playing shape. During this dark period of Orioles history, Brian Roberts was the brightest and biggest star we had. He sometimes wondered aloud if the Orioles had any intention of becoming competitive, but he never whined about it or demanded a trade. He has been a near perfect ball player (what hGH?).

The problem now is that we have a time line in terms of when the Orioles will be competitive. We are not competitive right now. We are about three very good players from that point. We need upgrades at first base, third base, and shortstop. We probably need one at DH, too. Our pitching, at the moment, is solidly average. This offseason we could address first base with Teixeira and SS with Furcal. Nothing looks like a steep improvement in the following free agent class. That is the basic problem we have. We can improve in the short-term, but not the long term. This is where Brian Roberts falls. He is great for us in the short-term, but not for the long-term. His ability is probably worth about 3 games to us over a replacement level 2b, but when the difference is between 78 and 75 wins . . . what is the point? It makes sense to use his talent and exchange it for a piece or pieces that will actually be able to contribute in the future.

Now, some would argue that the point of baseball is to win games and that sending away talent is foolish. Well, that is simply short-sighted. Baseball is not about winning games. It is about winning championships. You are doing one of two things in baseball if you are successful: 1) sustaining a championship caliber team or 2) building a championship caliber team. Trying to be a 78 win team instead of a 75 win team does not always mean you are closing the gap toward becoming a champion. What shocks me is that people do not understand that this method of playing the middle is what we have done for 10 years. We have many examples of this behavior:
1. Signing Ramon Hernandez
2. Signing Dannys Baez, Chad Bradford, and Jamie Walker
3. Trading for Kris Benson
4. Trading for Jaret Wright
and so on and so on.
Spending millions of dollars that could be spent on signing bonuses to high contract demand draftees or exploiting latin american talent is where this money should go. We should not be giving up 10 MM or so and a draft pick for Dannys Baez. These short term moves immobilizes cash flow and places it in diminishing return investments. It has been thought that free agents place winning high in their choices of going somewhere or not. Well, that is true to an extent. What is also true is that if you marginalize yourself with 78 win talent, you may get the occasional free agent. It should be recognized that few good players hit free agency at a young age due to the increasing commonality of signing extensions. Acquiring marginal talent is an incredibly inefficient way to build a team. Out of the 100 MM dollars spent on the six players itemized, how many top tier amateur domestic and international players could we have signed? That is the problem with trying to net free agents through slight increases in play. You undercut your minor league player development with guys who you can sign as opposed to who is the best player.

So, yes, Brian Roberts is approaching that stage. He is a very good second baseman, but we are devoting money to him that will not help us become a championship team. To the right is a generalized age curve (from The Hardball Times). That should fit Brian Roberts age curve somewhat well. He is a second baseman, which narrows the curve. He also has above average power and great plate discipline, so that should extend it to about where it is now. It is pretty amazing how the graph matches Roberts career line. Right now his OPS+ is 121. In the projection under unlimited number of at bats, this is what we could expect:
2008 110 OPS+
2009 109 OPS+
2010 103 OPS+
2011 94 OPS+
2012 90 OPS+
2013 73 OPS+
The italics denote what an average 2B hits. It should be noted that this worth is with respect to average defensive play. Roberts play, which was very good three years ago, has been in steady decline since. This year he is actually below average. Based on UZR, he is the fifth worst defensive second baseman in the game. This could be the result of having played only a third of the season, but I doubt that changes much. In all likelihood, Roberts will be an average 2B in 2010 as opposed to 2012. By the time he is 34, he will be a bench player. His past career may be able to keep him a roster spot. He should be out of baseball by the time he is 37. Now, I should add the caveat that this is the generalized aging curve. He may be different as I mentioned before i think his eye and his slight power has him keep the curve even though he plays second base.

To compare with other second basemen, I have written a list of All Star 2B and when they became roughly average (solely based on batting, inclusion of fielding may reduce these by a year or two):
Willie Randolph 35 (last year 37)
Manny Trillo 31 (last year 38)
Lou Whittaker 37 (last year 38)
Steve Sax 31 (last year 34)
Roberto Alomar 33 (last year 36)
Carlos Baerga 26 (last year 36)
Ryne Sandberg 33 (last year 36)
Tommy Herr 33 (last year 35)
Mariano Duncan 30 (last year 34)
Jay Bell 34 (last year 37)
This list is filled with guys who had significant power, speed, and/or plate discipline. Almost across the board you see precipitous decline in performance with second basemen. The best you could hope for within these comps is Willie Randolph. With the increasing likelihood that Roberts has issues with defending his position, I'm not sure Randolph is a good comp because Brian might have to shift off 2B.

Should we extend Roberts contract if he wishes to stay in Baltimore?
Well, it depends. We can trade him now for cheaper talent that is more likely to increase our ability to contend as well as increase cash flow for reinvestment. Or, we can extend him at market value (~10MM) for four seasons (2010-2013) for average to below average production from a 2B. I would like to say Roberts is an essential piece toward attaining a championship in Baltimore. In fact, that is probably true. Sadly, his contribution will be to be traded for cheaper talent that will be better than Roberts when this franchise is able to hold its own against the best teams in the league.

Stotle: M.I.A.

Hi All,

Sorry I've been missing this week. I'm working on the review of the Orioles Draft (which looks like it will be broken into four pieces). I'm out until next week but hope to have this stuff up shortly thereafter.

Other upcoming topics:
- a look at the Depot's Top 20 Orioles Prospects (Multi-Part)
- a look at some prospects to consider come trading season (by organization)
- Scouting the Cape Cod League

We will potentially be covering one or more high school showcases this summer, but that will depend on timing.

Hope to talk to you all soon. Until then I leave you in Crawdaddy's capable hands.

Best,
Stot

Revisiting Liz's Debut: Fastball Release Point

Today I was going to write about the effect of manager ejections on team performance. Well, I have to cross reference a couple databases to do this and it has been a lot of manual work. I am nowhere near done answering this question in a meaningful way. What I will focus on today was something that was left out of the Liz study I put up last week. It has actually been eating on me and I have been trying to figure out how to show it. I have decided to just do it visually.


Strikes and Balls by Location
My first stab at determining how release point affects control was to use the arrival point as an indication of a ball or strike and compare that to the release point (graph to the right). What you see are two populations. The fastball group is located a little to the bottom and right of the ball group. The difference between the two is clear, but there is overlap. Primarily, the ball group has a lower density as well. A problem that may arise from this analysis is that a ball thrown to the dead center of the strike zone has a lot of room for error and still be considered an accurate pitch. Meanwhile, a pitch on the boundary of the strike zone will have less room for error before considered a poor pitch. This might be the cause for much of the overlap.



Strikes as Called and BABIP
To try to add some sort of qualitative nature to the issue here, I am going beyond pitch arrival location and focusing on the definition of an accurate pitch as one that results in a strike or a ball in play. What we see here is a lot more definition out of the strike release point. Anything over 6.3 feet looks like there is an issue with accuracy. You may notice the strike that has a release point north of 6.5. That one, as expected, resulted in a high fastball. It was chased and hit foul. You can see with this method that the overlap in balls vs strike is decreasing, but there still seems to be a mix in some locations of his release point.







Relating Vertical Release Point to High Fastballs
This is something we all know. Release the ball early and it rides high. One thing that is interesting is that all but five fastballs were within the horizontal bounds of the strike zone. This seems to suggest that Liz doesn't have a horizontal control issue, but that his main problem is not repeating the same release point. The graph shows his issue with high fastballs. He has a high release point. He'll need to be more disciplined in his mechanics to be more effective. As is, he will have difficulty keeping the ball down in the zone. You will notice that the overlap is far less on this graph.

This looks fixable.

Odds Update: PECOTA Was Being Coy

There seems to be a lot more convergence over the past three weeks. The good folks over at BP have acknowledged that their PECOTA-based odds system was fixed as opposed to dynamic. I have done my best to backtrack and project where PECOTA would have been in the process of predicting the end of season record. I am also updating my own projections on a weekly basis.

PECOTA ODDS - 1:100
ELO - 1:20

Looking for a Deal: Rickie Weeks

Ken Rosenthal recently wrote how the Brewers have been scouting the Orioles lately. The supposed targets are Brian Roberts and, potentially, George Sherrill.

Here's a deal that makes sense: Brian Roberts for Rickie Weeks. The Brewers, who recently had two scouts watching the Orioles, are interested in Roberts, but it remains to be seen whether they are ready to give up on Weeks.
Roberts, a more accomplished leadoff hitter and better defender than Weeks, is a more natural fit for a contender. The Orioles, meanwhile, could be patient with Weeks defensively, much as the Twins are being patient with the erratic Carlos Gomez. Weeks would be another young, athletic building block to go with Adam Jones and Nick Markakis.
A straight-up deal might be out of the question, considering that Roberts is a free agent after next season while Weeks is under club control through 2011. But the Orioles could add a young pitcher or even one of their veteran relievers while perhaps getting another piece back in return.

I agree that a straight up deal, Roberts for Weeks, would be incredibly in our favor. Weeks is a young talent who has shown flashes of power and OBP skills, but his defensive ability leaves a bit of a need for improvement. To trade him for Roberts seems like a heavy dose of short term thinking on the Brewers part. This is especially true with regard to the Cub juggernaut. Where it does make sense for them is that Roberts is one of the few ideal lead off men in the game. He has speed and he gets on base. He plays average defense and he has a little pop. He probably will not be a league average 2B for another couple years, so you don't lose as much in the long term as you may gain in the short term.

George Sherrill is another player the Brewers may want. Gagne has failed as a closer and Salomon Torres is not someone to count on. Sherrill has a decent track record and is cost controlled. He would be an obvious target player for the Brewers to shore up their pen. The Orioles also have options to replace him. They can plug Jim Johnson back there or they could give Adam Loewen the role when he returns from his farm rehab. I guess most people know I have been down on Loewen for a while now. I think he'll settle in as a 4 pitcher and think that as a closer he has more immediate value to us. If we need him to start next year, we can stretch him out in spring training. Also, Trembley has already stated Loewen is going to be in the pen the rest of the year.

My suggestion:
Brian Roberts, 2B
George Sherrill, Cl
for
Rickie Weeks, 2B
Matt LaPorta, LF/DH
Brent Brewer, SS

With Corey Hart and Ryan Braun in the outfield, LaPorta is probably somewhat expendable. There is concern that with Fielder heading out one of these days that LaPorta's most likely destination would be 1B, but I think Mat Gamel and Taylor Green will be ready by the time Fielder exits. Mat Gamel might be ready next year. Gamel's superior hitting this year in AA and ability to play 3B most likely makes him more valuable to the Brewers than LaPorta (I think LaPorta is their best guy though). Brent Brewer is a young incredibly toolsy SS. He has not been able to hit for a lick, but he is fast and has a lot of projection to grow. We need guys like this in our system. I also think the Brewers prefer Alicedes Escobar anyway.

I think this would be a fair deal. If the Orioles could squeeze a little bit more out of the Brewers, I'd probably think that Caleb Gindl could be had.

What Andy MacPhail Has Reaped?

This post will be focused on whether or not MacPhail has made the Baltimore Orioles better in the present. This analysis will not consider draft picks, which are primarily dependent upon the scouting department and not the GM these days. This analysis will also view value as value. As in if we traded from a position with depth, we should still expect equal value in return. Players acquired who are in the minors will not count until they actually help the Major League club. The way we will look at this will be via win shares. Oh, and yes, this idea is kind of an extended look at what Dempsey's Army has set up in it's margins (thanks for the idea!). DA only took into consideration trades, I want to have a more inclusive look. I am assuming that Andy Macphail's ability will be reflected in his ability to get a positive win share differential in total and within four areas: trades, free agency, waiver wire, and rule 5 acquisitions. I will mentioned mainly players who have played in the Majors after a move, but not those who wound up out of baseball or mired in the Minors.

Trades
MacPhail has engaged in six trades:

2007
John Parrish for Sebastion Boucher
Money for Victor Santos
Money for Victor Zambrano
Steve Trachsel for Scott Moore, Rocky Cherry, and Jake Renshaw

The 2007 season trades resulted in a total win shares of -0.1. This is calculated by adding all of the win shares that the Orioles gained (-1.1) and subtracted it by the win shares the Orioles gave (-1). Needless to say, everyone seems to have lost in these deals. Of all players involved, only Scott Moore had a positive win share value. Now, there is a possibility that Scott Moore becomes a decent guy off the bench, Cherry may have a couple good relief seasons, and Renshaw may find his ways to the majors as a relief pitcher . . . so, this could become more in the Orioles favor.

2007 Offseason
Miguel Tejada for Troy Patton, Luke Scott, Mike Costanzo, Dennis Safarte, and Matt Albers
Eric Bedard for Adam Jones, George Sherrill, Chris Tillman, Tony Butler, and Kam Mikolio

The offseason deals were successful for all teams involved, but more immediately successful for the Orioles. Tejada has done well in his stint with the Astros as he has garnered 9.6 win shares and is on pace to match his 2005 performance level. Eric Bedard has not been so lucky with injuries and a couple poor outings limiting him to 2.3 win shares a third of the way through the season (last year he had 18.7). In total we gave up 11.9 win shares. In return we received 23.9 win shares from Luke Scott, Matt Albers, Dennis Safarte, Adam Jones, and George Sherrill. That is a difference of 12 ws or 4 wins. This is a difference that I imagine will become larger as time passes. Tejada, even at Minute Maid, is experiencing a decrease in power production. Bedard still can look amazing on some nights, but he seems to have some lingering injury issues this year. It is also arguable if the Mariners will be able to sign him.

In total, Andy MacPhail's trades have netted us 11.9 win shares.

Free Agency
The part of the evaluation is not as kind as the former.
Gained
2007
Fernando Cabrera (I believe he was signed and not claimed)
2007 Offseason
Guillermo Quiroz, Steve Trachsel, Alex Cintron, and Lance Cormier
Let Go
2007 Offseason
Gustavo Molina, and Corey Patterson

Cabrera (-1.5) and Trachsel (-2.4) overwhelm the positive contributions of Quiroz (0.5), Citron (0.3), and Cormier (1). Most of the people who we have let go do not play in the majors and some are absent from any professional league located in the continental United States. Gustavo Molina has evened himself out with the Mets (-0.2 hitting, 0.2 fielding) and Corey Patterson managed to defend his way to 1.1 win shares before being demoted for Jay Bruce. Although the Orioles have not been big players in free agency, MacPhail has basically gotten nothing out of it so far. As the season wears on, this number should shift toward the positive end as Cintron, Cormier, and most likely Cabrera will contributed for the ML squad. Of course, this assumes they will give a positive contribution, which is certainly not a given.

The free agency win shares total is -3.2.

Waiver Wire

We have only had two waiver wire acquisitions that have contributed to the Major league squad: Gustavo Molina (0.2) and Greg Aquino (-1.5). We have given up three players who have helped other clubs: Kurt Birkins (1.4), Chris Gomez (2.5), and Jeff Fiorentino (0.3). It should be noted that Fiorentino is now back in Norfolk, so his contribution there is not going to change much. This section looks like it will shift more against us. MacPhail, in his short time here, has not been much in terms of a GM who acquires talent on waivers. It may be that nothing was available.

The waiver wire total is -5.8.

Rule 5

Well, this is a short compilation as in the one year MacPhail has been in charge we have acquired one Major League player and given none up. Randor Bierd has contributed 1.4 win shares.

Conclusion
Trades.................... +11.9
Free Agency............... -3.2
Waiver Wire............... -5.8
Rule 5.................... +1.4
Total..................... +4.3

Wins...................... +1.4

In these four areas, MacPhail has done poorly in free agency and the waiver wire. It should be noted that neither is catastrophic. Our free agency misses were spent on one year deals. The same is true with respect to what we gave away. The waiver wire costs were for a journeyman reliever (Birkins) and a utility guy (Gomez). Those two areas represented a cost of 3 losses. Some of those positions are tempered due to the trades, which have been a major source of talent for the squad. Jones replaced Patterson and that is a positive move. Safarte or Albers replaced Birkins, so that was a plus. Tejada has done well, but as the years pass . . . it should go more into the Orioles favor. The same is true with Bedard, but our end should also increase in value. The Rule 5 section should also shift in the O's favor.

Overall, MacPhail has done well. As the years pass and the younger talent emerges, this should become even more clear. He has been able to find a way to make the team far less expensive to run and far richer in talent. He does seem to ignore the waiver wire, but often the players available that have any worth are though in which we have redundancies (i.e. Dan Johnson).

Current Major League Value Grade = C+
Longterm Projected ML Value Grade = B+

2008 Shadow Draft

How The Draft Was Run

The intent was to do this during the draft in conjunction with each of Baltimore's first five selections. Though our draft day coverage was cut short due to the demands of the real world, the Shadow Draft has been run. Each pick was made without taking into account the actual happenings in later rounds -- in other words we did not note where various players went and then draft accordingly (we'll point out players we missed out on and overdrafts we may have made). We will follow the careers of these players, occasionally comparing their progress with the progress of the actual players drafted by Baltimore. And now, on to our draft!

1:4 -- Brian Matusz (SP) University of San Diego
6'4" : 200 lbs : B/T (L/L)
1.71/1.00, 105 IP, 22 BB, 141 SO, 83 H, .211 BAA
Scouted: Film

Brian Matusz makes history as the first member of the Camden Depot Shadow Farm System, and what a building block he'll be. Since we've already provided a fairly in-depth scouting report (linked above) and will be examining Matusz in our Orioles recap, we will not spend much time on him here. He has the potential for four above-average Major League pitches and some tweaks to his motion could increase his velocity (it currently sits anywhere from 88 to 92). He'll move quickly through the system and while many place him as a future #2 we are confident that with some work he could be a staff anchor.

Actual Draft Slot: 1:4 (Baltimore Orioles)

MLB Scouting Video: Available at the Orioles Draft Recap

Notes: Many of our readers insist that Justin Smoak was the pick we should have made. While Smoak should be an excellent producer, we felt a polished lefty with room for growth and an advanced repertoire on the mound was more valuable to our system. A case can be made for each but we are satisfied Matusz was the correct pick, here.



2:4 -- Tim Melville (SP) Holt High School (Missouri)
6'5" : 210 lbs : B/T (R/R)
3.00/1.00, 47 IP, 15 BB, 72 SO, 32 H
Scouted: Film

It's difficult to know whether Melville tumbled due to an uneven showing this past high school season or because of signability concerns. Either way, we couldn't let the opportunity to land a second preseason top 10 selection pass us by. Melville is a big body who already possesses above-average arm strength. His arsenal consists of a low 90s fastball, an inconsistent knucklecurve with good depth and plus-potential and a changeup that is currently a "show me" pitch. Mechanically, he is sound, though there is certainly room for improvement. He doesn't do a good job of centering over the rubber, instead tending to start towards home before the apex of his leg kick. There is plenty of room in his frame for him to thicken and, accordingly, add even more velocity. He's far from a finished product, but the upside is undeniable and his tool set and raw stuff is first rate. Melville will be a tough sign, but we have plenty saved after cutting payroll -- we saw this as our chance to make this draft a success with two picks alone.

Actual Draft Slot: 4:3 (Kansas City Royals)

MLB Scouting Video: Available at the Royals Draft Recap

Notes: Though Melville would have been available at 3:4, it turns out not to matter as we likely would have selected Kieschnick here anyway.


3:4 -- Roger Kieschnick (OF) Texas Tech
6'3" : 215 lbs : B/T (L/R)
.305/.407/.632, 220 AB, 15 2B, 3 3B, 17 HR, 35 BB, 42 SO
Scouted: July 20, 2007 -- USA vs. Cuba (Film)

Roger Kieschnick is a great get for our system in the third round. We were close to selecting him at 2:4 and were thrilled to find him still on the board one round later. Again, our focus was trying to identify potential first round talents and Kieschnick more than makes the grade. His largest shortcoming this season was being a little too aggressive at the plate, striking out 42 times while walking only 35. He was successful at the plate last season (posting a batting average 50 points higher than this season), but his '08 struggles have (unfoundedly, we think) forced scouts to question his offensive approach.

Further, we disagree with scouts who have said there isn't enough in his lower half to generate power at the next level. He opens his hips a little early and gets the bat head out in front, limiting some of his power to "pull-side". Still he was able to generate adequate power this season (over half of his hits went for extra bases) as well as with a wood bat last summer with Team USA (over a third of his hits went for extra bases). We're confident there is plus-power potential here. His bat is otherwise clean through its swing plane, though some looseness in his lead arm would allow him to better get inside the ball and drive it to the opposite field. Defensively, Kieschnick flashes a plus-arm and takes clean lines to the ball, making him an excellent fit in right field. He also flashes above-average speed. He is a potential five-tool outfielder with moderate questions surrounding his swing -- an easy pick for us at 3:4.

Actual Draft Slot: 3:5 (San Francisco Giants)

MLB Scouting Video: Available at the Giants Draft Recap

Notes: After passing on Kieschnick in Round 2, we would have considered James Darnell (3B) University of South Carolina here had he still been around. Dave Adams (2B) University of Virginia was the target for Round 4.


4:4 -- Brandon Crawford (SS) University of California - Los Angeles
6'2" : 200 lbs : B/T (L/R)
.302/.394/.491, 13 2B, 5 3B, 7 HR, 31 BB, 59 SO
Scouted: March 1, 2008 vs. Bethune-Cookman (Film)

Sticking with the theme of first round upside, Brandon Crawford is an easy selection at 4:4. Our hope was that David Adams (2B) University of Virginia would fall past the third, but Crawford is a fine consolation prize. The two middle-infielders were attractive for similar reasons -- both displayed future first round talent in their freshman and sophomore years before suffering through down junior campaigns. Crawford struggled last summer in the Cape Cod League, and his uncertainty at the plate carried over through the start of the season. Dating back to the Cape, he has been pressing rather than letting his game flow naturally. As his struggled continued, he pressed harder -- regularly lunging at pitches and frequently showing signs of frustration. He has demonstrated a potential for plus-power, but he'll have to improve his contact rate to realize it.

Though uncomfortable at the plate this year, Crawford was again clean and true in the field. He ranges well to both sides and charges the ball well. His footwork is advanced and his plus-arm will easily play at the next level. Even if his bat doesn't mature, his floor is a great utility option with the ability to play any infield position at the next level -- fine value in the fourth round. If he's able to find his swing, he could be a solid everyday player. Now that he is starting his pro career, he should be able to put his struggles behind him and just focus on playing. With lowered expectations, some of the spotlight should be off him, allowing him to develop at his own pace.

Actual Draft Slot: 4:5 (San Francisco Giants)

MLB Scouting Video: Available at the Giants Draft Recap

Notes: Crawford is a high risk pick, but in our estimate a reasonable risk for the fourth round. We would have preferred the offensive upside of David Adams but are confident Crawford will be a nice start to building solid speed and defensive depth up the middle.



5:4 -- Brian Humphries (OF) Granite Hills High School (Calif.)
6'3" : 190 lbs : B/T (L/R)
.390 AVG / .602 SLG, 98 AB, 8 2B, 3 3B, 2 HR
Scouted: Film

We fell in love with Brian Humphries's tool set and frame (which we project could eventually produce plus-power at the Major League level). He has an average arm in CF, fringe-above-average speed and fringe-above-average defense. As he fills out his frame and becomes more comfortable with his size, he should show steady improvement in his consistency in the field (which has been a red flag for some scouts).

His offensive game is unrefined, but his size and above-average hand-eye coordination has produced flashes of brilliance at various showcases. He tends to hit off of his front foot a bit too much, and his swing tends to get a little tight and herky-jerky from stride to contact. Humphries is committed to Pepperdine, so this is another signability pick that we believe is worth the investment. Baseball America agrees that three years from now Humphries could be among the top talents in the 2011 draft -- we'd like that development to happen in our farm system rather than at Pepperdine.

Actual Draft Slot: 19:30 (Boston Red Sox)

MLB Scouting Video: Available at the Red Sox Draft Recap

Notes: Humphries's drop to the 19th round was likely tied to signability issues. As noted above, our approach was to identify the best talent available and pursue it aggressively.

Grading Ourselves

While this may not be the way that Major League teams approach the draft, we considered Baltimore's reduced payroll to be an excuse to up our draft budget by a couple of million dollars. Matusz has been rumored to be be highly signable (for close to slot) as he's apparently eager to get his pro season started. There should be enough in our budget to aggressively pursue Melville. I'd go so far as to offer top 10 money, which I firmly believe to be enough to keep him out of Chapel Hill. Prior to the start of the season, there was no indication that his commitment was rock solid.

Kieschnick and Crawford represent high upside picks that we feel are not as risky as the stats may make them out to be. Both have shown a track record of success prior to their respective hiccups in 2008. Both have tool sets that should allow them to provide value both in the field and at the plate, regardless of if they fully realize their ceiling with regards to both aspects of their games.

Humphries represents our attempt to land a first round talent three years before he's developed into that talent. Again, there was no indication entering the season that Humphries was unsignable, though it will certainly take an aggressive offer. He has the frame and base skill set to ultimately develop into an above-average Major Leaguer (though his tools are all only fringe-above-average right now).

Let us know what you think -- we'll update you as soon as our players sign!